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Few topics are sexier among commentators on corporate governance now
than whether activist hedge funds are good for, a danger to, or of no real consequence to public corporations and the people who depend upon them. As
beﬁts tradition in this space, catchy pejoratives caught on, and the phenomenon of concerted action by hedge funds and other more traditional money
managers, such as actively traded mutual funds who often encourage and support the investment strategy of the alpha wolf, to inﬂuence public companies’
business plans has been deemed “wolf pack activism.”
For a term so evocative of dangers to the ﬂesh, the debates over wolf packs,
and more generally the topic of hedge fund activism, have a surprisingly bloodless quality—one that uses abstraction and distancing to obscure what may be
really at stake. In the back and forth about short-term effects on stock price,
Tobin’s Q, survivorship bias, and the like, the ﬂesh-and-blood human beings
our corporate governance system is supposed to serve get lost.
But, unless we consider the economic realities of these ordinary human investors and how those realities bear on what is best for them, we are not focused on what is most important in assessing the public policies shaping our
corporate governance system. Stated in a somewhat crude but generally accurate way, we started with a system that reﬂected some implicit assumptions, including that:






stockholders had a long-term stake in the company’s best interests;
most stockholders owned their shares directly, for their own beneﬁt,
and held them for lengthy periods;
the stockholders who were most active and vocal were those who had
the longest-term stake in the corporation;
when corporations became more proﬁtable, they tended to create more
jobs, pay workers better, and create positive externalities for the communities within which they operated;
corporations had a national, and often regional focus, and their managers, directors, employees, lenders, and even stockholders often had
ties of loyalty to those communities; and, ﬁnally,
corporate managers were well but not lavishly paid, a plan of internal
succession was common, and corporate managers tended to live in the
community where the corporation was headquartered and be engaged
in community affairs.

In recent decades, these assumptions have been undermined and often
turned upside down:


corporate stockholder bases turn over rapidly;
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most stock is owned by institutional investors, but represents the capital of largely silent human investors, and many of these institutional
investors engage in much greater portfolio turnover;
the actual human investors whose capital is ultimately at stake are bystanders and do not vote;
the most vocal and active stockholders tend to be the ones with the investment strategies most in tension with the efficient market hypothesis, and often involve hedge funds who only became stockholders after
deciding to change the company and who have no prior interest in the
company’s well-being;
the tie between increasing corporate prosperity and the best interests of
corporate workers has been sharply eroded, with corporations not
sharing productivity gains with workers in their pay and focusing on
offshoring and job and wage cuts as methods to increase proﬁts;
corporations increasingly have no national, much less community,
identity and are willing to not only arbitrage their communities against
each other, but also to abandon their national identity for tax savings;
and, ﬁnally,
top corporate managers have been promised pay packages way out of
line with other managers, but in exchange must focus intently on stock
price growth and be willing to treat other corporate constituencies callously if that is necessary to please the stock market’s short-term wishes.

Indeed, as we shall see, these human investors are not so much citizens of
the corporate governance republic as they are the voiceless and choiceless many
whose economic prospects turn on power struggles among classes of haves
who happen to control the capital—of all kinds—of typical American investors.
And for all the talk of creating an ownership society, close to half of Americans
do not have any investments in equity securities, even in the form of 401(k)
and individual retirement account (IRA) investments in mutual funds. As or
even more important to the current topic, typical Americans who are investors
in the equity markets remain primarily dependent on wage employment for
their wealth, and the wealth they can deploy as owners of equity capital is not
controlled directly by them. Instead, the power of their capital is wielded by
others. Most traditionally, of course, we focus on corporate managers as exemplifying that reality, the so-called separation of ownership from control. But
now most Americans’ direct investments in equities and debt are controlled by
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professional money managers,1 from whom escape is virtually impossible. I
have called this phenomenon the “separation of ownership from ownership.”2
The republic upon which typical Americans depend is one where the debate is
between corporate-manager agents and money-manager agents, both of whom
have different interests than ordinary human investors.
The nature of this republic must be understood if we are to assess how to
address the emergence of activist hedge funds as a powerful force acting upon
public companies. Assuming or pretending that the proxy voting units of institutional investors will reliably identify what is in the best interest of human investors hardly instills peace of mind. Nor is ignoring the “do as I say, not as I
do” quality of those who wield power within our corporate governance system,
in which claims to have the same perspectives as ordinary Americans are confounded by actions such as rapid-ﬁre portfolio turnover, abandoning ship
when you’ve piloted it into rock-ﬁlled waters, and demanding the right to do
things you then say you don’t have the time or resources to do well.
Most fundamentally, one can’t fail to consider the oddity of a system where
the loudest voices mostly represent one interest, that of equity capital, but are
not representing the viewpoint of those human investors who entrust their
capital to the corporations whose futures are at stake. Now, the voice of equity
capital is represented most loudly by those whose investment philosophy the
efficient market hypothesis argues is most likely to fail—active speculators trying to outguess the market. Many hedge funds themselves ﬂy a reckless ﬂight
plan under the efficient market hypothesis and purport to be good at building
long-term engines of economic growth, but are public-spirited enough to leave
the resulting growth powerhouses after a few years, even though their inﬂuence on the corporation will last far beyond that. Because ordinary Americans
are stuck in the market for years and depend on its long-term, sustainable
growth for jobs and portfolio gain, they are exposed to a corporate republic increasingly built on the law of unintended consequences. That republic is one
where those with electoral power—the money managers with direct control
over the shares purchased with human investors’ money—act and, one would
1.

2.

By “money manager,” I mean the mutual funds, pension funds, other investment funds, and
others whose business is deciding how to invest someone else’s money to achieve a return, as
opposed to corporate managers who run businesses that make products and deliver services
to their customers.
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reﬂections on the Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate Governance, 33 J. CORP. L. 1,
6-7 (2007) [hereinafter Strine, Toward Common Sense and Common Ground]. See generally
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling
Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449 (2014) (discussing the “separation of ownership from ownership” and its implications).
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thus infer, think based on considerations of gains over periods of one to two
years. If out of this debate among those with short-term perspectives comes
optimal policy for human investors with far longer time horizons, that happy
coincidence would be remarkable.
To shed light on how hedge fund activism, including so-called wolf pack
activism, affects human investors, Part I of this Feature highlights the ﬂeshand-blood attributes of typical American investors—the real people, which this
Feature refers to as human investors, who use the capital markets to invest and
save for important life events like retirement or college education for their children. Then Part II explains what is meant by the confusing terms “activist
hedge fund” and “wolf pack” activism. From there, Part III will describe the
corporate republic upon which human investors are dependent but in which
they are largely bystanders to a power struggle among two classes of agents,
corporate managers and professional money managers. Part IV then explains
the two ways in which human investors are subjected to whatever beneﬁts and
risks activist hedge funds may cause to our corporate governance system, both
as indirect investors in hedge funds and as workers dependent on pension
funds, and, more importantly, as human beings who derive most of their
wealth from the ability of our economy, including its public companies, to create good jobs and raise wages. Sections IV.A and IV.B will explore these subjects and highlight the critical issues raising doubts that hedge fund activism is
likely to be materially beneﬁcial to human investors. Section IV.C discusses
how the current corporate governance debate imperfectly addresses these potential harms to human investors.
The Feature ﬁnishes in Part V with some modest policy proposals to ameliorate the risks that hedge fund activism poses while still retaining its potential
beneﬁts. Notably, these proposals do not involve ascribing to the hedge fund
industry itself any opprobrium; rather, as to the hedge fund industry itself,
they mostly rest on the proposition that when economically powerful forces are
acting on important societal institutions like public companies and taking
funds upon which human investors and institutions like charities and universities depend, they should be required to disclose accurate and timely information about their operations and interests. Most fundamentally, this Feature
recognizes that it is not hedge funds themselves that pose the major risk to
human investors, it is the failure of our overall corporate governance system to
represent faithfully the rational, long-term perspective of ordinary American
investors who can only gain if public corporations make money the oldfashioned way, by implementing sustainable strategies to sell products and services and not through edgy practices, accounting gimmickry, or never-ending
cycles of spin-offs and mergers.
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i
Human investors are the least-discussed participants in our corporate governance republic, a reality made more important by the menacing valence the
term “wolf pack” takes on when the prey might be human—investor, worker,
or otherwise. In this context, the term “wolf pack” was, I suppose, not one
adapted by environmentalists who dabble in corporate governance and are
seeking to advance their desire to reintroduce a viable population of wolves into
the American wild by associating them with a popular group of activist investors. Rather, the term calls on a scarier lineage, in which wolves are seen as
dangerous predators capable of ruthless and concerted action to bring down
and devour their prey. Visions of cowering children, vulnerable livestock, and
half-eaten chickens come to mind,3 or sailors forced to ﬁght for survival in the
great deep.4
But, when we talk of wolf packs in the sense of activist hedge funds and
their fellow travelers that seek to propose changes in policies at public companies, much of the academic consideration has a bloodless quality, in which the
reality that how public companies manage their businesses has an effect on actual human beings is obscured. Lost in the regressions5 and the rote references
to stockholder democracy6 are the people most affected by our corporate governance system, in no small part because those people mostly have to live with
the outcomes of a system of corporate governance in which they have almost
no direct voice.
3.

4.

5.

6.

Actual wolf packs menaced travelers in the American north before the twentieth century. See,
e.g., JACK LONDON, WHITE FANG 34 (MacMillan Co. 1906) (“[H]e was not destined to enjoy
that bed. Before his eyes closed the wolves had drawn too near for safety. . . . He kept the ﬁre
brightly blazing, for he knew that it alone intervened between the ﬂesh of his body and their
hungry fangs.”). A single wolf can be scary enough, as Little Red Riding Hood could attest.
See JACOB GRIMM & WILHELM GRIMM, GRIMM’S COMPLETE FAIRY TALES 96-99 (2011).
Wolf packs of German U-boats, i.e., groups of attack submarines, prowled the Atlantic and
Mediterranean during World War II to tremendous effect. See, e.g., Robert P. Post, British
Sink Three U-Boats, Save Convoy, Lose 4 Ships, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1942, at 1 (heralding the
successful arrival of a British convoy stalked by a German wolf pack after “a ﬁve-day running battle”).
E.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L.
REV. 1085 (2015); Alon Brav et al., The Real Effects of Hedge Fund Activism: Productivity, Asset
Allocation, and Labor Outcomes, 28 REV. FIN. STUD. 2723, 2753 (2015).
E.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833,
837 (2005) (“The U.S. corporation can be regarded as a ‘representative democracy’ . . . .”);
John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on
Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545, 605-06 (2016) (“[T]here is no alternative to shareholder democracy.”).
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In this back and forth, terms like “owner” are used as appellations by those
who control the capital of others—the money managers at institutional investment ﬁrms—and use vehicles to acquire ownership of equity securities.7 These
“owners” are not sole proprietors responsible ﬁnancially for all the costs and
risks of a business, nor are they even “owners” in the sense of bearing all the
risks of a human being who owns a share of stock in a public company. Money
managers’ incentives and risks are materially different than those whose capital
they control. Claiming to be an owner may just be the money manager speak
equivalent of a wolf putting on sheep’s clothing. Therefore, if the focus when
considering the effect of activist hedge funds is on the relative gain sharing
among corporate managers, activist hedge funds, and other forms of institutional investors, something fundamental will inevitably be slighted, which is
that these inquiries involve a summing up among the agents of the real human
beings whose wealth and well-being is supposed to be the focus of our society’s
economic policies. The real humans get lost in the shuffle.
If we are to consider in a prudent fashion how our corporate governance
system should regulate activist hedge funds or address other analogous matters, we must humanize our lens and remind ourselves of the realities of who
living, breathing investors are, the ways in which they are allowed to participate in the system, and the effect these realities have on what corporate governance system would be best for them.
Most essential in this humanizing process is realizing that most Americans
owe almost all of their wealth to their ability to hold a job and to secure gains
in wages. This is not simply true among the poorer half of Americans; it is true
of 99% of Americans. On average, Americans derive 64% of their income from
wages and another 15% from either retirement payments or other transfer
7.

E.g., Press Release, California State Teachers’ Retirement System, CalSTRS Achieves
Shareholder Victory at Freeport-McMoran (Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.calstrs.com/news-re
lease/calstrs-achieves-shareholder-victory-freeport-mcmoran [http://perma.cc/S94D-9874]
(quoting Anne Sheehan, CalSTRS director of corporate governance, as saying “[w]hile we
applaud the company’s willingness to engage, we as shareholders and owners have the right
to give input on strategic decisions and to debate the appropriateness of deals that impact
the long-term performance of the company”); Apple Stock Rated Best of Worst, CNET (Feb.
11, 1997, 12:00 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/apple-stock-rated-best-of-worst [http://
perma.cc/FF6A-8MBB] (quoting CalPERS general counsel as saying that “[a]s shareholders—and owners of this company—we believe that dedication of all of Apple’s directors and
personal incentives are critical to recovery”); see also Meena Krishnamsetty, Transcript of Bill
Ackman’s Super Fast Speech at the Ira Sohn Conference, INSIDER MONKEY (June 6, 2011, 7:05
AM), http://www.insidermonkey.com/blog/transcript-of-bill-ackmans-super-fast-speech
-at-the-ira-sohn-conference-3793 [http://perma.cc/9QD9-FTLC] (“By the way, I never
consider any bid on something I [through Pershing Square] own hostile. You’re welcome to
make an offer.”).
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payments.8 For the middle and upper-middle class, jobs are even more important, as wages comprise 70% or more of income.9 But the importance of labor does not stop there. Those in the eightieth to ninetieth percentiles derive
over 75% of their income from their labor, and those in the ninety-ﬁfth to ninety-ninth percentiles still get over 60% from their labor.10 Importantly, the extent to which transfer payments—such as food stamps, unemployment insurance, and the like—comprise an important percentage of ordinary Americans’
annual income underscores the points because it illustrates that in many cases
the employment that workers get is not enough to provide for their families,
and that others lack consistent employment at all.11 Jobs, jobs, jobs—they still
drive American wealth creation for all but the super-rich.
Now, it is also true that many Americans are now “forced capitalists”12—
forced by public retirement policies and market developments to turn over a
portion of their paycheck every month to the money management industry.13
8.

Joseph Rosenberg, Measuring Income for Distributional Analysis, URB.-BROOKINGS TAX POL’Y
CTR. 4-5 (July 25, 2013), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/ﬁles/alfresco/pub
lication-pdfs/412871-Measuring-Income-for-Distributional-Analysis.PDF [http://perma.cc
/C2SJ-AE5B]. The Urban-Brookings study classiﬁes taxable distributions from IRAs and
both taxable and nontaxable distributions from pension plans as retirement income. Id. at 4.
Social Security beneﬁts are classiﬁed as transfer payments. Id.
9. Id. at 5. Compensation constitutes 70% of income for those in the middle quintile and 73%
for those in the fourth, i.e., second-to-top, quintile. Id. “Compensation is the largest source
of income for all but the highest income group.” Id. at 4. Only 11% of Americans’ expanded
cash income came from investments. Id. at 5.
10. Id.
11. Transfer payments constitute 40% of income for those in the bottom quintile and 22% for
those in the second quintile. Id. at 5.
12. See Strine, Toward Common Sense and Common Ground, supra note 2, at 4-5.
13. See Peter Brady et al., The Success of the U.S. Retirement System, INV. CO. INST. 30 (2012),
http://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_12_success_retirement.pdf [http://perma.cc/2BG6-82LP] (describing an increase in the number of active participants in 401(k) plans from seventeen million in 1989 to ﬁfty-one million in 2010); John Broadbent et al., The Shift from Deﬁned
Beneﬁt to Deﬁned Contribution Pension Plans—Implications for Asset Allocation and Risk Management, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS 13-17 (2006), http://www.bis.org/publ/wgpapers
/cgfs27broadbent3.pdf [http://perma.cc/X2GG-SP7N]; Frequently Asked Questions About
401(k) Plans, INV. CO. INST. (Sept. 2014), http://www.ici.org/policy/retirement/plan/401k
/faqs_401k [http://perma.cc/6YDW-DPJP] (describing an increase in 401(k) plan assets
from $0.7 trillion in 1994 to $4.4 trillion in the second quarter of 2014); see also JOHN C. BOGLE, THE CLASH OF THE CULTURES: INVESTMENT VS. SPECULATION 226-38 (2012) (praising
the shift from deﬁned beneﬁt to deﬁned contribution plans, but arguing for reforms to the
deﬁned contribution system); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-408, RETIREMENT SECURITY: LOW DEFINED CONTRIBUTION SAVINGS MAY POSE CHALLENGES 2 (2016),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/676942.pdf [http://perma.cc/KVT6-P8NR] (ﬁnding that
40% of all U.S. households had some savings in a deﬁned contribution plan).
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Under the predominant approach, though, American workers are not able to
buy securities in public companies directly. Instead, they are given an option to
invest in the funds of whatever mutual fund families with which their employer contracts.14 Although these families may have a seeming breadth of options
because the investment choices are numerically diverse, those choices in reality
consist only of the menus of funds of the fund families their employer has selected.15 The workers’ version of the Wall Street rule16 involves not being able
to sell one stock in the Russell 3000 and buy another, or to move into particular
bonds. Instead, it involves being able to move from one fund to another, often
of the same fund family. And yes, of course, there is a kind of liquidity, in the
sense that the worker is entitled to withdraw her money at any time at the
fund’s net asset value.17 But this is not liquidity that allows a worker to live off
the proceeds. Rather, for most Americans, once funds are invested in a 401(k)
plan, the funds are out of their effective reach until they reach age ﬁfty-nine
and a half.18 To withdraw before that time subjects the worker to Castro-like

14.

15.

16.

17.
18.

Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis, Beyond Diversiﬁcation: The Pervasive Problem of Excessive Fees and
“Dominated Funds” in 401(k) Plans, 124 YALE L.J. 1476, 1485 (2015) (“The most common type
of investment options in 401(k) plans are mutual funds or similar investment vehicles that
pool funds managed by a professional fund manager.”). One important reason investment
options are restricted is the structure of the liability safe harbor that plan sponsors can take
advantage of by offering only certain investments. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1) (2012); 29
C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1 (2015). Thus it is perhaps not surprising that 43% of American households own mutual funds. Alan R. Palmiter, The Mutual Fund Investor 3 (2016)
(unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2853506 [http://perma.cc/D8QV
-MZBM]. Mutual funds also constitute a large proportion of household wealth—the median
mutual-fund-owning household holds two-thirds of its ﬁnancial assets in mutual funds. Id.
Most of those mutual funds are held in deﬁned-contribution retirement accounts or IRAs.
Id. at 4.
Ayres & Curtis, supra note 14, at 1485 (“The menu of mutual funds from which employees
choose is ultimately constructed by the employer . . . .”). “In the largest 200 deﬁnedcontribution plans, the average number of funds on the menu is twenty-two.” WILLIAM A.
BIRDTHISTLE, EMPIRE OF THE FUND 143 (2016).
Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 553 (deﬁning the “Wall Street Rule” under which, if institutional investors were dissatisﬁed with management, they sold their stock and moved on); see
also Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J.
FIN. 1729, 1734 (2008) (“[T]he ‘Wall Street Rule’ often becomes the default form of institutional shareholder activism.”).
See 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1 (2015). An open-end fund must sell its shares based on the net asset
value, which must be calculated at least once daily. Id.
I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(A)(i) (2012). This is also true for IRAs. Id. § 408A(d)(2)(A)(i).
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expropriation in the form of conﬁscatory taxes.19 For this reason, most workers
have a substantial interest in the durable appreciation of their portfolio, and do
not beneﬁt in any way from stock bubbles arising from gimmicks or unsustainable strategies because these gains will go away and if those bubbles result in
economic recessions and diminutions in economic growth, the worker will
suffer both at the time of retirement, and perhaps more importantly, during
their working careers, as economic slowdowns that result in job losses and
wage stagnation threaten their most important source of wealth.
I admit to focusing on 401(k) funds,20 and I do so for good reason. Most
Americans are not wealthy enough to buy a lot of securities21 outside of retirement and college savings accounts under 26 U.S.C. § 529.22 In fact, most Amer19.

Id. § 72(t)(1) (“If any taxpayer receives any amount from a qualiﬁed retirement plan . . . the
taxpayer’s tax under this chapter for the taxable year in which such amount is received shall
be increased by an amount equal to 10 [%] . . . .”).
20. By 401(k) investors, I also include workers who, by virtue of their employment by a government agency or non-proﬁt, invest in analogous 403(b) and 457(b) plans. See id.
§§ 403(b), 457(b); IRC 457(b) Deferred Compensation Plans, I.R.S. (July 28, 2016), http://
www.irs.gov/retirement-plans/irc-457b-deferred-compensation-plans
[http://perma.cc
/4DEA-QZWA]; Plan Feature Comparison Chart: Choose a Retirement Plan, I.R.S. 4 (Feb.
2015), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p4484.pdf [http://perma.cc/M3BZ-E8AM] (comparing plans); Publication 571: Tax-Sheltered Annuity Plans (403(b) Plans), I.R.S. (Jan. 2016),
http://www.irs.gov/publications/p571 [http://perma.cc/MF5H-FXTG] (describing 403(b)
plans for employees of public schools and certain tax-exempt organizations). Many, but not
all of these investors, can be said to have a deﬁned contribution or “DC” plan in the sense
that the employer puts an amount into the plan on their behalf each paycheck but does not
guarantee a future set pension (a deﬁned beneﬁt such as in a traditional pension plan).
Some 401(k) investors, however, get an employer contribution and, of course, it must be
remembered that whether the plan is called a deﬁned contribution or deﬁned beneﬁt plan, it
comprises one element of the employees’ compensation for their labor. IRAs are also closely
linked to what happens with 401(k)s because the bulk of IRA money comes from rollovers
from employer plans, not direct contributions. Palmiter, supra note 14, at 4 (“Deﬁnedcontribution plans and IRAs are intricately linked, as most of the money ﬂowing into IRAs
comes from rollovers from employer-based retirement plans, not direct IRA contributions.”).
21. See Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 5.
22. Like 401(k) plans, most 529 plans provide participants with a choice of mutual funds in
which to invest and, if those funds are withdrawn except for speciﬁc purposes set forth in
the tax code, they are subject to tax penalties. See An Introduction to 529 Plans, SEC. & EXCH.
COMMISSION (Jan. 6, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/intro529.htm [http://
perma.cc/9BRD-ZQ3X] (“Investment options often include stock mutual funds, bond mutual funds, and money market funds . . . ”); Common 529 Questions, C. SAVINGS PLANS
NETWORK, http://www.collegesavings.org/common-529-questions/#question15 [http://
perma.cc/CCH9-88ZC] (“Earnings in a 529 plan grow tax-deferred and are free of federal
income tax when used for qualiﬁed higher education expenses under Internal
Revenue Code Section 529.”); What Is a 529 Plan?, C. SAVINGS PLANS NETWORK, http://
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icans are not wealthy enough to come near hitting the annual limits for what
they may set aside in a 401(k) retirement account. That annual limit is $18,000
per worker,23 or 32% of the median household income in 2015.24 For most people, savings outside of college savings and retirement accounts have to be available in liquid and non-risky form to meet events of life like house and car down
payments, air conditioners that need to be replaced, auto catastrophes not covered by warranty, children getting married or needing help, school tuition, or
other issues in the general category of “stuff happens.”
And for most Americans, how much they have to invest is singularly a
function of how much they can make from their labor. The equity and debt
capital they acquire comes originally from sweat. Because most of us don’t have
a large surplus, it is not surprising that a majority of Americans have relatively
little saved for retirement in the form of an ownership interest in funds invested in equity securities.25 “[N]early half of all working-age families have zero
retirement savings . . . .”26 This results in dire aggregate savings rates: the me-

23.

24.
25.

26.

www.collegesavings.org/what-is-529 [http://perma.cc/R7X6-UY5X]. As a result, most 529
investments go ultimately into the same kinds of mutual funds as workers’ 401(k)
plans. Simona Hannon et al., Saving for College and Section 529 Plans, BOARD GOVERNORS
FED. RES. SYS. (Feb. 3, 2016), http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/notes/feds-notes
/2016/saving-for-college-and-section-529-plans-20160203.html [http://perma.cc/WW7W
-L2CK] (“529-college-savings-plan administrators typically offer a selection of investment
portfolios to their clients. Each portfolio includes either one or several mutual funds.”). I say
ultimately because many 529 plans market target date funds based on the age of the child for
whom the funds are invested and when that child is likely to go to college. Those target date
funds invest in speciﬁc blends of equity and debt funds that move from a more equity-based
approach when the child is more distant from college and into a more liquid, debt-based
fund approach as the child nears college and is likely to need the funds in the near term for
tuition. See Common 529 Questions, supra (“The most common investment option is the agebased allocation strategy in which the age of the beneﬁciary determines the speciﬁc mix of
investments.”).
Press Release, IRS, IRS Announces 2016 Pension Plan Limitations; 401(k) Contribution
Limit Remains Unchanged at $18,000 for 2016 (Oct. 21, 2015), http://www.irs.gov
/uac/newsroom/irs-announces-2016-pension-plan-limitations-401-k-contribution-limit
-remains-unchanged-at-18-000-for-2016 [http://perma.cc/969T-KH6R]. The contribution
limit for an IRA for 2016 remained unchanged at $5,500. Id.
Real Median Household Income in the United States, FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS (Sept. 13, 2016),
http://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MEHOINUSA672N [http://perma.cc/K8RF-6DMW].
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 13, at 13 n.30 (“[T]he overall median
balance of DC savings for all working, prime-age (age 25-64) households in 2013 was just
$3,000.”).
Monique Morrissey, The State of American Retirement: How 401(k)s Have Failed Most American Workers, ECON. POL’Y INST. 15 (Mar. 3, 2016), http://www.epi.org/ﬁles/2016/state-of
-american-retirement-ﬁnal.pdf [http://perma.cc/QB7Y-CQ2D]. There is some variation by
age. In a 2015 report, the Government Accountability Office noted that 52% of households in
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dian family with a head of household between the ages of thirty-two and thirty-seven has $480 across all of its retirement accounts.27 If households without
any retirement savings are excluded, the picture is a little better: working-age
households that do save have a median retirement account balance of
$41,900.28 Even among households whose members are retirement age and
have retirement savings, those savings are capable of generating only a modest
annuity.29 Not surprisingly, these balances largely track family income.30 But,
even the comfortably middle class—American households earning between
$88,100 and $133,900 annually—have median account balances of only
$60,900.31 Only when looking at the top quartile of American households—
earning more than $135,000—do median account balances exceed six ﬁgures,
demonstrating how critical it is to continue to make good wages through access
to a quality job.32 Yet, even for more affluent Americans well above the median,
these savings produce a relatively small amount of their total income.33 And regrettably, the wealth gap between white and black Americans that has resulted

27.

28.

29.

30.
31.
32.

33.

the ﬁfty-ﬁve and older category have no retirement savings in 401(k)s or IRAs. U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-419, RETIREMENT SECURITY: MOST HOUSEHOLDS APPROACHING RETIREMENT HAVE LOW SAVINGS 7 (2015), http://www.gao.gov/assets/680
/670153.pdf [http://perma.cc/BG7Y-SUCQ]. About half of those in households aged sixtyﬁve and up are mostly dependent on Social Security. Id.
Morrissey, supra note 26, at 11. The situation is slightly better for older households: median
retirement savings rises to $4,200 for ages 38-43, $6,200 for ages 44-49, $8,000 for ages 5055, and $17,000 for ages 56-61. Id.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 13, at 13 n.30. This study used the 25-64 age
range to stand for working-age people. Id. On that broader measure, the median household
balance including those with no retirement savings at all is $3,000. Id.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 26, at 15 (noting that the median retirement
savings amount for the 48% of households age 65-74 with retirement savings is $148,000,
which is “comparable to an insured, inﬂation-protected annuity of $649 per month for a 70year-old”).
Morrissey, supra note 26, at 5; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 13, at
13 (low-income households had less savings in retirement plans than other income groups).
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 13, at 14 (measuring working households
that have at least some retirement savings).
Id. It is worth reiterating that when looked at from the perspective of income, the importance of wages for almost all Americans cannot be overstated—only the top 1% of Americans derive less income from wages than from other sources. See supra text accompanying
notes 8-11.
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 13, at 15 (showing that the top quarter of
retirement-age households have retirement savings sufficient to generate less than $2,000 a
month in an insured, inﬂation-protected annuity for a 70-year old); id. at 18 ﬁg.3 (indicating
that for even those retirement-age households with retirement savings, retirement savings
constitute only a quarter of retirement income).

1881

the yale law journal

126:1870

2017

from our society’s history of racial oppression shows up in a huge way in
401(k) savings assets.34 For starters, black and Hispanic households are less
likely than households generally to have access to a 401(k)-type plan through
their workplace.35 Where plans are available, black and Hispanic workers have
lower account balances.36
A declining but still sizable number of Americans have their wealth invested indirectly in equity and debt capital markets through a more traditional
means—a pension plan.37 Every paycheck, part of their effective wage is put
toward a supposed guarantee of a deﬁned pension based on years of work and
other factors such as salary level. These other factors underscore the importance of wages as driving the pension payments a worker will receive, thus
linking the worker’s ability to live comfortably in retirement with her access to
good wages during her working career.38 For pensioners, in contrast to 401(k)
savers, no investment choices typically must be made. Rather, the trusting pensioners ﬁnd themselves in the hands of their pension fund and dependent upon
considerations such as whether the pension fund is annually funded in an actuarially sound manner and whether the pension fund is investing its assets in a
prudent manner that will enable it to meet its promises to its beneﬁciaries.
Even more obviously than 401(k) investors, workers who have been promised a
pension should rationally want a corporate governance system focused on sustainable wealth creation. Investments must grow durably and be there when it
counts. Not only that, unless the approach to economic growth is one that beneﬁts workers, by generating good jobs and wage growth, the prospective pensioner risks unattractive fates like non-vesting if a job is lost, or minimal
growth in pension prospects if promotions and other wage growth options that
will generate a higher pension are limited.
Precisely because human investors save for college and retirement, they are
also likely to have substantial investments in debt securities and not just equi-

34.

Id. at 52 tbl.5.
Id. at 18.
36. Morrissey, supra note 26, at 6. Account balances for black and Hispanic workers also declined more than for whites in the 2007-13 period. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 13, at 19-20.
37. Brady et al., supra note 13, at 28-29 ﬁg.7; William J. Wiatrowski, The Last Private Industry
Pension Plans: A Visual Essay, MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3, 4 ﬁg.1 (Dec. 2012) (describing the overall decline in deﬁned beneﬁt pensions and noting that only around 20% of workers had deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans by 2011).
38. Types of Retirement Plans, U.S. DEP’T LAB., http://www.dol.gov/general/topic/retirement
/typesofplans [http://perma.cc/RNR4-HZ53] (noting that deﬁned beneﬁt plans “commonly” have a beneﬁt calculated based on amount of salary and length of service).
35.
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ties.39 Why? Because as college and retirement loom, it is prudent that more of
your portfolio be in a form less vulnerable to losses in principal.40 For this reason, human investors are particularly vulnerable if the corporate governance
system allows excessive leverage, which can threaten jobs through insolvencies,
economic shocks such as ﬁnancial crises, and a reduction in the value of debt
securities.
These realities are buttressed by corporate ﬁnance theory itself. The mainstream of that theory teaches that the current value of an asset should be based
on its expected future cash ﬂows.41 It also teaches that when assets such as
stocks are traded in a liquid market with a rich information ﬂow about corporate prospects, an active trading strategy dependent on outguessing the collective judgments of the market is unlikely to succeed.42 That does not mean that
you can’t guess right sometimes or over some period, but that the ability to do
so durably and consistently over time is slim to non-existent.43
39.
40.

41.

42.

43.

Palmiter, supra note 14, at 3 (noting that bond funds constitute almost a quarter of mutual
fund assets).
E.g., Retirement Portfolio Allocation, CHARLES SCHWAB, http://www.schwab.com/public/sch
wab/investing/retirement_and_planning/retirement_income/portfolio_allocation [http://
perma.cc/Y22Z-7894] (advising a shift from stocks to debt securities and cash as investors
age or want greater stability).
William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158
U. PA. L. REV. 653, 693 (2010) (“The corporation is a collection of assets and its value is the
free cash ﬂow that those assets are expected to generate into the indeﬁnite future.”). See generally RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 115 (9th ed. 2008)
(observing that net present value is the preferable metric for investment decisions and concluding, “[g]uess what? NPV, properly interpreted, wins out in the end”).
Bratton & Wachter, supra note 41, at 692 (noting that one implication of the semi-strong
form of the efficient capital market hypothesis is that “no trading strategy based on public
information can regularly outperform the market” (footnote omitted)); see also BREALEY ET
AL., supra note 41, at 358-63 (describing the three forms of the efficient market hypothesis
and observing that “in competitive markets easy proﬁts don’t last”); id. at 373 (stating that
“in an efficient market, there is no way for most investors to achieve consistently superior
rates of return”).
BREALEY ET AL., supra note 41, at 361 (“Tests of the strong form of the hypothesis have examined the recommendations of professional security analysts and have looked for mutual
funds or pension funds that could predictably outperform the market. Some researchers
have found a slight persistent outperformance, but just as many have concluded that professionally managed funds fail to recoup the costs of management.”); Burton G. Malkiel, The
Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 59, 77 (2003) (“A remarkably
large body of evidence suggests that professional investment managers are not able to outperform index funds . . . .”); see also BOGLE, supra note 13, at 301-07 (arguing that attempts
to outguess the market are irrational and showing that even eight actively managed funds
considered to be highly successful had returns that tended to revert to that of the market
overall and to have poorer returns, when their higher costs were considered); BREALEY ET
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For human investors, these aspects of theory seem to counsel in favor of a
corporate governance system that encourages investment in the development of
useful products and the delivery of useful services because it is the purchase of
products and services that must ultimately be the source of sustainable proﬁts.
Over the long term, you must sell something customers need or want. Whether
you are a pure play or have a strong stock buyback program won’t matter if you
can’t do that. Simply squeezing the corporate lemon to get the most juice right
now at the expense of growing future lemons does not help human investors
build wealth, as they risk employment opportunities and cuts in long-term
portfolio growth. Offshoring jobs to nations with pitiful wages and little protection for labor as shortcuts to more immediate proﬁts, rather than making
proﬁts in an ethical, sustainable manner that does not involve externalizing the
real costs of business, hurts human investors. Corporate ﬁnance gimmicks
won’t generate jobs or a retirement fund for workers outside the industry space
coming up with the gimmicks, and gimmicks have a way of getting found over
time. And over time is how human investors build wealth.
This is not to say that human investors do not want to hold corporate managers accountable. Of course they do. Human investors don’t want self-dealing
that diverts proﬁts from the corporation unfairly to insiders. They don’t want
empire building that simply makes a corporation larger for its own sake, and
does not make it more proﬁtable in the long term. But what human investors
are concerned with is not quarter-to-quarter earnings. Rather, they are also
concerned when managers and others with power to inﬂuence corporate policies can gain substantially if corporations show paper proﬁts that are not indicative of economic reality or leverage themselves up to make immediate payments at the cost of future insolvency or lower returns. If the very economy
that human investors count on to provide them with jobs is hollowed out at the
insistence of those who wield the power that comes with managing human investors’ equity capital, human investors will likely end up less wealthy in the
long run.
In sum, human investors are creatures with special attributes, distinct (as
we shall see) from other participants in our corporate governance system. Speciﬁcally, human investors are true Benjamin Graham-style long-term investors.44 Their time horizon is the twenty-some years from the birth of a child
until college or the even lengthier period from entering the workforce until retirement. The vast majority of human investors are also not primarily invesAL.,

supra note 41, at 362 ﬁg.14.5 (showing that “mutual funds underperform the market in
approximately two-thirds of the years” from 1962-2006).
44. See BENJAMIN GRAHAM, THE INTELLIGENT INVESTOR 188-207 (HarperCollins Publishers
2005) (1949) (espousing a long-term buy-and-hold philosophy).
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tors—most of their wealth is derived from labor and wages, not capital appreciation and dividend income. These two attributes distinguish what is in the best
interest of human investors from what is in the best interest of other market
participants. Bubbles disproportionately harm human investors because their
time horizon means they not only ride the bubble up, but they also ride it back
down to a bottom that may be lower than would have been the case but for the
inﬂated egos that caused it. Human investors are also likely to have investments in both equity and debt and so are sensitive to value transfers from debt
to equity. Most materially, human investors are exposed to the broader real
world consequences of changes in corporate behavior inﬂuenced by stock market forces such as hedge fund activism: a short-term increase in productivity
and stock price at the expense of long-term reinvestment and wage growth will
likely harm the overall “portfolio” of the human investor.45 The point of this
Feature is not to vilify hedge funds but to ask questions about basic assumptions by using the perspective of the too-often-ignored human beings for
whom the system is supposed to work. If you were one of the many—the average or above average below the ninety-ﬁfth percentile—how would you want
the corporate governance system designed? Even if you were way more fortunate than the many, in the ninety-ﬁfth to ninety-ninth percentile, how would
you want it designed?
Keeping a close eye on these ﬂesh-and-blood investors, it is time to clarify
what exactly terms like “hedge fund” and “wolf pack activism” mean in this
context and begin to explore how activists’ incentives and strategies act on the
real-world companies they target.
ii
The term “hedge fund activism” is an odd one. Hedge funds were originally
associated more with the tempering, the “hedging,” of risk.46 And that remains
true. Many, if not indeed most, hedge funds are involved in trading strategies
that do not involve the subject of this Feature.47 Many of them still focus on
45.

See discussion infra Parts III, IV.
46. See William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375, 1382-83
(2007) (summarizing traditional hedge fund strategies).
47. Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control,
155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1046 (2007) (stating that only around 5% of all hedge fund assets are
used for activism); Activist Funds: An Investor Calls, ECONOMIST (Feb. 7, 2015), http://www
.economist.com/news/brieﬁng/21642175-sometimes-ill-mannered-speculative-and-wrong
-activists-are-rampant-they-will-change-american [http://perma.cc/H7UW-G54Z] (“[O]f
about 8,000 hedge funds activists number just 71 . . . .”). Of the ﬁfty largest hedge funds as
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strategies combining leverage, “long” equity investments, and “short” downside-protecting hedges that gave hedge funds their name.48 But, for purposes
of this Feature, I focus on the more oxymoronic part of the industry, which rather than primarily acting to hedge risk, takes an aggressive investment interest
in the stock (and other securities and more exotic interests tied to the value of
that stock) of a public company and seeks to make returns by inﬂuencing the
corporation to change its capital structure or business plan. The funds that do
this make up a minority of the overall hedge fund industry,49 but they have an
outsized role in the debate about corporate governance because they have had
an important effect on the manner in which public companies operate. And
however attractive it is for politicians to talk about small business being the engine for job growth, the reality remains that public companies are the most vital source of jobs in our economy. Directly, they provide employment for more
than 22% of Americans.50 That understates their effect because countless small
measured by equity assets, only nine are also on FactSet’s SharkWatch 50 list of “signiﬁcant
activist investors.” Hedge Fund Ownership, FACTSET (Aug. 23, 2016), http://www.fact
set.com/websiteﬁles/PDFs/hedgefund_ownership/hedgefund_ownership_8.23.16 [http://
perma.cc/2QKZ-H7UA]. Only one of the SharkWatch 50, Icahn Associates, is in the top ten
hedge funds by equity assets. Id. This probably overstates the actual prevalence of activist
funds because the report looks at ﬁrm-level equity assets, and some of the SharkWatch 50
ﬁrms engage in multiple strategies. See, e.g., Philosophy, CARLSON CAP., http://www.carlson
capital.com/default.aspx [http://perma.cc/4CVN-4BAU] (“We believe that superior riskadjusted returns can be achieved by the use of thoughtful, targeted hedging strategies and
diversiﬁcation, across multiple strategies and multiple decision makers.”).
48. Of the 100 top performing hedge funds, based on a three-year measurement, forty were
pure equity long-short funds; more used some variation of that strategy. Barron’s 2016 List:
Best 100 Hedge Funds, BARRON’S (June 18, 2016), http://www.barrons.com/articles/best
-100-hedge-funds-1466223924 [http://perma.cc/S4UE-2MGJ]; see also Sebastian Mallaby,
Learning To Love Hedge Funds, WALL ST. J. (June 11, 2010), http://www.wsj.com/articles
/SB10001424052748703302604575294983666012928 [http://perma.cc/8F36-85LQ] (describing Alfred Winslow Jones, the founder of the ﬁrst hedge funds, and his ﬁrst funds that
had a long-short structure). But, the term “hedge fund” is applied to a broad set of investment strategies. See Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas, Gap Filling, Hedge Funds, and Financial Innovation, in NEW FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS AND INSTITUTIONS: OPPORTUNITIES AND
POLICY CHALLENGES 114 (Yasuyuki Fuchita & Robert E. Litan eds., 2007) (observing that
“[t]here is no generally agreed-upon deﬁnition of a hedge fund”); id. at 115 (setting out four
characteristics of hedge funds, none of which relate to investment strategy other than a general focus on public, rather than private, markets).
49. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
50. The companies comprising the S&P 500 employ approximately twenty-four million people,
which is approximately 70% of the overall workforce employed by Russell 3000 companies.
See Justin Fox, Big Companies Still Employ Lots of People, BLOOMBERGVIEW (Apr.
20, 2016, 4:54 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-04-20/big-companies
-still-employ-lots-of-people [http://perma.cc/VSG3-GGMN]. That results in an overall
public company employment ﬁgure of around thirty-four million. The civilian labor force is
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businesses are proﬁtable because they operate in communities where public
company operations exist; they play a role in acting as suppliers of goods and
service providers to the public company and its employees.
The information that is available regarding hedge funds is much more limited than about investment ﬁrms registered under the Investment Company
Act, also known as the “40 Act.”51 Until recently, hedge funds were not registered52 and could only take investments from “accredited investors,”53 also
sometimes known by the moniker of “sophisticated investors.” Because of the
lack of disclosure required of hedge funds,54 less-than-ideal information exists

51.

52.

53.

54.

approximately 157 million people. Economic News Release, The Employment Situation – July
2016, BUREAU LAB. STAT. tbl.A-1 (Aug. 5, 2016), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit
.nr0.htm [http://perma.cc/8DQL-MP6V]. Thus, public company employment as measured
using the Russell 3000 as a proxy constitutes approximately twenty-two percent of
the labor force. Twenty-two percent is likely both underinclusive and overinclusive. For
one thing, that uses the Russell 3000 index as a proxy for U.S. public companies. The index
measures the performance of the 3,000 largest companies, which represent 98% of the
investable U.S. stock market. Russell 3000 Index Fund Institutional Shares (VRTTX),
VANGUARD, http://advisors.vanguard.com/VGApp/iip/site/advisor/investments/productov
erview?fundId=1854 [http://perma.cc/99Y8-ZBNZ]. This both excludes a small portion of
the U.S. market and includes companies that may have a relatively large proportion of employees outside the U.S.—for example, Yum! Brands, the corporate owner of Kentucky Fried
Chicken among other brands, with over half of revenue coming from China alone in recent
years. Yum! Brands, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 12 (July 19, 2016). At the same
time, of course, many public companies from other nations—who increasingly face hedge
fund activism in their own corporate domiciles—employ many American workers. See Micheline Maynard, A Lifeline Not Made in the U.S.A., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2009), http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/10/18/business/18excerpt.html [http://perma.cc/EXS6-TBGY].
Institutional investors such as mutual funds are required to provide in depth disclosure of
their holdings on a semiannual basis, among other disclosure requirements. See Investment
Company Act of 1940 § 30(e)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-29(e)(2) (2012); Kahan & Rock, supra
note 47, at 49-50.
Frank Partnoy, U.S. Hedge Fund Activism, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 104 (2015) (describing new reporting requirements promulgated by the SEC in response
to Dodd-Frank’s mandate). In fact, lack of registration was often used as all or part of the
deﬁnition of hedge fund. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 47, at 1024 n.1 (explaining that “in
general, hedge funds are funds exempt from regulation under the Investment Company
Act” and citing the deﬁnition used in an SEC report on hedge funds (citation omitted)).
17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2016) (deﬁning “accredited investor”); Brian R. Cheffins & John
Armour, The Past, Present, and Future of Shareholder Activism by Hedge Funds, 37 J. CORP. L.
51, 88-89 (2011) (describing the SEC safe harbor, which allows funds exempt from the Investment Company Act such as hedge funds to skip determinations of investor suitability
beyond conﬁrming that they are “accredited”).
Even though the SEC receives more information through hedge fund registration and Form
PF than it used to, this information is not available to the public other than in summary
form. Partnoy, supra note 52, at 104.
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about how the hedge fund industry has performed in comparison to traditional
mutual funds or market indices. Hedge fund track records are notoriously difficult to assess because the survival rates of hedge funds are much lower than for
traditional mutual funds,55 and it is not clear that studies assessing hedge fund
performance consistently capture the negative returns of funds that have gone
out of business for lack of positive returns.56 The lack of reliable information
55.

MARK J.P. ANSON, CAIA LEVEL I: AN INTRODUCTION TO CORE TOPICS IN ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS 241 (2009); Mila Getmansky, The Life Cycle of Hedge Funds: Fund Flows, Size,
Competition, and Performance 34 (May 7, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com
/abstract=2084410 [http://perma.cc/A336-CRXJ] (“Compared to mutual funds, hedge
funds have a very large probability of liquidation.”); Getmansky, supra, at 1 (“[A]longside
the tremendous growth, there has also been a signiﬁcant attrition in the industry.”); id. at 4
(“25% of funds have been in business between 5 and 7 years. Only 5% of funds survived past
15 years, and over 35% of funds did not make it after 3 years of operation.”). If the initial performance of a fund is poor, it is to the managers’ advantage, if it is able to do so, to terminate the fund and start a new one rather than to try and dig out of its bad performance,
Robert C. Pozen, Curbing Short-Termism in Corporate America: Focus on Executive Compensation, GOVERNANCE STUD. BROOKINGS 7 (2014), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/re
search/ﬁles/papers/2014/05/06-pozen/brookings_shorttermismﬁnal_may2014.pdf [http://
perma.cc/6TZB-FL2C], and, according to market participants, often with the same investors.
56. See ANDREW W. LO, HEDGE FUNDS: AN ANALYTIC PERSPECTIVE 31 (2010) (citing studies ﬁnding that survivorship bias affects measurement of hedge fund returns); Hedge Fund Survivor
Bias and the Flaws of Blind Fund-Following Strategies, ALPHABETAWORKS INSIGHTS (Mar.
26, 2015) http://abwinsights.com/2015/03/26/hedge-fund-survivor-bias [http://perma.cc
/9JZT-JA47] (analyzing hedge fund portfolios and performance statistics and ﬁnding
“[h]istorical performance of surviving hedge funds overstates actual average returns by a
ﬁfth,” and “survivor bias boosts 10-year nominal returns by 26%”); see also William Fung &
David A. Hsieh, Hedge-Fund Benchmarks: Information Content and Biases, 58 FIN. ANALYST J.
22, 25 (2002) (“When the fund’s track record is satisfactory, the fund manager markets the
fund to investors, which often includes asking to be in a hedge-fund database.”); id. at 23
(“Survivorship bias . . . arises when a sample of hedge funds includes only funds that are
operating at the end of the sampling period and excludes funds that have ceased operations
during the period.”). Fung and Hsieh also observe that, assuming funds cease operation because of poor performance, the “historical return performance of the sample is biased upward and the historical risk is biased downward relative to the universe of all funds.” Fung &
Hsieh, supra, at 23; see also Vikas Agarwal et al., Hedge Funds: A Survey of the Academic Literature 91-92 (Founds. & Trends in Fin., Working Paper, Aug. 25, 2015), http://ssrn.com
/abstract=2650919 [http://perma.cc/3F63-K3DK] (describing biases in databases of hedge
fund performance). Other biases associated with hedge fund performance reporting are selection bias, ANSON, supra note 55, at 241 (ﬁnding that better-performing hedge funds are
less likely to report results), backﬁlling bias, id. (describing a practice of databases that creates an “instant history of hedge fund returns” dating back to the beginning of a fund’s operation that may be based on a particularly high-performing time period), liquidation bias,
id. (explaining that hedge funds which are about to shut down will not report their poor
performance), and stale price bias, Agarwal et al., supra, at 95 (describing how rarely priced
illiquid assets can skew performance measures).
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about hedge fund performance and its effect on the ability of pension funds
and other ﬁduciary investors to protect their beneﬁciaries also extends to private equity, leading to calls for legislative action to increase the disclosure of issues like the terms of private equity funds’ contracts with investors.57 Of special
concern to human investors is the reality that nonregistered funds can strike
different deals with different investors, and that those funds most likely to be
acting on behalf of human investors may be, on balance, those less likely to
beneﬁt from, and thus most likely to suffer from, preferential arrangements.58
Like their tactics, the targets of hedge fund activism cannot be put in one
category.59 Scholars and commentators may underestimate the effect that industry growth has in considering this issue in particular. Some of the examples
used as characterizing hedge fund success involved companies with rather seri57.

See Gretchen Morgenson, Private Equity Funds Balk at Disclosure, and Public Risk Grows, N.Y.
TIMES (July 3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/03/business/private-equity-funds
-balk-at-disclosure-and-public-risk-grows.html [http://perma.cc/34R5-FU4J].
58. Co-investment—where an investor is able to invest more money alongside the hedge
fund but not through the hedge fund’s own structure—is one such special deal. See Aligning
Interests: The Emergence of Hedge Fund Co-Investment Vehicles, J.P. MORGAN 6-7 (2014),
http://www.managedfunds.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/JPMorgan_PB_Perspectives
-Co-Investment_1Q2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q74P-646L] (describing types of coinvestment structures); id. at 5 (describing beneﬁts for investors). Some investors may also
negotiate fee terms for the money invested in the hedge fund directly than the traditional 2
and 20. See Down to 1.4 and 17, ECONOMIST (Feb. 8, 2014), http://www.economist
.com/news/ﬁnance-and-economics/21595942-cost-investing-alternative-assets-fallingslowly
-down-14-and-17 [http://perma.cc/CKG6-EP8Y] (describing negotiating power of certain
hedge fund clients to obtain better fee terms). Sovereign wealth funds are known to be
adept at using their bargaining position granted by large amounts of capital ready to
deploy to extract favorable fee terms. Id. The story for American public pension funds is
varied. Certainly, some of the larger funds are sophisticated hedge fund consumers and
have reportedly been able to obtain favorable terms for themselves. Darrell
Preston, Hedge Funds Leave U.S. Pensions with Little To Show for the Fees, BLOOMBERG (Dec.
9, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-09/hedge-fund-rout-leaves
-pensions-with-little-to-show-for-the-fees [http://perma.cc/EHV2-D6NS] (citing a market
participant’s observation that “some pensions have used the lackluster returns [of recent
years] to push for lower fees and more information about investment strategies”). But, more
often than not, it seems likely that public pension funds, particularly the many with fewer
assets than the few heavyweights, have not been able to negotiate with fund managers from
a position of strength.
59. For a reader who wants an excellent summary of the existing academic research regarding
the impact of activist hedge fund investing, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund
Activism on Corporate Governance by Professors John C. Coffee, Jr. and Darius Palia is a thorough, evenhanded overview. See Coffee & Palia, supra note 6. I am grateful to its authors and
do not intend to replicate their impressive distillation of the existing data, but do draw heavily on their balanced conclusions about overall trends because of their commitment to objectivity.
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ous ethical and legal difficulties, which were dealt with on account of unrest by
investors (and aid from regulatory revelations).60 This sort of activism is not
typical, however, and has become even less so as the industry has grown.61 Although scholars are not in full agreement about how to characterize the companies targeted by hedge funds, with some calling them underperforming,62 and
others calling them proﬁtable companies undervalued by the market,63 some
common characteristics have emerged. In contrast to when activist hedge funds
ﬁrst emerged as a force, hedge funds now tend to target companies that are
proﬁtable, not ones that are not.64 But the companies that they target tend to

60.

61.

62.
63.

64.

One prominent example is the role Cardinal Value Equity Partners played in drawing attention to wrongdoing at Hollinger International, Inc., including its suit against Hollinger’s
controlling stockholder and CEO for breach of his ﬁduciary duties. See Kahan & Rock, supra
note 47, at 1032-33; Elena Cherney, Cardinal Suit Against Hollinger Details Payments to Executives, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 5, 2004), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB107314585612540700
[http://perma.cc/9HBW-X967]. Third Point targeted heat-oil distributor Star Gas, in part
due to suboptimal governance practices that included the CEO’s 78-year-old mother serving
as a member of the board. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 47, at 1029. The fund successfully
caused both the CEO and his mother resign. Judy McDermott, What Now for Star Gas?,
LEVERAGED FIN. NEWS (Mar. 14, 2005), http://www.leveragedﬁnancenews.com/issues/2005
_11/154579-1.html [http://perma.cc/3YLH-DDRP]. An activist investor was also one of the
ﬁrst to ﬁnger Enron for accounting misdeeds. Bratton, supra note 46, at 1384-85.
Brav et al., supra note 16, at 1742 (summarizing study of activists’ stated goals that suggest a
little over 5% of campaigns demand “[m]ore information disclosure/potential fraud” and
about the same proportion look to unseat the CEO or chairman, as compared to 12-16% of
campaigns that seek to improve operational efficiency, sell the target to a third party or improve the target’s capital structure); see also Bratton, supra note 46, at 1398 (observing that
an activist intervention at Sovereign Bancorp—a ﬁrm engaged in ethically dubious relatedparty dealing—stood out in a sample of activist interventions because the activist’s reasons
to intervene were purely predicated on edgy practices, not ﬁrm performance); id. at 1401
(summarizing the ﬁndings and listing four typical attributes of activist targets, none of
which involved dubious management practices).
Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 1090 (“[A]ctivists tend to target companies that are underperforming relative to industry peers . . . .”).
Brav et al., supra note 16, at 1730 (“Hedge fund activists tend to target companies that are
typically ‘value’ ﬁrms, with low market value relative to book value, although they are
proﬁtable with sound operating cash ﬂows and return on assets.”); id. at 1752 (“[I]n about
two-thirds of our cases, the hedge fund explicitly states that it believes the target is undervalued . . . .”); Cheffins & Armour, supra note 53, at 57 (“Hedge funds that engage in offensive shareholder activism typically rely on the ‘value approach’ when identifying targets . . . .”); Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 582 (summarizing studies and noting targets
tend to have relatively high book-to-market ratios).
Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 582 (activist targets are more proﬁtable than control sample);
see also Bratton, supra note 46, at 1398-99, 1399 ﬁg.IV (studying a sample of hedge fund interventions from 2002-2006, showing that targets were heavily weighted toward ﬁrms underperforming the market in 2002 and less so by the end, and that the interventions overall
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pay out less of their proﬁts than the industry average and have strong cash
ﬂows and balances.65 Some might view the typical target of a hedge fund to
therefore be a “value buy,” the kind of fundamentally proﬁtable, but undervalued, ﬁrm that someone like Benjamin Graham might have said was a good part
of a solid portfolio.66 When going active against these ﬁrms, hedge funds will
commonly argue that the ﬁrms are engaging in excessive expenditures (using
resulted in above market returns—”poor performance ma[de] for a better target”); April
Klein & Emanuel Zur, Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors, 64 J. FIN. 187, 189 (2009) (hedge funds target more proﬁtable ﬁrms); Klein & Zur,
supra at 226; Brav et al., supra note 16, at 1754 (target ﬁrms are proﬁtable and enjoy handsome cash ﬂows); cf. Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 554 (“Historically hedge fund activism
focused on smaller cap companies . . . [b]ut this has changed. In 2013, for the ﬁrst time, almost one third of activist campaigns focused on companies with a market capitalization of
over $2 billion.”); id. (considering the tremendous increase in activist campaigns and funds
and articulating the possibility that “more and more hedge funds are pursuing fewer and
fewer legitimate opportunities”); id. at 573 (observing that underperforming companies are
easier to identify than simply undervalued companies); Activist Funds: An Investor Calls, supra note 47 (“Given the size of activist funds and their pace of intervention, they collectively
need to ﬁnd 100 large target companies over the next three years. Only 76 ﬁrms in the S&P
500 are currently showing persistently poor returns on equity . . . and only 29 trade at below
their liquidation value . . . .”). As a sophisticated practitioner indicated:
[A]ctivists have had to turn to better run companies given that there are fewer
targets overall for them. There are very few conglomerates for them to after and
break-up (like Fortune Brands). And the market no longer gives much credit to
buy-backs and return of capital—many institutions, like Blackrock, have said they
prefer investing in the business. I have never thought buy-backs did anything,
and the return of capital platform is a lot less credible now. Activists then are left
with “sell the company”—not the most actionable plan. The fact is that the socalled activists are now just stock pickers, and they are not good at it. Bill Ackman’s investment in Valeant [which was initially done to facilitate a tax inversion
transaction by which Valeant would have moved its tax domicile to low-tax Ireland] had nothing to do with activism. I said over a year ago I would short the activist asset class—too much money chasing too few ideas.
E-mail to Leo E. Strine, Jr. (Sept. 7, 2016, 6:08 PM) (on ﬁle with author). But see C.N.V.
Krishnan et al., The Second Wave of Hedge Fund Activism: The Importance of Reputation, Clout,
and Expertise, 40 J. CORP. FIN. 296, 299 (2016) (“On average, the targets in our sample were
not proﬁtable before intervention.”).
65. Brav et al., supra note 16, at 1730, 1753-57 (hedge funds target value ﬁrms that tend to have
low market to book value, “sound operating cash ﬂows and return on assets,” are actually
“proﬁtable,” and “enjoy handsome cash ﬂows,” but have relatively low dividends or relatively
high CEO pay); Klein & Zur, supra note 64, at 188-89, 203-05 (hedge funds target proﬁtable
ﬁrms with cash on hand); see also Bratton, supra note 46, at 1395 (“As more money ﬂows into
more funds pursuing double-digit gains from activist strategies, the funds relax their ﬁnancial standards, pursuing less appropriate targets.”).
66. See generally GRAHAM, supra note 44 (describing a long-term approach to investing based on
a deep analysis of company fundamentals).
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executive compensation when possible as a high-saliency example).67 The activists argue that, instead, the ﬁrms could reorganize their capital structure to
provide higher payoffs to stockholders in the near-term, without long-term
cost, because they are merely targeting slack unnecessary to future growth.68
What is commonly accepted about activist hedge funds is that they do not
originally invest in companies they like and only become active when they become dissatisﬁed with the corporation’s management or business plan.69 Rather, activist hedge funds identify companies and take an equity position in
them only when they have identiﬁed a way to change the corporation’s operations in a manner that the hedge fund believes will cause its stock price to rise.
The rise that most hedge funds seek must occur within a relatively short time
period, because many activist hedge funds have historically retained their positions for only one to two years at most.70 As shall be discussed, there is some
evidence that the more successful activist funds are the ones more likely to take
a ﬁduciary position, by seating a representative on the target board and hold
their investments for ﬁve to ten years.71 There is also some evidence suggesting

67.

68.
69.

70.

71.

See Brav et al., supra note 16, at 1742 (noting that close to 5% of hedge fund interventions in
their sample speciﬁcally targeted excess executive compensation); supra note 63 and accompanying text. But see Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 582-83 (summarizing studies and noting
that while a minority support the idea that activists are in fact cutting back on wasteful expenditures, the “majority do not report evidence of changes in real variables consistent with
this free cash ﬂow hypothesis”).
Brav et al., supra note 16, at 1742 (ﬁnding that close to 20% of hedge fund interventions speciﬁcally focused upon the target ﬁrm’s payout policy and capital structure).
Compare Kahan & Rock, supra note 47, at 1069 (observing that “activist hedge funds usually
accumulate stakes in portfolio companies in order to engage in activism”), with id. at 1042-45
(describing “activism” by traditional institutional investors).
Brav et al., supra note 16, at 1749 (noting that the median holding period for activist funds in
their database was 556 days by one measure, and twenty-two months by another); Coffee &
Palia, supra note 6, at 567 (summarizing studies showing that most interventions do not last
for long); id. at 572 (“Few activist hedge funds have held their stock for anything approaching three years . . . .”); see also Yvan Allaire & François Dauphin, “Activist” Hedge Funds: Creators of Lasting Wealth? What Do the Empirical Studies Really Say?, INST. FOR GOVERNANCE
PRIV. & PUB. ORGS. 15 (2014) http://igopp.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/IGOPP
_Article_Template2014_Activism_EN_v6.pdf [http://perma.cc/9E4V-UU39] (noting that
half of activist investments last slightly less than nine months).
Nelson Peltz, cofounder of Trian Partners—an activist fund with a reputation for constructive engagement—observed that Trian’s average investment lasts ﬁve years, but “[a]t Fidelity
it’s 18 months.” Kerry A. Dolan, Trian’s Nelson Peltz on Why He’s a Nicer Investor than People
Think, FORBES (June 21, 2016, 9:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kerryadolan
/2016/06/21/trians-nelson-peltz-on-why-hes-a-nicer-investor-than-people-think [http://
perma.cc/6MG8-Q9AK]. But see Julie Jargon, A Bite at a Time, Peltz Reshapes Food
Industry, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 7, 2007), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB119439562423884571
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that hedge fund holding periods overall have lengthened in recent years.72 One
major reason that most hedge funds have relatively short holding periods is
that hedge funds have contracts with their investors that allow investors to get
their money back after lock-up periods of typically six months to two years.73 A
useful contrast is private equity’s typical ﬁve- to ten-year lock-up.74 The compensation system for hedge fund managers, which has been the focus of much
public debate75 and is not the obsession of this Feature, also creates an incen-

72.

73.

74.

75.

[http://perma.cc/HG6Y-2MN9] (noting that compensation arrangements for Trianaffiliated directors, including Peltz himself, at some of Trian’s targeted companies have come
in for criticism); Leslie Patton, Wendy’s Paid Chairman Peltz $657,514 for Security in 2012,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 12, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013
-04-11/wendy-s-paid-chairman-peltz-657-514-for-security-in-2012 [http://perma.cc/LW4H
-42JG] (citing less favorable views of Peltz’s effect on one of his target companies).
In 2012, hedge funds’ portfolio turnover was the slowest it has been for ten years, although
this takes into account hedge funds as a whole, not just activist funds. See Tabinda Hussain,
Hedge Fund Portfolio Turnover at Record Low of 29%: Goldman, VALUEWALK (Nov. 21, 2012,
11:30 AM), http://www.valuewalk.com/2012/11/hedge-fund-portfolio-turnover-at-record
-low-of-29-goldman [http://perma.cc/FL3Y-HL2A]. Generally, hedge fund holding periods
have gradually increased since 2008. See Matt Turner, Hedge Fund Managers Are Waiting for
the World To Change, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 21, 2016, 5:09 PM), http://www.businessinsider
.com/hedge-fund-manager-turnover-and-concentration-2016-8 [http://perma.cc/7GPW
-9NS5] (reviewing a recent Goldman Sachs research report on hedge fund behavior). It is
worth noting that other investors trade even more frantically. K.J. Martijn Cremers & Antti
Petajisto, How Active Is Your Fund Manager? A New Measure that Predicts Performance, 22 REV.
FIN. STUD. 3329, 3344 (2009) (ﬁnding that the portfolio turnover for the average mutual
fund is 95% per year). By some measurements, annualized turnover in U.S. stock markets as
a whole is well above 100%. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Who Needs the Stock Market? Part I:
The Empirical Evidence 5 (Oct. 30, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com
/abstract=1292403 [http://perma.cc/QE43-GE82].
See Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 573 (hedge funds are constrained by a short-term horizon
because investors “can withdraw their funds at regular intervals,” and will switch to fund
managers who have recently earned above-market returns if a current fund lags).
Bratton, supra note 46, at 1384 (“Contracts governing private equity investment tend to lock
up investments for ﬁve years, with some contracts going as far as ten years . . . . In contrast,
the hedge funds’ shorter durations, when coupled with the large, illiquid positions, invite
aggression and impatience.”); see also id. at 1383-84 (contrasting typical hedge fund restrictions on investors removing money to private equity); Kahan & Rock, supra note 47, at
1063-64.
E.g., Paul Krugman, Opinion, Now That’s Rich, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2014), http://www
.nytimes.com/2014/05/09/opinion/krugman-now-thats-rich.html [http://perma.cc/BP3W
-T7VX] (calling hedge fund managers “oligarchs” and criticizing hedge fund managers’ arguments that it is unfair and socially unproductive to make them pay the same tax rates as
workers do); Rich Managers, Poor Clients, ECONOMIST (Dec. 22, 2012), http://www
.economist.com/news/leaders/21568740-investors-have-paid-too-much-hedge-fund-expert
ise-better-focus-low-costs-star [http://perma.cc/SK69-R8DZ] (noting that hedge fund fee
structures make it more likely the managers will get rich than that their clients will).
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tive for a near-term focus.76 The so-called “2 and 20”77 approach provides a
great deal of beneﬁt to a hedge fund manager that can lock in a lucrative gain,
and is not designed to compensate the manager for a mere market rate of return.78 The high fees are supposed to be justiﬁed by the delivery of far superior
returns than a buy-and-hold strategy.
Although it is, of course, true that wealthy individuals are the source of a
material amount of capital invested in the hedge fund industry, the industry’s
growth cannot be attributed solely to the super-wealthy. Rather, institutions
upon which ordinary Americans rely—such as pension funds, university endowments, and charitable foundations—have entrusted large amounts of capital to the hedge fund industry. By way of example, institutional investor money
constituted 25% of hedge fund assets in 2001, and pension funds were poised
to raise their allocations to hedge funds sharply.79 By 2015, one source estimat-

76.

See Pozen, supra note 55, at 7 (describing how incentive fees—the “20” in “2 and 20”—can
reward a short-term outlook inasmuch as big gains early in the measurement period are disproportionately beneﬁcial to the manager, even if investors might be indifferent or even prefer gains distributed differently); see also Kahan & Rock, supra note 47, at 1064-66 (describing typical compensation structures for hedge fund managers).
77. The phrase “2 and 20” refers to the traditional hedge fund compensation structure in which
fund managers earned 2% of assets under management as well as 20% of proﬁts. See Bratton, supra note 46, at 1384. Although investors have had some success in decreasing the percentage “take,” the basic structure of charging a percentage of total assets and a higher percentage of performance seems untouched. See, e.g., Tom DiChristopher, CalSTRS CIO: The
2 and 20 Hedge-Fund Model Is Dead, CNBC (May 2, 2016, 11:35 AM), http://www.cnbc.com
/2016/05/02/calstrs-cio-the-2-and-20-hedge-fund-model-is-dead.html
[http://perma.cc
/7UXT-CS4V] (quoting the chief investment officer of a large pension fund saying the percentages have come down in many cases); Down to 1.4 and 17, supra note 58 (fee trend moving closer to 1.4% on assets and 17% on proﬁts for all but the highest performing funds).
Apparently Alfred Winslow Jones, the founder of the ﬁrst hedge funds, picked 20% “invoking the Phoenician sea captains who kept a ﬁfth of the proﬁts from successful voyages.” Mallaby, supra note 48.
78. See Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 573 (in exchange for the “generous” 2 and 20 structure,
“hedge fund investors expect quick returns that outperform the market”). Although
many hedge fund managers cannot treat their income as “carried interest,” as many
private equity managers can (because hedge fund proﬁts, unlike private equity proﬁts, are
typically short-term capital gains), other tax deferral strategies are available, including ones
that can transform hedge fund proﬁts into long-term capital gains. See Victor Fleischer,
Why Hedge Funds Don’t Worry About Carried Interest Tax Rules, N.Y. TIMES (May
14, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/05/14/why-hedge-funds-dont-worry-about
-carried-interest-tax-rules [http://perma.cc/YLY3-6KGS].
79. Cheffins & Armour, supra note 53, at 90, 97; Tamar Frankel, Private Investment Funds: Hedge
Funds’ Regulation by Size, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 657, 666 (2008) (“Before the year 2000, most
hedge fund investors were wealthy individuals. Since then, institutional investors, such as
pension funds, endowment funds, and sovereign wealth funds, have invested in hedge

1894

who bleeds when the wolves bite?

ed that pension funds constituted about 40% of the capital invested in hedge
funds.80 At the same time as the composition of hedge fund investors has
changed, so too have activist hedge funds developed a distinct investment
strategy.
In recent decades, hedge fund activism has increased considerably. Although hedge fund activism campaigns display some diversity, basic patterns
have emerged. First, the hedge fund must secure an equity position that allows
it to make sizable gains if its activism succeeds in whole or in part. It can be expensive to get active, particularly if the fund ultimately has to get its way
through a proxy ﬁght or similar battle, and the fund must secure enough equity not just to have credible inﬂuence, but more importantly to make gains justifying its risky investment with material upfront expenses. Using the antiquated
disclosure regime under Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act, hedge funds
can acquire as much equity as they want, so long as they disclose their interests
within ten days of reaching a 5% ownership threshold.81 Even then, though,
the disclosure regime is incomplete and does not capture all the derivative positions the hedge fund can take.82 These positions must be understood if one is
funds.”); see also LO, supra note 56, at 1 (“Long the province of foundations, family offices,
and high-net-worth investors, alternative investments are now attracting major institutional
investors such as large state and corporate pension funds, insurance companies, and university endowments, and efforts are underway to make hedge fund investments available to individual investors through more traditional mutual fund investment vehicles.”); Cheffins &
Armour, supra note 53, at 89 (changes to the Investment Company Act facilitated institutional investor participation in hedge funds); Summer A. LePree, Taxation of United States
Tax-Exempt Entities’ Offshore Hedge Fund Investments: Application of the Section 514 DebtFinanced Rules to Leveraged Hedge Funds and Derivatives and the Case for Equalization, 61 TAX
LAW. 807, 810-12 (2008) (describing investments by pensions in hedge funds).
80. 2015 Preqin Global Hedge Fund Report, PREQIN 10 ﬁg.6.23 (2015), http://www.pre
qin.com/docs/samples/2015-Preqin-Global-Hedge-Fund-Report-Sample-Pages.pdf [http://
perma.cc/6ASF-XVUF].
81. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (2015).
82. Cheffins & Armour, supra note 53, at 65-67 (describing situations where activists have used
derivatives such as total return swaps to build positions while avoiding reporting); Kahan &
Rock, supra note 47, at 1063 (noting that options and derivatives are excluded from hedge
fund quarterly reporting requirements as well as the fact that no disclosure is required at all
if the hedge fund’s 13(f) securities are under $100 million). Even so, one recent study found
call options used in 6.6% of its sample of interventions and put options used in 3.1% of its
sample. Krishnan et al., supra note 64, at 300 tbl.1. Another potentially relevant reporting
requirement, the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, requires, assuming the jurisdictional bases are satisﬁed, ﬁlings and waiting periods before acquiring voting
securities in excess of approximately $200 million. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(2)(A) (2012); 16 C.F.R.
§ 801.1(h) (2016) (deﬁning notiﬁcation thresholds). It is, however, the acquisition of the
right to vote that counts. 16 C.F.R. § 801.13 to .14. Obtaining a right to acquire shares does
not count until the actual voting rights are obtained.
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able to tell just how “long”—exposed to increases in equity value—the hedge
fund is on the public company.83 Although in some instances a lead hedge fund
has come public with ownership stakes of 20% or more—such as in the J.C.
Penney situation in 2010 when activist Pershing Square, working with Vornado
Realty Trust, surfaced owning 26.4% of J.C. Penney84—the median ownership
interest of a lead hedge fund when it goes public has been reported at 6.3% in
one study85 and 8.3% in another, more recent study.86
The wolf pack imagery comes in at this stage. There is evidence that when
an alpha wolf—the primary moving hedge fund—has begun accumulating
shares but has not yet gone public with a Schedule 13D ﬁling, other wolves
move into the stock.87 Thus, when the alpha wolf emerges with its teeth into a
good-sized piece of its prey, other wolves are also grabbing chunks for themselves.88 This, naturally, has led to suspicion that the alpha wolf has been or-

83.

84.

85.
86.
87.

88.

See David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, 13(d) Reporting Inadequacies in an Era of Speed and
Innovation; Corporate Governance, N.Y.L.J. (Sept. 24, 2015) (arguing that current disclosure
of derivatives and synthetic positions is inadequate); Theodore N. Mirvis et al., Beneﬁcial
Ownership of Equity Derivatives and Short Positions—A Modest Proposal to Bring the 13D Reporting System into the 21st Century, WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ (Mar. 3, 2015), http://
www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/WLRKMemos/WLRK/WLRK.15395.08.pdf [http://
perma.cc/2XBJ-QBVM] (arguing that current disclosure of derivatives and synthetic positions is inadequate). Although the Dodd-Frank Act did authorize measures to increase reporting by private funds, the ultimate rulemaking had little effect on public position reporting. A Closer Look: The Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: Impact on
Alternative Asset Managers, PWC 15-18 (Aug. 2010), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/ﬁnancial
-services/regulatory-services/publications/dodd-frank-closer-look.html [http://perma.cc
/7PZQ-U6RS].
See Michael J. de la Merced, J.C. Penney Gives Board Seats to Roth and Ackman, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 24, 2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/01/24/penney-to-give-board-seats-to
-pershing-and-vornado [http://perma.cc/BB33-JCTM]; see also Coffee & Palia, supra note 6,
at 567 n.79 (“Much attention earlier focused on the acquisition of 26.7% in J.C. Penney by
Pershing Square and Vornado Realty Trust, most of which occurred during the ten-day
window period after they crossed 5%.”).
Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Pre-Disclosure Accumulations by Activist Investors: Evidence and Policy, 39 J. CORP. L. 1, 4-5, 15 (2013).
Krishnan et al., supra note 64, at 300 tbl.1.
Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 562-64; see also Alon Brav et al., Wolf Pack Activism 4-7 (Robert H. Smith Sch. Research Paper No. RHS 2529230, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract
=2529230 [http://perma.cc/MPR8-WJB5] (modeling wolf pack behavior).
Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 565 (noting that unusual trading volumes suggest “many
other institutional investors” buy target company stock before the lead activist ﬁles a Schedule 13D); see also id. at 567 n.79 (collecting instances where insurgents collectively acquired
material amounts of target stock in a short period).
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ganizing the hunt with the other wolves.89 Professors Coffee and Palia summarize other studies by observing that “tipping and informed trading appears to
characterize both the formation of the ‘wolf pack’ and transactions during the
window period preceding the ﬁling of the Schedule 13D.”90
Understanding wolf pack behavior is further complicated because hedge
funds are not subject to some important market regulations. Hedge funds are
not subject to Regulation FD—a regulation requiring issuers to disclose material non-public information broadly to the market, if the information is disclosed at all.91 Moreover, stockholders do not normally have duties to companies in which they invest and that is almost always true of hedge funds in the
stake-building period itself because they typically had no ownership position
before and no representation on the board.92 Thus, so long as they are not disclosing nonpublic information which they obtained as a result of an insider’s
breach of duty, hedge funds are normally free to tip third parties about their
own plans or intentions without running afoul of Rule 10b-5.93 Thus, as a result of the inapplicability of Regulation FD and Rule 10b-5,94 there is often the
potential for entirely legal tipping that accompanies activists investing in a target company. The failure of the disclosure laws to demand a full accounting of
all interests compounds the complexity of understanding the economic interests of the various activist hedge funds who simultaneously or concurrently
move into the target’s stock with the alpha wolf.95 Not only may some wolves
own fewer than 5%, so too may disclosing wolves have additional interests not
captured by an outdated disclosure regime.
Whether the alpha wolf consciously forms a pack or the other wolves are
just good at sniffing blood and being present to get their share of the kill is also
not so much the focus of this Feature. But the reality is that, given the lack of

89.
90.
91.

92.

93.
94.

95.

See id. at 565-66.
Id. at 565.
See General Rule Regarding Selective Disclosure, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a) (2015) (“Whenever
an issuer . . . discloses any material nonpublic information regarding that issuer or its securities . . . the issuer shall make public disclosure of that information . . . .” (emphasis added)).
See, e.g., Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del. 1987) (“Under Delaware law a shareholder owes a ﬁduciary duty only if it owns a majority interest in or
exercises control over the business affairs of the corporation.” (citation omitted)).
See Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 566 & n.75.
SEC Rule 10b-5 is “the federal securities laws’ principal antifraud prohibition.” Donald C.
Langevoort, Theories of Liability—Principal Theories Under the Federal Securities Laws—Abstain
or Disclose, in 18 INSIDER TRADING REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT AND PREVENTION § 1:8
(Westlaw 2016).
See Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 562-64.
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stringency in Section 13(d) and its limited reach to concerted activity, it is not
uncommon for a public corporation to ﬁnd itself with a sudden change in investment proﬁle that involves 10 to 25% or more of its stock ending up in the
hands of various activist hedge funds without prior public disclosure.96
When viewed from an objective perspective, and not through the lens of
anti-activist zealotry, the wolf pack in the more important, high-salience activist campaigns is likely to include not just fellow hedge funds, but actively traded mutual funds. Many sophisticated practitioners note that the fund managers
of actively traded mutual funds, who are frustrated with corporate managers
who do not listen to their input, share their frustrations and their ideas about
improving the corporation with activists whom they ﬁnd credible.97 Even more
commonly, active long-only funds often provide voting and, as important, private (in terms of communicating to the target’s management and board that
advisability of listening to the activist) and public support to activist initiatives.98 Without the support of these mainstream funds, the activist hedge fund

96.

See id. at 567-68.
For understandable reasons, market participants and practitioners are reluctant to be quoted
to this effect. But it is commonly understood to be true. Many leading practitioners have
commented to me that, generally, there is a great deal of communication among actively
traded mutual fund managers, stock analysts, and activists, which includes mutual funds directing activist hedge funds to good targets for intervention. That communication happens
in both directions. An experienced practitioner noted that Nelson Peltz, the leading activist
behind Trian, once said he could control a company with ﬁve phone calls to traditional
money managers, including mutual funds. This phenomenon has received some wider attention. E.g., David Benoit & Kirsten Grind, Activist Investors’ Secret Ally: Big Mutual Funds,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 9, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/activist-investors-secret-ally-big
-mutual-funds-1439173910 [http://perma.cc/M5Q2-8ZPD] (describing activist intervention
at Microsoft involving discussions between activist and long-only mutual fund families that
already held a material amount of the target’s stock). In fact, one market participant indicated that because actively traded mutual funds have been underperforming—resulting in a
shift of asset allocation to passive index funds—actively managed funds are now beginning
to act more like activists themselves to try to generate higher returns.
98. Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 572 (activists have the potential to increase their inﬂuence
over target boards by partnering with pension funds and mutual funds); Benoit & Grind,
supra note 97 (describing situations where activists were backed with “serious muscle” in the
form of large mutual funds); see also William D. Cohan, Starboard Value’s Jeff Smith: The Investor CEOs Fear Most, FORTUNE (Dec. 3, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://fortune.com/2014/12/03
/starboard-capitals-jeff-smith-activist-investor-darden-restaurants [http://perma.cc/ZA7L
-M6R2] (describing evidence that the mutual fund and long-only fund family Capital Research “work[ed] hand and glove” with Starboard during its intervention at Darden). Longonly mutual funds may provide more subtle support to activists in the form of an unwillingness to back efforts by the managers of public companies to undertake potentially very
value-enhancing, but risky transitions in business strategy when an easier M&A sale option
is available. As one experienced practitioner related:
97.
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leader would not have the clout to extract favorable concessions in a settlement,
much less to prevail in a contested proxy ﬁght.99
The strategies that hedge funds advocate are not diverse. In a few situations, hedge funds have claimed to have innovative strategies to improve the
operations of companies in challenging industries, such as department
stores.100 As will be discussed, there are not many stories of this sort of operational innovation systematically creating value. An example of an unusual story
along these lines involves Starboard Value’s intervention at Darden Restaurants. Its three-hundred page presentation identiﬁed numerous operational
improvements including practice changes to ensure only fresh breadsticks came
to the table at Olive Garden and to decrease table wait times.101 Some evidence
is emerging that when longer-term hedge funds succeed in seating experienced, successful corporate executives on target boards as a result of a settle-

In three [situations] companies were trying to deal with technology changes . . .
and were led by founders who . . . wanted to try and turn the company around in
the public markets. In each case the CEOs went to their largest institutional investors, and essentially sought the guidance of these investors, who were long-term
investors in the company, and asked would they support a risky transition that
might or might not succeed—although of course management and the CEOs believed it would succeed and had a track record of success—and lead to a stronger
company and higher stock price in 3-5 years or would they prefer to sell the company now for a certain premium. The answer in all three cases was the same—sell.
E-mail to Leo E. Strine, Jr. (Oct. 18, 2016, 12:14 PM) (on ﬁle with author).
99. See Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 572. (“Thus, [activist hedge funds] will need allies among
traditional institutional investors, who are largely indexed and have held their investments
in most companies for multiple years.”).
100. See infra notes 127, 261, 276 (describing interventions at J.C. Penney, Macy’s, and Sears, respectively). Pershing Square’s intervention at Target Corp. was another notable attempt, albeit heavy on ﬁnancial engineering objectives such as placing Target’s land (on which its
stores sit) into a separately traded real estate investment trust and selling credit card receivables to third parties. Zachery Kouwe, Target’s Shareholders Strongly Reject Dissident Slate, Ending Divisive Proxy Battle, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/29
/business/29target.html [http://perma.cc/TM5P-K6W7].
101. Transforming Darden Restaurants, STARBOARD VALUE (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www
.shareholderforum.com/dri/Library/20140911_Starboard-presentation.pdf [http://perma.cc
/BW9E-6XWN]. In the two years following the start of Starboard’s intervention, Darden’s
stock price rose around 47%. Julie Jargon & David Benoit, How a Shareholder Coup at Olive
Garden’s Owner Sparked a Turnaround, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 5, 2016), http://www.wsj.com
/articles/activists-reap-olive-garden-bounty-1459902161 [http://perma.cc/Z6UR-4HLS].
Whether or not this intervention was successful, what can at least be said is that Starboard
focused on speciﬁc business strategy changes that were rationally designed to draw in more
customers and thus increase revenue.
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ment or election, the target’s performance improves.102 But, many of the gains
from even these longer-term funds have come from putting targets into a sale
in whole or in part,103 and, what is missing is a matching of a number of actual
stories about management improvement at speciﬁc high-salience targets to the
overall data in the samples they study.
Thus, what remains more common is that a hedge fund will argue that a
corporation with healthy proﬁts is not returning enough of those proﬁts to its
investors.104 The hedge fund will argue that the corporation, by dint of exces102.

See Krishnan et al., supra note 64, at 296 (arguing that the success of certain hedge fund activists appears to result more from board representation, improved performance, and monitoring management than from capital structure or dividend policy changes).
103. Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 588 (summarizing studies that tend to suggest “expected
takeover premium, more than operating improvements” constitute the majority of stock
price gain found in both short-term and long-term studies of shareholder activism); Activist
Investing: An Annual Review of Trends in Shareholder Activism, ACTIVIST INSIGHT & SHULTE
ROTH & ZABEL 11 (2016) [hereinafter Activist Investing], http://www.activistinsight
.com/amp/issues/The%20Activist%20Investing%20Annual%20Review%202016._260.pdf
[http://perma.cc/WXD7-9E7F] (“[I]n a bumper year for M&A, activists both pushed for
deals and higher valuations.”); see also Marco Becht et al., Hedge Fund Activism in Europe 3
(Corp. Governance Inst. Fin. Working Paper No. 283/2010, 2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract
_id=1616340 [http://perma.cc/DW98-WR5B] (studying returns from hedge fund activism
in Europe and ﬁnding similar results). Indeed, in one of the purest forms of this strategy,
many notable funds have built stakes in two companies and pushed them to merge.
Mitel Networks’s acquisition of Polycom was the product of an activist taking a stake
in both. Anne Steele, Mitel Networks To Acquire Polycom for Nearly $2 Billion, WALL ST. J.
(Apr. 15, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/mitel-networks-to-acquire-polycom-for-1-8
-billion-1460718185 [http://perma.cc/W7HL-J7ZM].
Another fund took stakes in Baker Hughes and Halliburton to encourage their merger,
a merger that was later halted on antitrust grounds. David Benoit, U.S. v. ValueAct: A Lawsuit To Deﬁne Activism, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 4, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/justice
-department-sues-valueact-over-baker-hughes-halliburton-disclosures-1459794637 [http://
perma.cc/D29B-RLY2].
Still another fund built stakes in competitors Staples and Office Depot and pushed for
them to merge, but largely was out of the stocks by the time the merger collapsed, also on
antitrust grounds. David Benoit, Starboard Avoids the Staples-Office Depot Shredder, WALL
ST. J. (May 12, 2016), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2016/05/12/starboard-avoids-the
-staples-office-depot-shredder [http://perma.cc/4KA6-M4G4].
104. See Brav et al., supra note 16, at 1742-43 tbl.I (summarizing stated objectives of activist interventions in sample, ﬁnding that 19% of interventions involve arguments in favor of capital
return but only 1% involve arguments in favor of pursuing growth strategies); Cheffins &
Armour, supra note 53, at 60 (“Hedge funds often lobby for ﬁnance-oriented changes, such
as having a target company squeeze value from the balance sheet by spinning off underperforming non-core assets and by using share buy-backs or a sizeable one-off dividend to distribute ‘excess’ cash to shareholders.”); Klein & Zur, supra note 64, at 189, 203-05. But see
Krishnan et al., supra note 64, at 310 (ﬁnding that more successful interventions in terms of
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sive costs, is operating inefficiently, and that if it cut its spending or took on
more debt, it could pay out more gains to its investors immediately. Thus, arguments to reduce capital and other spending (including headcount) and to
increase dividends or do a large stock buyback program are de rigueur.105 Even a
giant and massively proﬁtable company like Apple has not been immune from
these pressures for short-term increases in returns, as its capitulation to Carl
Icahn’s demand for an increased stock buyback program demonstrates.106 Corporate ﬁnance plays of another kind are also common, with the hedge fund arguing that if the company is broken into pieces, its value will increase as pure
plays.107 As suggested, with arguments for all these strategies is an almost al-

market reaction involved activists whose interventions were characterized by growth in research and development spending, sales, and return on assets, but that the bulk of interventions in the sample involved activists whose interventions were characterized by meaningful
drops in those metrics, resulting in a material percentage of targets delisted for reasons other
than merger activity); Activist Investing, supra note 103, at 11 (describing the high frequency
of “balance sheet activism”).
105. See Brav et al., supra note 16, at 1741, 1742 tbl.I (noting that 19% of interventions involve direct calls to address excess cash or change capital structure); see also Klein & Zur, supra note
64 at 226 (“Hedge funds address the free cash ﬂow problem by frequently demanding the
target ﬁrm to buy back its own shares, cut the CEO’s salary, and initiate dividends.”); Vipal
Monga et al., As Activism Rises, U.S. Firms Spend More on Buybacks than Factories, WALL ST. J.
(May 26, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/companies-send-more-cash-back-to-share
holders-1432693805 [http://perma.cc/6YKK-PJSL] (describing activist investors advocating
for increased buybacks and dividends).
106. Icahn took a stake in Apple in 2013, and urged the company to raise capital in the debt markets to buy back its stock. Ian Sherr & David Benoit, Icahn Pushes Apple on Buyback, WALL
ST. J. (Aug. 13, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324085304579010971
386703480 [http://perma.cc/GL2G-GXB8]. Apple later did just that. Michael J. De La
Merced, Icahn Ends Call for Apple Stock Buyback, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2014), http://dealbook
.nytimes.com/2014/02/10/icahn-backs-off-apple-buyback-proposal [http://perma.cc/ZL4K
-CJHA]. Although Icahn claimed that “[t]here is nothing short term about my intentions
here,” he exited his Apple investment within three years of that statement. John Lanchester,
How Should We Read Investor Letters, NEW YORKER (Sept. 5, 2016), http://www.new
yorker.com/magazine/2016/09/05/jeff-gramms-dear-chairman-boardroom-battles-and-the
-rise-of-shareholder-activism [http://perma.cc/8PSN-9X4G]. DuPont was another recent
activist target that otherwise “had consistently outperformed all relevant benchmarks for
corporate performance.” Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 555; see infra notes 263–264 and accompanying text.
107. Brav et al., supra note 16, at 1741-42 (identifying approximately 9% of activist interventions
in the authors’ dataset where the goal is enhancing target focus through spinoffs or restructuring). For example, Trian advocated a restructuring of DuPont spinning off aspects of its
business. Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 579 (describing Trian’s DuPont intervention as ﬁtting the “paradigm” of the kind of campaigns activists prefer); see also Jacob Bunge &
David Benoit, DuPont Defeats Peltz, Trian in Board Fight, WALL ST. J. (May 13, 2015),
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ways present hint that a sale of the company should also be considered.108 That
sale will not involve a purchase by the hedge fund or its fellow wolves.
Hedge funds, unlike private equity funds, will not buy a company’s entire
equity and arrange their own ﬁnancing, as is typically required when a full
change of control happens.109 Rather, hedge funds will not bear that kind of
risk and wish for the option of trading out of the company’s equity. If a hedge
fund can push a target into a merger with a lucrative target-side premium, that
will facilitate the hedge fund’s exit, but the hedge fund has no desire to be the
acquirer in that kind of transaction. And when a hedge fund succeeds in changing the target’s business plan in other ways through pressure strategies, the
hedge fund typically will make no commitment to remain as a long-term
stockholder.110
How hedge funds succeed in their campaigns vary.111 For the most part
now, they win by coming public, not so subtly suggesting a willingness to
scuffle, and by reaching an accommodation with the target’s management that
involves the hedge fund gaining board seats.112 Once inside the boardroom, the

108.

109.
110.
111.

112.

http://www.wsj.com/articles/dupont-appears-poised-to-win-over-peltz-1431521564 [http://
perma.cc/AJK5-SNVQ] (describing Trian’s attempted intervention).
See Brav et al., supra note 16, at 1741-44 (noting that most activism calls for increasing cash
ﬂows for near-term payouts, encouraging restructurings such as spinoffs, encouraging a sale
of the target, or targeting ﬁrm governance).
Cheffins & Armour, supra note 53, at 60 (noting that hedge funds typically do not wish to
own the ﬁrms that they seek to ﬁx).
See supra text accompanying notes 70-74 (discussing relatively short hedge fund holding periods).
What constitutes “success” is far from clear. For example, a simple uptick in the target’s
stock price following the announcement that an activist has taken a position in the target’s
stock can create a proﬁt on paper for the activist. Obtaining minority representation on the
target’s board through an election or settlement is often argued to constitute “success,” although that is no guarantee that the board will adopt the activist’s program. Regardless,
“success” on either of those deﬁnitions does not guarantee that the company is better off in
either the short- or long-term. Furthermore, there is at least some evidence that there is no
difference in abnormal returns in target company stock regardless of who wins a proxy contest—the theory is that management tends to implement the kinds of changes insurgents
want even if they stay in control. See Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 572 (describing the results of a study conﬁrming this conclusion). DuPont’s resistance to Trian and later spinoffs
and potential merger with Dow is a high-proﬁle example of this phenomenon. See infra text
accompanying notes 262-264. But see Bratton, supra note 46, at 1420 (suggesting that when
the activist funds stay invested in the target over time, better results ensue); Krishnan et al.,
supra note 64, at 309-10 (same).
See Elizabeth Judd, Let’s Make a Deal: A Look at Recent Activist Settlements, CORP.
SECRETARY (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.corporatesecretary.com/articles/proxy-voting-sha
reholder-actions/12868/lets-make-deal-look-recent-activist-settlements
[http://perma.cc
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activists press for their particular variety of corporate change. In the past few
years, most activist hedge fund campaigns resulted in the hedge fund gaining
at least some degree of representation on the company’s board,113 and in most
of these situations, the victory resulted from a settlement.114 But these settlements would not occur at their current high rate without the industry’s willingness to engage in high-proﬁle proxy ﬁghts, “withhold vote” contests, and
other pressure strategies.115 High-salience wins by the hedge fund industry involving major corporations116 and the demonstrated willingness of key proxy

/6RAE-XHDQ]; see also Hedge Fund Activism in Technology and Life Science Companies, LAT& WATKINS LLP 10, 14 (Mar. 2012), http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf
/pub4723_1.pdf [http://perma.cc/TQ8Z-HECD] (discussing the practice of settlements and
ways companies may defend against hedge fund activists).
Brav et al., supra note 16, at 1744 (ﬁnding that “hedge funds achieve success, or partial success, in nearly two-thirds of the cases”).
See 2016 US Activism Review: Stabilization, INST. SHAREHOLDER SERVS. 1 (2016) (noting that
although activists gained twenty-seven board seats through contested elections in 2016
through September, they gained “substantially” more seats through settlements); Gregory
H. Shill, The Golden Leash and the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty, 64 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming
2017) (manuscript at 7), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2833399 [http://perma.cc/2YVX-AXSJ]
(describing a “dynamic” of “boards and activists . . . edging unmistakably towards collaboration” and noting a trend whereby 40% of announced proxy contests result in settlement);
Michael Flaherty, Big Funds Push Back Against Activist Investor Settlements, REUTERS (Jul. 18,
2016, 3:21 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-activist-investors-idUSKCN0ZY2DP
[http://perma.cc/2DBT-HFYG] (describing the “historically high number” of settle
ments); Judd, supra note 112 (noting that 33% of proxy ﬁghts in 2014 settled); see also Michael Flaherty & Anjali Athavaley, U.S. Companies Quicker To Give Board Seats to Activists,
REUTERS (Sept. 25, 2015, 7:41 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-hedgefunds
-activists-insight-idUSKCN0RP0D020150925 [http://perma.cc/XKY9-WJWH] (describing a decrease in the number of days from initial disclosure of activist position to settlement).
See, e.g., Che Odom, Quick Settlement Times Show Power of Activist Investors, BLOOMBERG
CORP. L. & ACCOUNTABILITY REP. (June 22, 2016), http://www.bna.com/quick-settlement
-times-n57982074550 [http://perma.cc/W5V8-C2GC] (quoting Marc Weingarten of Shulte
Roth & Zabel, LLP as observing that companies “think it’s more prudent to settle than to go
through the distraction and expense of a proxy ﬁght they’re likely to lose anyway”).
In one case, ailing internet giant Yahoo agreed to add board members, including the
chief executive of the hedge fund agitating for a new board. Douglas Macmillian &
David Benoit, Yahoo Reaches Deal With Starboard To Add Board Members, WALL ST. J.
(Apr. 27, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/yahoo-reaches-deal-with-starboard-14617623
87 [http://perma.cc/FC22-FDVB]. Other high-visibility wins include board shakeups at
Pentair PLC, Intuit Inc., and Adobe Systems Inc. David Benoit, Activism’s Long Road From
Corporate Raiding to Banner Year, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 26, 2015), http://www.wsj.com
/articles/activisms-long-road-from-corporate-raiding-to-banner-year-1451070910 [http://
perma.cc/GCR8-BBBX].
HAM

113.
114.

115.

116.
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advisors like ISS, Glass Lewis,117 and mainstream mutual funds to support and
vote for activist hedge fund campaigns have made clear to public company
boards that activist hedge funds can beat them at the ballot box.
Commonly, these wins arrive well before the ballot box.118 Settlements typically involve a combination of business policy strategy changes, usually involving some increase in immediate returns to investors through dividends or buybacks, and agreement to put directors proposed by the hedge fund (which can
include hedge fund managers themselves) on the board of directors to help
oversee the policy changes or a determination to sell the company.119 The

117.

Don Duffy, CEOs Need a ‘Healthy Paranoia’ of Activist Investors, CNBC (Aug. 12, 2015, 3:05
PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/08/12/ceos-need-a-healthy-paranoia-of-activist-investors
-commentary.html [http://perma.cc/5KFH-LNHG] (noting increasing support proxy advisory ﬁrms give to activist positions); Anthony Garcia, Does ISS Pull the Strings in a Proxy
Fight?, FACTSET (Mar. 11, 2015), http://insight.factset.com/does-iss-pull-the-strings-in-a
-proxy-ﬁght [http://perma.cc/5KFH-LNHG] (analyzing disclosed ISS recommendations in
activist interventions and ﬁnding that “in the last three years [ISS support] was more often
for the dissident than management”). That support can come indirectly as well, through
proxy advisor advocacy for corporate governance rules more conducive to shareholder direct
democracy. As a very current example, ISS indicated that starting in the 2017 proxy season, it
will recommend no or withhold votes for board members on governance committees where
the company restricts shareholder direct democracy in companies’ bylaws. Americas: U.S.,
Canada, and Latin America Proxy Voting Guidelines Updates, INST. SHAREHOLDER
SERVS. 1 (2016), http://www.issgovernance.com/policy-gateway/2016-policy-information
[http://perma.cc/M358-G5V8].
118. See Activist Investing, supra note 103, at 12 (observing that board representation is more likely
to come through settlement than a contested election).
119. See id. at 13 (“Without having board representation, an activist investor may ﬁnd it difficult
to ensure their ideas and strategies are being properly implemented.” (quoting Bruce Goldfarb, CEO of proxy solicitation ﬁrm, Okapi Partners)). In the case of ValueAct’s intervention
with Microsoft, the two sides reached a settlement on August 28, 2013, including a provision
where Mason Morﬁt, ValueAct’s CEO, would get a seat on Microsoft’s board. Within a
month, Microsoft announced an increased dividend and stock buyback plan—measures it
had previously resisted. See OWEN WALKER, BARBARIANS IN THE BOARDROOM: ACTIVIST INVESTORS AND THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE WORLD’S MOST POWERFUL COMPANIES 15055 (2016). When art auction house Sotheby’s settled with Dan Loeb’s Third Point fund, the
activist investor received three board seats. David Benoit & Sara Germano, Sotheby’s, Third
Point Reach Settlement, WALL ST. J. (May 5, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB
10001424052702303647204579543581203051454 [http://perma.cc/6HL6-N3LL]. Less than a
year later, Sotheby’s tapped an unconventional (for an art company) new CEO—
a Harvard Business School MBA with more experience in branding and technology
than art, who some regarded as “a safe pair of hands who can deliver on operational efficiencies and help Sotheby’s transition” to new owners. Katya Kazakina, Art Degree Not Needed:
New Sotheby’s CEO Offers Technology Savvy, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 30, 2015, 12:00 AM
EDT), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-30/art-degree-not-needed-new
-sotheby-s-ceo-offers-technology-savvy [http://perma.cc/7CS6-TXUY].
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placement of one of a hedge fund’s managers on the board does not mean that
the fund is likely to commit to remain permanently invested, but it admittedly
does subject the hedge fund to regulations like prohibitions on short-swing
proﬁt taking and insider trading.120 For this reason, settlements that involve a
target implementing the policy changes the hedge fund advocates, but denying
the hedge fund board seats, might be attractive to the hedge fund because its
liquidity will be considerably enhanced. Nonetheless, it is increasingly common
for settlements to involve the hedge fund placing one or more of its key employees directly on the board,121 and there is some emerging evidence that
when hedge funds are willing to invest long-term, the outcomes for all are
more positive.122

120.

There are multiple paths for an activist hedge fund to fall within Section 16 short-swing
proﬁt liability. E.g., Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 563 & n.67 (describing how an activist
becomes subject to Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act after acquiring 10% of a
company’s shares, and therefore may be forced to surrender “short swing proﬁts”). But, appointing one or more directors to a company board is one way—and a way that is not predicated on the hedge fund remaining a greater-than-10% stockholder. Cf. Carol Anne Huff &
Elisabeth Martin, Corporate Governance: Director Equity Awards to PE Fund Representatives on
Public Company Boards, 26 INSIGHTS: THE CORP. & SEC. L. ADVISOR 18, 19-22 (Sept. 2012),
http://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/Publications/Insights%20(Director%20Equity%20Awar
ds_%20Huff%20byline).pdf [http://perma.cc/WND7-GDXX] (discussing the concept of
“director by deputization” in the private equity context where funds placing directors on
corporate boards may be brought within Rule 16b—short swing proﬁt liability for insiders—
depending on the relationship and interaction between the fund and the director). Depending on the arrangement between the director and investor, the investor also may be restricted from trading if she is receiving information about the company from the director.
See Francis J. Aquila, Selecting Directors Designated by an Investor, PRACTICAL L.J. 20, 24
(Feb. 2015), http://www.sullcrom.com/ﬁles/upload/Feb15_InTheBoardroom.pdf [http://
perma.cc/H2LE-5HR7].
121. 2015 broke the previous record for campaigns resulting in board seats for investors or their
designees. Benoit, supra note 116.
122. For example, a new study suggests that activists with a proven capacity to take a very large
stake, gain board seats, and inﬂuence business strategy over a long period generate more
gains. See Krishnan et al., supra note 64, at 310-12. The study implies this by showing that
interventions by certain activists—a minority of the overall interventions and activists in the
study—with those characteristics had better results, not simply in terms of stock price, but
on growth in metrics like research and development spending, sales, and return on assets.
Id. at 298. In contrast, those metrics all materially decreased in the majority of interventions.
Notably, the more successful minority made materially larger investments, in terms of dollars, and so the difference in performance on a value-weighted basis could be even greater
than the authors’ data allow them to conclude. Id. at 298, 302. The authors of that study
have not fully linked together their story, but the case they seem to make is that activists capable of bringing in genuine managerial skill over a longer time period and who act as longer-term owners will generate better results for stockholders and other constituencies. See
Bratton, supra note 46, at 1420 (ﬁnding that the best performing subset of portfolios con-
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Even when activists obtain seats on the board, their strategies may not be
adopted, or the strategies may not succeed. In some high-proﬁle situations, this
has led to the payment of what traditionally was called “greenmail” as the price
of getting a hedge fund to exit.123 This arguably happened in interventions targeting General Growth Properties, Yahoo, and ADT.124 These buyouts have
been understandably controversial because the corporation’s willingness to buy
the hedge fund’s block arguably confers upon the fund a premium over the
block discount it would have suffered if it tried to unload its position in the
market while complying with the legal constraints on its selling ﬂexibility attributable to its ﬁduciary role in the corporation.125 These situations have not
been common, however, and it seems likely that most hedge funds exit through
the public markets from which they acquired ownership and do so after a period that is brief in terms of the life cycle of a corporation or an ordinary human
investor.126 Even when hedge funds exit through public markets, it is sometimes with a helping hand from their former target—when the activist agitating
for change at J.C. Penney reached a strategic dead end,127 the board struck a

123.

124.
125.

126.
127.

structed from a sample of 104 hedge fund interventions from 2002-2006 was the one involving companies where the intervening hedge funds continued to hold a substantial ownership block).
See Liz Hoffman & David Benoit, Activist Funds Dust Off ‘Greenmail’ Playbook, WALL ST. J.
(June 11, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/activist-funds-dust-off-greenmail-playbook
-1402527339 [http://perma.cc/UG6H-SJ24]. Unlike the “greenmail” of the 1980s, the share
buybacks today are priced slightly below market—avoiding the 50% tax levied on proﬁts
from greenmail enacted in 1987. Id.
Id.
See Kahan & Rock, supra note 47, at 1082 (discussing the possibility of such a conﬂict); see
also Hoffman & Benoit, supra note 123 (quoting a market participant who characterized such
buybacks as “inappropriate” and argued that “[m]anagement owes the shareholders an explanation”).
See sources cited supra note 72.
When Pershing Square intervened in J.C. Penney, it brought in a new CEO with retail, rather than ﬁnancial, experience; pushed changes in how products were promoted and put on
sale; and focused on changes to bring in relatively higher end brands. See Think Big, PERSHING SQUARE CAP. MGMT., LP (May 16, 2012), http://ftalphaville.ft.com/ﬁles/2012/05/ira
-sohn-pershing.pdf [http://perma.cc/M3GC-8KVD] (presenting these changes to investors). The new CEO lasted less than a year, until the board replaced him with his predecessor, and J.C. Penney’s sales continued their slide. See Emily Glazer et al., Penney Backﬁres on
Ackman, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 9, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241278873245
04704578412440293890624 [http://perma.cc/D9PA-WV4P]. The new team nixed the
“JCP” branding, which had been one of the hedge fund team’s innovations, and brought
back coupons. Id.
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deal with the fund, allowing its board designee to resign and providing the
fund with help to enable it to sell the fund’s stake cost effectively.128
Charles Nathan, a distinguished practitioner, has rightly argued that what
matters is not that an activist has a short-term holding period but whether the
strategy it advocates is sound.129 But, what he slights in his current thinking,
which is somewhat different from his past thinking,130 is that if the proponent
of a strategy with long-term effects has no intention to hold and suffer the risks
of that strategy, there is naturally less reason for that proponent to concentrate
on the long term.131 And Nathan is right that activists cannot be held responsible “if shareholders are predisposed to favor shorter-term programs for extraneous reasons (such as concern for quarterly and annual performance rankings
on the part of active money managers).”132 But that makes my primary point.
Shareholders predisposed to do that are not shareholders in the original sense
of being the risk bearers of the equity they control. Shareholders predisposed
to make trades out of a concern for Morningstar ratings are conﬂicted agents,
whose incentives are different and not rationally aligned with the human investors whose capital they possess. If it is the case that these money managers are
acting for their own short-term motives and if most hedge funds themselves
have no incentive to think long term, that illustrates that we are relying on the
law of unintended consequences to drive important elements of decision making in a context critical to human investors’ wellbeing.

128.

129.

130.

131.

132.

Emily Glazer et al., Ackman Moves To Dump Entire Stake in J.C. Penney, WALL ST. J. (Aug.
26, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324591204579037251135114142
[http://perma.cc/C5EV-4P2P].
Charles Nathan, Seven Deadly Fallacies of Activist Investing’s Critics, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 29, 2016), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/06/29
/criticism-of-activist-investing [http://perma.cc/26TL-3VJK].
Earlier in his career, as a corporate lawyer, Nathan was less generously disposed toward
hedge fund activism. In one instance, he described activism as “an alternate universe” separate from value creation and warned of “the large and growing agency costs” that activism
imposes on the ultimate owners of public companies. Charles M. Nathan et al., Corporate
Governance Commentary: Corporate Governance Activism: Here To Stay?, LATHAM & WATKINS
LLP 1 (June 2012), http://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/CorporateGovernanceActivism
-HereToStay [http://perma.cc/Z47G-XR5Z]. He also referred to wolf packs as “destabilization campaign[s].” Charles M. Nathan, Recent Poison Pill Developments and Trends, HARV. L.
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 12, 2009), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu
/2009/05/12/recent-poison-pill-developments-and-trends [http://perma.cc/4Z6H-W4PF].
See, e.g., Bratton, supra note 46, at 1393 (describing how companies arguably experiencing
conglomerate discounts are enticing activist targets because the activist can, if successful, experience the appreciation from a rerating of the stock without being concerned with any
long-term implications from the breakup).
Nathan, supra note 129.
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Studies of the impact of activist hedge fund investing are emerging monthly, and it is hazardous to summarize them. But, there is some emerging evidence suggesting that activist hedge funds prepared to take a long-term position and work as ﬁduciaries to improve the performance of the companies they
target achieve a better market reaction.133 There is also some evidence that
hedge funds with a longer-term outlook are less likely to pursue cuts in longterm growth drivers like research and development, when compared to hedge
funds looking for a quick pop.134 This is also the space where practitioners say
there is genuine symbiosis between traditional active mutual fund managers
and activist hedge funds. It is these companies where mutual fund managers
who feel their input over the years has been ignored suggest to an activist
hedge fund with proven clout that company X might deserve examination. In
this context, the activist can go into the ﬁght with more conﬁdence that the existing investors are frustrated and likely to support an alternative to the present
regime. This evidence suggests that hedge fund activism is perhaps most valuable when it involves a somewhat rougher form of relationship investing of the
kind for which Warren Buffet is known.135 The activist may need to knock a bit
loudly, but once let in, assumes the duties and economic consequences of becoming a genuine ﬁduciary with duties to other stockholders and of holding its
position for a period of ﬁve to ten years, during which it is a constructive participant in helping the rest of the board and management improve a lagging
company. Nelson Peltz and his Trian Fund Management might be thought of
in this manner. Peltz is not a recent business school graduate without manage-

133.

See supra note 122 and accompanying text. One example of this might be Pershing Square’s
intervention at Canadian Paciﬁc. Termed “one of the great corporate turnarounds in recent
memory,” Pershing Square’s strategy involved bringing in a new CEO with extensive
railroad industry experience who had already turned around another railroad. Antoine Gara,
By Selling Canadian Paciﬁc, Billionaire Bill Ackman Is Planning To Invest Again, FORBES
(Aug. 3, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/antoinegara/2016/08/03/by-selling-canadian
-paciﬁc-bill-ackman-is-planning-to-invest-again [http://perma.cc/6NHL-HF65].
134. See Krishnan et al., supra note 64, at 298, 309-10 (observing that targets of the high performing hedge funds—funds which also tended to take large stakes in their dataset—not only performed well but experienced growth in research and development spending as compared to targets of other funds); cf. Activist Funds: An Investor Calls, supra note 47 (analyzing
the ﬁfty largest activist positions in public company targets and ﬁnding an increase in
proﬁts, capital investment, and R&D after the intervention begins).
135. Warren E. Buffet, Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 2015 Annual Report, BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. 33
(Feb. 27, 2016), http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/2015ar/2015ar.pdf [http://perma.cc
/7M4Q-G8LB] (describing Berkshire Hathaway’s allocation of authority where business
managers make operating decisions and capital allocation decisions are made centrally); id.
at 32 (describing Berkshire Hathaway’s acquisition criteria); id. at 6 (“At Berkshire, we go
only where we are welcome.”).
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ment experience. Rather, he has been a successful CEO of several businesses for
decades,136 and has been applauded for his willingness to get into the thicket of
important work when serving on target boards.137 Precisely because in this story the hedge fund is not really short-term, at least in comparison to the rest of
the participants in our short-term markets,138 whatever business ideas it has are
likely to be ones that have to consider long-term effects more closely.
In this regard, a caution ﬂag should be noticed by both zealots for and
against hedge fund activism. If pro-hedge fund zealots point to evidence that
the more successful hedge funds are not in fact short-term, but commit to invest for ﬁve to ten years, then they should be far less passionate to defend all
hedge fund activism as useful when the results from activism overall seem to be
more problematic for other stockholders and society as a whole. Meanwhile,
anti-hedge fund zealots should not paint with spray cans and suggest that all
hedge fund activists are the same. Rather, they should be less worried about
activists who 1) bring genuine managerial expertise to bear; 2) are willing to
serve as ﬁduciaries of the target company; and 3) are willing to hold the target’s
stock for a lengthy period.
This point, of course, raises another important issue, which relates to the
question of scale: namely, whether this sort of activism, which represents a minority numerically, can grow to be the predominant form, with the more common and less successful hit-and-run approaches going away. Right now, actual
companies face both, and that is problematic, especially if the hit-and-run approaches induce companies to take shortcuts that harm long-term performance, leading to those companies being targeted later by other relationship
activists as a result of poor performance resulting from managing the company
to the market rather than in a sound long-term way.
To conclude, whether the corporations that activists leave behind are better
or worse positioned to generate sustainable proﬁts in the future is still debatable, as shall be discussed. But what is certain is that the fundamental premise of

136.

Peltz was chairman and CEO for a decade of the company that owns the Wendy’s restaurants; he also spent ﬁve years as CEO of a conglomerate manufacturer and another eight
years as CEO of a specialty chemical company. Nelson Peltz, TRIAN PARTNERS, http://www
.trianpartners.com/team-members/nelson-peltz [http://perma.cc/8YGB-73RQ].
137. David Benoit, Trian’s Nelson Peltz: What Happens When Activist Comes on Board, WALL
ST. J. (May 7, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/trians-nelson-peltz-what-happens-when
-activist-comes-on-board-1430991002 [http://perma.cc/AKN8-MG7H] (describing Peltz’s
engagement while he was a board member at H.J. Heinz Co., including considerable requests for information, and quoting board members who praised Peltz’s analytical strength
and preparation). But that is not to say that Trian is without critics. See supra note 71.
138. See Dolan, supra note 71.
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an activist hedge fund campaign is that the target corporation is able to and
should make material changes in the way it does business that will make the
corporation more valuable. Nothing genuinely valuable is cost-free, and therefore all commentators likely can agree that the corporations successfully targeted by activist hedge funds, as well as those corporations who preemptively tailor their business plans to ﬁt the typical hedge fund demand for corporate
management changes, will be differently positioned to seize the opportunities
and weather the risks of the future. Those changes have the potential to affect
human investors in multiple ways, as will be taken up in Part IV of this Feature.
Although this Feature focuses on hedge fund activism and its effects on
human investors, it is ﬁrst necessary to consider the system within which
hedge funds exert inﬂuence over public companies, their stockholders, and
other constituencies including human investors. Part III, therefore, discusses
the features of this strange corporate republic we have today.
iii
The corporate governance system to which human investors are now subject and within which activist hedge funds act was in fact built for humans.
Although the history is not in a straight line, it can be safely assumed that
when for-proﬁt corporations were ﬁrst chartered under general, not special,
legislation, the underlying assumptions of lawmakers were straightforward.
Within the corporate polity, the stockholders were the citizens, and they held
the managers, the elected officials, accountable through a system of checks and
balances, involving republican election principles and elements of direct democracy to deal with certain particularly important subjects. Corporations were
originally seen as having identities that were intensely geographic, and their
operations, management, and stockholder bases tended to be concentrated.139
Stockholders were mostly human beings, and they invested for the long term,
options for trading were limited, and they made their own voting decisions.140

139.

By way of example, in our early history, corporations’ ability to do business outside the
domicile that created them was dubious. See Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Putting Stockholders First,
Not the First-Filed Complaint, 69 BUS. LAW. 1, 30 & n.105 (2013). See generally Ralph Gomory
& Richard Sylla, The American Corporation, 142(2) DAEDALUS 102 (2013) (describing the historical evolution of corporations in America).
140. In a 2009 speech, John Bogle, the famed low-cost fund innovator, observed the change between the “old ownership society” where individuals held over 90% of stocks and “today’s
agency society” where institutional ownership dominates. John C. Bogle, Building a Fiduciary
Society, BOGLE FIN. MKTS. RES. CTR. (Mar. 13, 2009), http://www.vanguard.com/bogle
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Perhaps most fundamentally, as the corporation concept expanded and
larger corporations with diverse stockholders and large-scale operations
emerged, corporations began to take on a national importance and identity.141
Gain sharing among corporate constituencies was for the most part assumed,
and it was thought, particularly after the New Deal, that the stockholders and
workers of a corporation were in a symbiotic relationship, where proﬁts for the
corporations would translate into gains for both constituencies and for the
communities in which the corporation operated.142 Even though this was the
_site/sp20090313.html [http://perma.cc/5AYE-XSDD]; see also Marshall E. Blume & Donald B. Keim, The Changing Nature of Institutional Stock Investing 4 (Nov. 12, 2014)
(unpublished manuscript), http://faculty.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/06
/ChangingInstitutionPreferences_12Nov2014_CFR.pdf
[http://perma.cc/9LXX-RGVE]
(“The proportion of equities managed by institutional investors hovered around ﬁve percent
from 1900 to 1945.”). Even in 1965, the “holdings of the three groups of traditional institutional investors amounted to a relatively small fraction of the stock market: 5% for mutual
funds, 6% for pension funds, and 3% for insurance companies.” Sharon Hannes, Super
Hedge Fund, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 163, 170 (2015) (footnote omitted). By 2010, some measures
put institutional ownership of equities at 67%. Blume & Keim, supra, at 4. A few veteran
scholars and practitioners—by which I mean seasoned ones who have experienced the markets since the 1960s—made the point that ordinary investors in the past were not particularly active in voting their shares when they had direct ownership. I do not quibble with that
point. But, even if true, it does not contradict my central point. Investors in the past largely
bought stocks because they liked the company’s management and its prospects, and they
held their shares for much longer periods. Because they liked the companies, they tended to
support the inertial direction of the company’s managers, and it was much harder for an intervening investor to galvanize the market forces necessary to disrupt company policy. Perhaps even more importantly for human investors, because the momentary pressures of the
stock market on companies were less potent, managers were more free to pursue long-term
approaches that involved gain sharing with other constituencies. Not only that, other
constituencies, particularly workers in the form of labor unions, had greater power in previous eras, for both market and legal reasons. See Chattanooga Shoo-Shoo, ECONOMIST (Feb.
22, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/business/21596997-union-movement-misses
-big-opportunity-halt-its-decline-chattanooga-shoo-shoo [http://perma.cc/SR6C-92SS];
Neil Shah & Ben Casselman, ‘Right-To-Work’ Economics, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 14, 2012), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732429660457817960313686013 [http://perma.cc
/6H6Y-VJ7D].
141. This growth inspired the classic, ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
142. Charles Erwin Wilson, General Motors’s CEO, exempliﬁed the period when he
observed, when questioned at a Senate conﬁrmation hearing about his GM stock: “I cannot
conceive of [a conﬂict of interest] because for years I thought that what was good for our
country was good for General Motors, and vice versa.” Wilson, Charles E., GM HERITAGE
CTR., http://history.gmheritagecenter.com/wiki/index.php/Wilson,_Charles_E [http://
perma.cc/Q69Q-5X7Y]; see also William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 136
(2008) (observing that Adolf Berle, one of the important mid-twentieth century corporate
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thought, it was also understood that for the most part, the worker and investor
class would not overlap and that workers were unlikely to hold much stock.
Rather, stock would tend to be held by wealthy individuals or by corporate
pension funds responsible for paying pensions to retired workers.143
But from the standpoint of those forced to save for retirement through
401(k) investments, our so-called system of stockholder democracy now works
very differently from these original assumptions. Money managers, controlling
other people’s money, not human investors, now dominate direct stock ownership. As a human investor, you turn your capital over every paycheck to funds
available among fund families chosen by your employer.144 Those funds are
effectively available to you only when you hit ﬁfty-nine-and-a-half years old.
Thus, for decades or even generations, the money is not available to you to
meet your expenses. During that time, you do not get to pick the shares of
stock bought on your behalf or to express any view about how those shares are
voted. Rather, you are a direct stockholder of a mutual or index fund, a status
that in essence means you have no real voice at all. Derivative suits, proxy
ﬁghts, and all the things that self-proclaimed stockholder advocates believe are

theorists, articulated a framework of “benign equipoise amongst strong organizations, an
equipoise constrained by a wider public consensus that empowered the central government
in the role of welfare maximizer”). Berle articulated an “American Economic Republic” that
was “interdependent,” where companies did the producing, “incentivized by the proﬁt motive” and government intervention happened to ensure stability. Id. at 136-37 (footnotes
omitted). Private actors “moderat[ed] their conduct” and thus greater government intervention was avoided. Id. at 137. “As a wielder of power in the interdependent system, a [corporate] manager would be held to responsibilities to suppliers, customers, employees, and
shareholders, along with other, more peripheral constituents.” Id. at 141. The public would
make demands, much as they would of politicians, and managers would need to respond.
Id. Berle was an inﬂuential member of FDR’s “Brains Trust,” id. at 109, and his articulation
of a “new” individualism ﬁt into the ascendant stream of corporatist thinking in the New
Deal and post-New Deal time period, id. at 111-12; see also William W. Bratton, Berle and
Means Reconsidered at the Century’s Turn, 26 J. CORP. L. 737, 737 (2001) (describing Berle’s
landmark book as “the basis of a paradigm that dominated the ﬁeld” for ﬁfty years).
143. See supra note 140.
144. The open-ended funds that are the main choice for human investors putting money into
retirement accounts now dominate the U.S. market with over $16 trillion in ﬁnancial assets.
Palmiter, supra note 14, at 1. Many are passive; at the end of 2014, “382 index funds managed
total net assets of $2.1 trillion.” 2015 Investment Company Fact Book, INV. COMPANY INST. 45
(2015), http://www.ici.org/pdf/2015_factbook.pdf [http://perma.cc/CGH8-4NM6]. Of
that, the majority were equity funds, and the proportion of indexed equity funds to actively
managed funds continues to increase. Id. By summer 2015, index-tracking ETFs alone constituted close to 30% of U.S. equities trading. Elizabeth MacBride, Watch Out for this $1 Trillion Stock Bubble, CNBC (Jan. 14, 2016, 9:48 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/01/14/watch
-out-for-this-1-trillion-stock-bubble.html [http://perma.cc/9757-JART].
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too scarce, basically do not exist at the mutual fund level.145 Exit is your only
option, and that exit is to another fund in the same mutual fund family or another family selected by your employer, most of which will look the same as the
one you exited.146
The funds in which you invest will not vote in a way that is fund speciﬁc. If
you invest in a fund that is supposed to be “socially responsible,” it is likely to
vote on issues in exactly the same way as the other funds in the fund family,
however inconsistent that is with the fund’s stated purpose.147 If you are a rational index fund investor and your fund will not exit until the portfolio stock
leaves the index,148 you will ﬁnd you get no independent thinking at all or any
separate voice.149 Rather, your index fund will vote the same way as the actively
145.

146.

147.

148.

149.

For an excellent overview of how limited the tools that mutual fund investors have to hold
their fund managers accountable are, see Lyman Johnson, Protecting Mutual Fund Investors:
An Inevitable Eclecticism (Univ. of St. Thomas Minnesota, Legal Studies Research Paper No.
16-17, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2814214 [http://perma.cc/HS9N-R5LZ]. See also
Donald C. Langevoort, Private Litigation To Enforce Fiduciary Duties in Mutual Funds: Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors and the Ideology of Investor Sovereignty, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1017,
1032 (2005) (“Institutional shareholder voice does not exist in the fund area.”); Eric D.
Roiter, Disentangling Mutual Fund Governance from Corporate Governance, 6 HARV. BUS. L.
REV. 1, 13-17 (2016) (noting that redemption is the key governance tool).
Johnson, supra note 145, at 7 (citing the statistical reality that, although there are many mutual funds, there are comparatively few fund families, and the choice for ordinary investors
involves moving from one fund family to another).
Ying Duan & Yawen Jiao, The Role of Mutual Funds in Corporate Governance: Evidence from
Mutual Funds’ Proxy Voting and Trading Behavior, 51 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 489,
498 n.13 (2016) (“Less than 7% of our sample deviates from unanimous family voting . . . .”); Susanne Craig, The Giant of Shareholders, Quietly Stirring, N.Y. TIMES (May
18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/19/business/blackrock-a-shareholding-giant
-is-quietly-stirring.html [http://perma.cc/ZD7V-A679] (describing BlackRock’s centralized
decision-making process for voting its shares across all funds, in which the central team prevails “regardless of the views of the ﬁrm’s portfolio managers or even [CEO] Mr. Fink”); see
also Johnson, supra note 145, at 7 (“[P]roblems with conﬂicts between one company and its
advisor likely plague all funds in the same family.”).
“[A]n index fund buys all (or a representative sample) of the securities in a speciﬁc index,
like the S&P 500 Index. The goal of an index fund is to track the performance of a speciﬁc
market benchmark as closely as possible.” Index Funds Could Help Lower Long-Term Costs,
VANGUARD GROUP, INC., http://investor.vanguard.com/mutual-funds/index-funds [http://
perma.cc/V4EG-YHPL]. “[T]he ultimate goal in this type of fund is simply to replicate an
external and independent phenomenon [the fund’s market benchmark], therefore comparatively little human judgment is involved . . . .” BIRDTHISTLE, supra note 15, at 26. Even when
the actively managed funds in a fund complex are heading for the exits because they smell
Enron-level fraud, that complex’s index funds will stay in the stock until the stock is taken
out of the index. Strine, Toward Common Sense and Common Ground, supra note 2, at 17.
See Craig, supra note 147 (describing how Blackrock’s centralized governance team determines how all of Blackrock’s funds will vote); see also Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 48, at
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traded funds in the fund complex,150 regardless of the fact that the active funds
do not hold long term,151 and regardless of key factors such as whether the issue on the table is a stock-for-stock merger in which the index fund holds both
the acquirer and the target.152
Interestingly, a study that focused intensively on mutual funds exiting
companies that are the subject of controversy never focused on what the index
funds at the same fund families did after their actively traded fund cousins exited.153 If those funds exited because of dangers of insolvency or other serious

150.

151.

152.

153.

133-34 (observing that ETFs, one of the main instruments that investors use to hold entire
indexes, typically have voting policies that indicate their managers believe that “their involvement in corporate governance and voting is not worth the cost”).
See Scott Hirst, Social Responsibility Resolutions, J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript
at 11) (noting how almost all mutual fund families voted all their funds identically on social
proposals, regardless of fund purpose); supra notes 147-149; see also, e.g., Statement of Additional Information, VANGUARD GROUP, INC. B-45 (Apr. 27, 2016), http://www.vanguard.com
/pub/Pdf/sai040.pdf [http://perma.cc/A4GA-GLX7] (“For most proxy proposals, particularly those involving corporate governance, the evaluation will result in the same
position being taken across all of the funds and the funds voting as a block.”). The same
guidelines do allow that “a fund may vote differently, depending upon the nature and objective of the fund, the composition of its portfolio, and other factors.” Id. Although
Vanguard is best known for its low-cost index funds, it also has twenty-one actively
managed funds focused on the U.S. market alone. Vanguard Mutual Funds, VANGUARD
GROUP, INC., http://advisors.vanguard.com/VGApp/iip/site/advisor/home [http://
perma.cc/CE7Y-JCKQ] (follow “Investment Products: Mutual funds: U.S. stock” hyperlink; then select “Active” under “Mgmt style/Benchmark” dropdown). BlackRock, another
large index fund manager through its iShares unit, has an overarching proxy policy,
although it also allows deviation on a case-by-case basis. Proxy Voting Guidelines for
U.S. Securities, BLACKROCK (Feb. 2015), http://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-br/about
-us/investment-stewardship/voting-guidelines-reports-position-papers [http://perma.cc
/8G7M-WZZ8]. Other index fund managers such as State Street Global Advisors, Invesco
Powershares, Charles Schwab, and Guggenheim Investments rely to varying degrees on the
general advice provided by one of the big two proxy advisory ﬁrms, ISS and Glass Lewis,
and apply the advice consistently. See Ari I. Weinberg, How Activist Is Your Index Fund?,
FORBES (Apr. 25, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ariweinberg/2012/04/25/how-activist
-is-your-index-fund/#327afa6218b0 [http://perma.cc/6DKZ-QN5M]; Rydex ETF Trust,
Registration Statement (Form N-1A), at 30 (Aug. 5, 2015).
E.g., Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV.
561, 579 (2006) (“The average turnover rate among stock mutual funds was 117[%] in
2004.”).
The reason for this is that mutual fund complexes tend to come to a position based on how
the stock of a particular public company should be voted. All funds in the family, including
index funds, vote the same way, regardless of whether a fund owns the other stock affected
by the transaction. Cf. Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 558 (observing that many mutual fund
families compete on cost and thus ﬁnd it more efficient to outsource vote decisions to proxy
advisors like ISS).
Duan & Jiao, supra note 147.
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risks, what did the fund family do for those of its index investors who still
faced the risk? Did they voice concerns on behalf of their stuck-in investors? Or
just do nothing? The latter seems more likely given the data on mutual fund
family behavior.
Regardless of fund, those who manage active funds are likely to have compensation arrangements more based on the fund family’s proﬁts or short-term
returns than the long-term returns of the funds they manage.154 Fund managers will not be the ones who make most voting decisions. Because fund managers ﬁnd most voting a waste of time,155 the fund family will, at best, establish a
centralized voting unit comprised of comparatively less expensive employees,
who will develop voting policies and make sure government mandates for voting are satisﬁed.156 In a materially important way, many fund families tend to
154.

A study looking at over 3,400 U.S. open-end mutual funds found that manager pay is often
tied to the performance of the fund advisor and that “[t]he performance evaluation window
ranges from one quarter to ten years, and the average evaluation window is three years.”
Linlin Ma et al., Portfolio Manager Compensation and Mutual Fund Performance 2 (Finance
Down Under 2014 Building on the Best from the Cellars of Finance, 2016), http://ssrn.com
/abstract=2024027 [http//perma.cc/9SYW-JTSX]; see also Cheffins & Armour, supra note
53, at 74 (identifying prohibitions on tying manager compensation to fund performance in
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940); Kahan & Rock, supra note 47, at 1050 (highlighting
regulatory obstacles to basing management fees on performance). Although mutual fund
manager pay may not be as closely aligned with human investors’ needs as would be ideal,
hedge fund manager pay structures, especially incentive fees, look worse in comparison. See,
e.g., Pozen, supra note 55, at 7.
155. This is especially true for managers of index funds whose incentives are to achieve a return
matching the index at low cost, not outperformance over time. Kahan & Rock, supra note 47,
at 1051.
156. See, e.g., Proxy Voting and Shareholder Engagement FAQ, BLACKROCK (2014), http://www
.blackrock.com/corporate/en-is/literature/fact-sheet/blk-responsible-investment-faq-global
.pdf [http://perma.cc/3BS6-FD4E] (“BlackRock’s proxy voting process is led by our Corporate Governance and Responsible Investment team . . . .”); Statement of Additional Information, supra note 150, at B-45 (“For most proxy proposals, particularly those involving corporate governance, the evaluation will result in the same position being taken across all of
the funds and the funds voting as a block.”). In 2012, BlackRock’s Corporate Governance
and Responsible Investment team globally had twenty individuals, determining votes for
15,000 shareholder meetings. Letter from Robert E. Zivnuska, Head of Corp. Governance &
Responsible Inv., Americas, BlackRock, to B.C. Sec. Comm. et al. 1 (Sept. 20, 2012). This is
the best case and is more true at larger funds than smaller ones. The general trend is that
smaller ﬁrms with more limited resources tend to rely more on proxy advisory services. See,
e.g., Letter from Karrie McMillan, Gen. Counsel, Inv. Co. Inst., to Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-14-10
/s71410-167.pdf [http://perma.cc/JDD5-RSBV] (“[Certain] funds—such as those that are
part of smaller fund families with more limited resources—may rely more heavily on proxy
advisory ﬁrms to guide their votes.”); see also David F. Larcker et al., Outsourcing Shareholder
Voting to Proxy Advisory Firms, 58 J.L. & ECON. 173, 177 n.4 (2015) (“[Based on 2011 data on
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defer to proxy advisory ﬁrms157 on votes, because this gives them a way to say
they have made an informed vote—and thus satisfy federal regulatory requirements158—on the thousands and thousands of votes they have to cast each
year.159 Even though fund managers may believe the number of votes is wasteful and not good for them or their investors, they remain silent and go along
with those, to be discussed, who press for corporations to be governed on a direct democracy, corporate California model—where there is always an opportunity for immediate market sentiments to be heard and where there is no attempt to establish a rational system of periodic votes on issues like executive
compensation or to ensure that certain stockholders with triﬂing amounts of
equity do not burden corporate performance with constant precatory proposals, which involve no cost to them and great cost to corporations. The chain
separating actual human beings from voting shares in corporations can be long
indeed.
None of the participants in this lengthy chain can be meaningfully thought
of as anything other than agents, and the ties of their agency tend to be thicker
as to the interests of the money manager fund family seeking proﬁt than to the
human investors the power of whose capital is being wielded.160 In 2016, the

157.

158.

159.

160.

say-on-pay votes,] SEI Investment Management; Grantham, Mayo, Van Otterloo; Evergreen Investment Management; Dimensional Fund Advisors; Wells Fargo Funds Management; and Nuveen Asset Management voted more than 99 percent of the time with the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) recommendation when this recommendation differed
from that of management. Similarly, Charles Schwab, Neuberger Berman, Loomis Sayles,
and Invesco explicitly disclose that they follow Glass, Lewis & Co. (GL) SOP recommendations.”).
Really, just two ﬁrms—Glass Lewis and ISS—have 97% market share in the United States.
Bryce C. Tingle, The Agency Cost Case for Regulating Proxy Advisory Firms, 49 U.B.C. L. REV.
725, 743 (2016).
See 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-6 (2016) (requiring investment advisers to “[a]dopt and implement written policies and procedures that are reasonably designed to ensure that [the investment advisers] vote client securities in the best interest of clients”).
Duan & Jiao, supra note 147, at 501 (summarizing research that found that 29.6% of mutual
funds in the sample always voted consistently with ISS and all funds in the sample were
more likely to vote against the recommendation of corporate management or sell the stock
when ISS was recommending action different from management).
Johnson, supra note 145, at 4-6 (observing that advisors hold the most power in the mutual
fund context and describing conﬂicts of interest between investors and advisors); Memorandum from Chester Spratt, Chief Economist, Office of Econ. Analysis, SEC, to Inv.
Co., File S7-03-04, at 4-10 (Dec. 29, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70304
/oeamemo122906-litreview.pdf [http://perma.cc/RP9D-HLJD] (describing agency conﬂicts between fund managers and investors); see also Ma et al., supra note 154, at 2 (reviewing mutual fund manager compensation and ﬁnding that, in half of their sample, a manager’s bonus was linked to the fund complex’s performance, rather than the manager’s own

1916

who bleeds when the wolves bite?

concept of “superdelegates” playing a material role in the presidential nomination process faced renewed criticism,161 and the voice of superdelegates is being
turned down substantially.162 In the corporate governance system, however, we
have moved to a system almost exclusively comprised of layers of superdelegates, who have the chance to use the delegated power of ordinary human investors to inﬂuence public corporations.
Even worse than 401(k) investors who have (limited) ability to vote with
their feet, workers who look to pension funds for their retirement have no investment choice at all, much less any voice over how the power conferred by
their capital is exercised. The pension fund decides where the funds taken from
the workers’ checks are invested. Although most human investors are locked
out of investing in private equity funds or hedge funds or other unregistered
investments, pension funds get to do so on their behalf, because of their supposed sophistication. Thus, when unregistered investment advisers fail, it is
human investors who have no choice in the matter, who bear the costs. Likewise, pension funds have been active163 in proliferating litigation over mergers
and acquisitions that involve no conﬂict of interest, that were overwhelmingly
supported by most institutional investors (often including the pension fund’s
own investment managers), and where the litigation delivered no beneﬁts to

fund); Tingle, supra note 157, at 12 (observing that the size of assets under management
plays a materially greater role in fund manager compensation than the fund’s performance
for its investors). If one turns one’s gaze to the hedge fund industry, rather than more conventional money managers, the incentives are arguably even harder to rationalize. Simon
Lack, The Hedge Fund Mirage: The Illusion of Big Money and Why It’s Too Good To Be True,
C.F.A. INST. 14, 18-19 (2012) (noting that since 1998, 98% of net real proﬁts derived from
hedge funds have gone to hedge fund and fund-of-fund managers rather than to the investors). But see Ma et al., supra note 154, at 2 (“[T]he bonus component of compensation is
explicitly tied to the fund’s investment performance for 79.2% of sample funds.”).
161. E.g., Laura Meckler, Bernie Sanders Makes a Last Push: To Change Party Rules, WALL ST. J.
(June 17, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/bernie-sanders-makes-a-last-push-to-change
-party-rules-1466202267 [http://perma.cc/PQ56-39K7]; Diane Russell, Opinion, Abolish
Superdelegates. It’s Only Democratic, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2016), http://www.nytimes
.com/2016/07/23/opinion/campaign-stops/abolish-superdelegates-its-only-democratic.html
[http://perma.cc/ZAG3-446D].
162. See Evelyn Rupert, Democrats Vote To Overhaul Superdelegate System, HILL (July
23, 2016), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-brieﬁng-room/news/288989-democrats-vote-to
-reform-super-delegate-system [http://perma.cc/8B32-KAUP].
163. David H. Webber, Private Policing of Mergers and Acquisitions: An Empirical Assessment of Institutional Lead Plaintiffs in Transactional Class and Derivative Actions, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 907,
960-61 (2014) (noting the prevalence of pension funds as lead plaintiffs in mergers and acquisition litigation in Delaware).
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investors as a class,164 but only to the law ﬁrms with whom the pension funds’
board had developed an unusually close and not easily explicable relationship.165 As one learned practitioner said to me, the role of pension funds affiliated with labor unions has been disheartening in this story.166 I agree with that
point. Labor unions felt burned by their experience when they believed their
support of management in ﬁghts over constituency statutes and anti-takeover
statutes were not rewarded with a commitment by management to address
global competition in a way that involved investment in and nurturing of
American workers. Instead, unions saw managers using the statutes to give
them leverage for higher pay and severance packages. So, pension funds affiliated with labor then joined forces with others to push for an elimination to
structural defenses, to push for options-based executive pay, and in general to
push for corporate governance changes that make companies immediately sus-

164.

See Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State
Competition and Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 465, 475 tbl.1, 476 tbl.2 (2015) (highlighting the
precipitous rise in the incidence of merger litigation and number of suits generated by a single transaction); id. at 478-79 (noting that well over half of merger litigation settlements only result in enhanced disclosure); id. at 485-86 (noting that shareholders are unlikely to
change their votes in light of settlement-driven disclosure); Charles R. Korsmo & Minor
Myers, The Structure of Stockholder Litigation: When Do the Merits Matter?, 75 OHIO ST. L.J.
829, 835-36 (2014). Certain pension funds act as lead plaintiff so frequently it attracts opprobrium. Inst. for Legal Reform, Bayou State Fund Is a Voracious Frequent Filer, U.S. CHAMBER COM. (Oct. 21, 2013), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/resource/bayou-state
-fund-is-voracious-frequent-ﬁler [http://perma.cc/3BGC-WCJW] (identifying the Louisiana Municipal Police Employees’ Retirement System pension fund as the “most proliﬁc ﬁler
of shareholder litigation in U.S. history”); Inst. for Legal Reform, Frequent Filers: The
Problems of Shareholder Lawsuits and the Path to Reform, U.S. CHAMBER COM. 11-14
(Feb. 2014), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/Frequent_Filers
_Final_Version.pdf [http://perma.cc/UX8M-JR4A] (discussing the Mississippi Public Employees’ Retirement System’s frequent ﬁling of securities class actions).
165. Cain & Solomon, supra note 164, at 478 tbl.3 (reporting mean attorneys’ fees for disclosureonly settlements at $749,000); Korsmo & Myers, supra note 164, at 841 (describing acute
conﬂicts of interest between securities plaintiff litigators and the plaintiffs (quoting Janet
Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43
STAN L. REV. 497, 535 (1991))); Korsmo & Myers, supra note 164, at 857 (“[T]he plaintiffs’
attorney has the strongest ﬁnancial stake in the claim, virtually always far outweighing that
of any individual stockholder.”); see also Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A
Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 535-36 (1991) (“Class actions . . . are characterized by high agency costs: that is, a signiﬁcant possibility that litigation decisions will be made in accordance with the lawyer’s economic interests rather than
those of the class.”); Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 48, at 111 (observing instances of plaintiffs’ law ﬁrms being accused of making campaign contributions to elected officials who
make pension fund decisions).
166. E-mail to Leo E. Strine, Jr. (Sept. 4, 2016, 10:25 AM) (on ﬁle with author).
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ceptible to inﬂuence by the stock market.167 At the same time, labor funds did
little to encourage companies to improve risk management practices, to embrace sustainable approaches to value creation, or to manage their businesses in
ways that involved good treatment of their human capital.168 Rather, they added their voices to the choir of voices that most fervently pushed for stock market direct democracy.169 This is a complicated story, and it is evolving, but this
simple rendering regrettably has the ring of truth.

167.

See Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the United
States, 19 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 55 (2007) (describing the rising prevalence of union-fund
sponsored shareholder proposals in the mid-1990s); id. at 63 ﬁg.3 (showing the increase in
proposals by union funds in the 2004-05 period compared to 1987-94 period and decreases
in proposals by other groups over same comparison periods); Andrew K. Prevost et al., Labor Unions as Shareholder Activists: Champions or Detractors?, 47 FIN. REV. 327, 329-31 (2012)
(summarizing studies showing labor unions’ high level of activity in submitting shareholder
proposals related to corporate governance—and relatively high levels of success); Prevost et
al., supra, at 333-36, 334 tbl.1 (reviewing a sample of union-sponsored shareholder proposals
and ﬁnding them concentrated in efforts to remove antitakeover devices, repeal classiﬁed
boards, and increase board independence); Paula Tkac, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, One
Proxy at a Time: Pursuing Social Change Through Shareholder Proposals, 91 ECON. REV. 1, 6
(2006) (“In the years since 2002 the unions have withdrawn from social advocacy and focused entirely on corporate governance proposals.”); see also John W. Cioffi, Fiduciaries, Federalization, and Finance Capitalism: Berle’s Ambiguous Legacy and the Collapse of Countervailing
Power, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1081, 1112 (2011) (“Paradoxically, the legal recognition of nonshareholder interests served only to entrench and empower management . . . . Managerial
interests and organized labor spearheaded the political support for constituency statutes . . . . Labor, however, occupied a subordinate position in the antitakeover alliance . . . .
Labor . . . served as a legitimating ﬁg leaf for managerial power.”).
168. Prevost et al., supra note 167, at 334 tbl.1 (showing relatively few union proposals remotely
related to ﬁrm operations); Tkac, supra note 167 at 10, 11 n.13 (summarizing a sample of
proposals and ﬁnding that, historically, unions sponsored at least some proposals seeking
higher wages or enhanced working conditions overseas—arguably in at least partial service
of maintaining labor unions’ relevance—but also ﬁnding that since 2002, “unions have
switched their shareholder activism strategy to sponsor corporate governance proposals rather than call for socially responsible ﬁrm behavior” (emphasis added)); cf. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 247 (2012) (describing the
vulnerability of public pension funds to “being used as a vehicle for advancing political/social goals unrelated to shareholder interests generally”).
169. E.g., AFL-CIO Proxy Voting Guidelines: Exercising Authority, Restoring Accountability, AM.
FED’N LAB. & CONG. INDUS. ORGS. 7 (2012), http://www.aﬂcio.org/Corporate-Watch
/Capital-Stewardship/Proxy-Voting [http://perma.cc/8KV5-YSUK] (discouraging classiﬁed boards and encouraging a majority, rather than plurality standard for director elections); id. at 7-8 (encouraging proposals easing shareholder ability to elect their own directors); id. at 18 (opposing reincorporation in states with stronger antitakeover protections
and poison pills that do not require a routine shareholder vote); see also Leo E. Strine, Jr.,
One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for
the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term, 66 BUS. L. 1, 13
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Relatedly, certain pension funds have been consistent advocates for turning
the American corporate governance system into a direct democracy, with constant agitation for referenda and frequent stockholder votes on a variety of topics. The symbiotic relationship activist hedge funds have with pension funds
that engage in corporate governance activism is well understood.170 At times,
scholars have called the changes wrought by corporate governance activism
“small,”171 but the large company-speciﬁc changes activist hedge funds have
made have been facilitated by those governance changes. By making target corporations susceptible to immediate market pressures through the elimination
of staggered boards, proliferating stockholder votes on proposals, the move to
turn a decision not to vote into a “no vote,” and similar changes in governance,
corporate governance activists have made it much easier for activist hedge
funds to prevail in a contest with management. Thus, although putatively arguing that corporate executives should be paid in a way that aligns their interests with those of pensioners,172 pension funds have pushed for annual say-onn.44 (2010) (examining corporate governance activism after the Enron and WorldCom
scandals and concluding the evidence “does not suggest that institutional investors changed
their focus to concentrate more on issues of fundamental risk, fraud avoidance, and effective
risk and leverage management practices,” but instead focused on takeover defenses and making corporations more subject to direct stockholder action).
170. Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 572 (observing the increased power that activists can gain
through partnership with pension funds and other traditional money managers); Ronald J.
Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the
Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 897-99 (2013) (describing the
“complementary” specializations of institutional investors and activist investors, where activist investors specialize in monitoring company strategy and institutional investors specialize in assessing activist ideas).
171. Kahan & Rock, supra note 47, at 1044; see also id. at 1042-45 (describing the types of governance changes historically sought by pension funds).
172. E.g., Press Release, Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., CalPERS Approves Plan To Crack Down on
Executive Compensation System; Believes that Fat Cat Pay Is out of Control (June 17,
2003), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20030617005632/en/CalPERS-Approves
-Plan-Crack-Executive-Compensation-System [http://perma.cc/7CCM-FG7U] (“Poorly
designed compensation packages are having a disastrous impact on companies and shareowners by emphasizing short-term or self interested behavior . . . . This plan will help curb
the abusive practices by aligning corporate management with its owners and enhancing
long-term superior performance.”); Press Release, Controller of the State of Cal., CalPERS
Adopts Westly Executive Pay Proposals (Feb. 14, 2006), http://www.sco.ca.gov/Press-Re
leases/2006/pr017execPay0214.pdf [http://perma.cc/74XN-X8QM] (heralding CalPERS’s
adoption of executive compensation clawbacks as a criterion in its proxy voting guidelines
and arguing that “[o]ur retirees pay the price when companies misrepresent their performance. Clawbacks make executives accountable”); see also Marilyn F. Johnson et al., Stakeholder Pressure and the Structure of Executive Compensation 37 (1997) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=41780 [http://perma.cc/WA2P-JARV] (ﬁnding that
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pay votes that overwhelm the capacity of voting institutions to vote thoughtfully,173 that are clearly inconsistent with any prudent and rational way of contracting with executives, and that result in the views of proxy advisors being
the key determinant of outcomes.174 Pension funds vote yes on the same pay
stakeholder pressure, including that by institutional investors, resulted in short-term compensation becoming more sensitive to ﬁrm performance); id. at 12-13 (discussing calls by institutional investors for moderation of CEO pay). For a more recent example, see Athanasia
Karananou & Olivia Mooney, Integrating ESG Issues into Executive Pay, Principles for Responsible Investment, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INV. 6 (2016), http://www.unpri.org/download
_report/8534 [http://perma.cc/M2DD-LP5W], which analyzes ways to tie executive pay to
environmental, social, and governance issues in the name of “sustainable value creation” and
long-term business strategy. Principles for Responsible Investment is an organization advocating for various ESG-related concerns on behalf of a group of signatories including ninetysome pension funds (including CalPERS). Signatory Directory, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE
INV., http://www.unpri.org/signatory-directory [http://perma.cc/W5DX-KVZT].
173.

Tkac, supra note 167, at 11 ﬁg.2 (showing that pensions and unions constituted the bulk of
the proponents of pay-related ballot measures in the 1992-2002 sample period); see also
James F. Cotter et al., The First Year of Say-on-Pay Under Dodd-Frank: An Empirical Analysis
and Look Forward, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 967, 979 (2013) (noting that the 2011 proxy season, the ﬁrst year of required say-on-pay voting, entailed votes at over 2,200 companies);
Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Effect of Shareholder Proposals on Executive
Compensation, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1021, 1036-37 (1999) (describing the historical focus of labor pension-related shareholders on executive compensation issues); Randall S. Thomas et
al., Dodd-Frank’s Say on Pay: Will It Lead to a Greater Role for Shareholders in Corporate Governance?, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1213, 1218 (2012) (observing that the American Federation of
State, County, and Municipal Employees submitted the ﬁrst shareholder proposal seeking a
say-on-pay vote).
174. Evidence exists that ISS’s views are the most important determinants of the outcomes in
say-on-pay votes. Cotter et al., supra note 173, at 981 (summarizing ﬁndings that ISS recommendations had a “signiﬁcant” effect on say-on-pay votes); id. at 989 (observing that an
“against” recommendation from ISS “overshadow[s]” other performance factors such as the
growth of CEO pay); id. at 1001 (describing trends suggesting ISS’s inﬂuence on say-on-pay
votes is increasing); Holly J. Gregory, Lessons for the 2015 Proxy Season, PRAC. L. (Sept. 1,
2014), http://us.practicallaw.com/4-578-4485 [http://perma.cc/8XRK-A4YL] (“It appears
that ISS negative vote recommendations based on the perceived lack of board responsiveness
to shareholder concerns (as evidenced by the failure to implement a successful shareholder
proposal) was the leading factor associated with directors who failed to receive a majority of
votes cast in an uncontested election in 2014.”); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO17-47, CORPORATE SHAREHOLDER MEETINGS: PROXY ADVISORY FIRMS’ ROLE IN VOTING AND
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES 16 (2016), http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/681050
.pdf [http://perma.cc/DT2J-P7P3] (describing studies suggesting that “proxy advisory ﬁrm
recommendations are the key determinant of voting outcomes in the context of mandatory
‘say-on-pay’ votes”). Even a study that purports to show that proxy advisor recommendations are not as inﬂuential as some contend ﬁnds that the advisors drive 6 to 10% of the
vote. See Stephen Choi et al., The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?, 59 EMORY L.J.
869, 906 (2010). Tellingly, negative recommendations by ISS often do not reﬂect changes in
the pay plan—which ISS would have supported in prior years—but rather the company’s
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plan for four years, and then vote no in the ﬁfth year, because that year was a
poor year economically for the company, signaling either that the prior four
votes were uninformed or that say-on-pay is being used as a way to express
general unhappiness when that spirit moves the market.
Little apparent effort has ﬂowed from pension funds to rationalize the corporate governance republic, or to consider how pushing for corporate California and therefore for corporations to be subject to the immediate inﬂuences of
stock market sentiment at all times would affect pensioners, most of whose
funds should be rationally invested through index funds, who should have
parts of their portfolio in debt, and who need continuing access to quality jobs
and wage growth to live a digniﬁed and secure life. For them, pension fund activism would have been far better spent on issues like ensuring that corporations have appropriate risk management structures, fundamentally sound accounting and business practices, and proper capitalization to handle the risks of
their business plans. For that reason, the obsession of pension funds over recent decades with causes like reducing takeover defenses, shifting executive
compensation from cash to stock options, and other issues more directed to the
extraction of short-term gains, rather than ones involving more fundamental
questions of sustained long-term performance, seems to reﬂect the fact that
those involved in corporate governance policymaking at pension funds have interests quite different from those who are depending on a pension to fund their
retirements.175
current performance, making the vote less about the pay plan and more about expressing
general unhappiness with the company’s stock price. See Ryan Kraus et al., When Do Shareholders Care About CEO Pay?, CONF. BOARD 4 (2013), http://www.conference-board.org
/retrieveﬁle.cfm?ﬁlename=TCB_DN-V5N16-131.pdf&type=subsite [http://perma.cc/LK6V
-SGDV] (“Our results provide clear evidence that shareholders, even those acting in the role
of institutional shareholders, only weigh their own losses when deciding whether to approve
a SOP ballot.”). There is evidence that the inﬂuence proxy advisors have over say-on-pay
votes extends more broadly. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra, at 15 (“Recent
studies, market participants, and other stakeholders agree that proxy advisory ﬁrms have
inﬂuence on shareholder voting and corporate governance practices, but had mixed views
about the extent of their inﬂuence.”).
175. See INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR ACTIVISM: HEDGE FUNDS AND PRIVATE EQUITY, ECONOMICS
AND REGULATION 2 (William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery eds., 2015) (“Public sector
pension funds and labour unions take the lead roles, acting through agents incentivised by
prospects of reputational advancement. These actors target companies and challenge their
managers with shareholder proposals and ‘just vote no’ campaigns. They thereby register
their voice and affect outcomes, but from a secondary position and on an occasional basis.
The cumulated governance activity is impressive, but none of it assures or very often results
in constructive engagement by shareholders in the formulation of business policy at individual ﬁrms. As to that, collective action problems and the problems of separation of ownership and control persist.”); Roberta Romano, Less Is More: Making Shareholder Activism a
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In this corporate republic, human investors are basically witnesses to a
clash of agents. At best, the human investors can hope that their direct agents
(the institutional investors) and their indirect agents (the managers of the
public companies) will reach some constructive accommodation when push
comes to shove. Focusing on just these layers of agency actually simpliﬁes the
typical situation. If a corporation makes a bid for another, the human investor
will ﬁnd the layers of agency compounded, because the institutional investors
they directly invest in will often own both stocks. Likewise, when a hedge fund
launches a proxy contest in support of its expressed desire for a corporation to
change policies, a pension fund may well be invested in the hedge fund, at the
same time as it is more heavily invested in an index fund committed to holding
the target’s stock until it leaves the benchmark index. The pension fund may
also own corporate debt securities of the target. And mutual fund families are
not immune from these realities. The 2020 target retirement fund may well
own the stock of the target and debt securities of the target. In this mix, of
course, will be the proxy advisory ﬁrms that can tip the balance in even highsalience cases.
If those who get to suit up on behalf of human investors tended to act like
human investors would seem to want, the bystander status of human investors
might be less a source of concern. But, in the corporate governance game, the
most vocal and powerful of the electorate will be those with investment horizons the least aligned with human investors. This is true not just of hedge
funds themselves, but even more importantly true of the pension funds and
mutual funds. The pension funds making the most noise are often not the
most prudently ﬁnanced or invested.176 And the actively managed mutual
funds—that is to say, the ones most likely to underperform as they depend on
outguessing the market—and proxy advisors like ISS drive the voting outcomes, not the index funds.
Within this system, the voice of traditional lenders and other creditors has
also gone down.177 With the increasing securitization of corporate debt, many
Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 174, 231-32 (2001) (describing the private beneﬁts that accrue to pension fund investors from sponsoring shareholder
proposals, including enhanced political reputations and advancements in personal employment); sources cited supra note 169 (showing the paucity of stockholder proposals related to
issues of fundamental risk and the plethora of proposals to tear down defenses, making it
easier to remove directors and tie executive pay to market prices).
176. David H. Webber, Is “Pay-To-Play” Driving Public Pension Fund Activism in Securities Class
Actions?, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2031, 2035, 2072-74 (2010) (ﬁnding that “the degree of the funds’
underfunding correlates positively with lead plaintiff appointments”).
177. See Michelle M. Harner, The Corporate Governance and Public Policy Implications of Activist
Distressed Debt Investing, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 703, 706-08 (2008) (“An investor can pur-
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companies do not have a traditional lender.178 And outside of distressed situations, the voice of creditors in monitoring corporate ﬁnancial practices and leverage is comparatively minor.179 A variety of factors, from low interest rates to
competition among banks for lucrative underwriting opportunities, has contributed to an easing of terms for companies seeking new loans. With the advent of terms like “covenant lite” to describe diminution in credit protection,
reason exists to suspect that the risk-taking voice of equity has been ampliﬁed
in part because the voice of creditors has reduced its volume.180
chase the debt of a ﬁnancially troubled company and then try to inﬂuence corporate matters
by exercising or threatening to exercise its contractual and statutory rights as a debtholder . . . . Institutional investors increasingly are looking to the distressed debt market not only
to make a quick proﬁt, but also to create value by proactively inﬂuencing corporate governance.”).
178. Franklin R. Edwards & Frederic S. Mishkin, The Decline of Traditional Banking: Implications
for Financial Stability and Regulatory Policy, 1 FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV.
27, 27-28 (July 1995), http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/epr/95v01n2/9507edwa.html
[http://perma.cc/LCA9-KUEF] (describing decrease in importance of commercial banks as
source of funds for commercial borrowers); id. at 31 (attributing that decrease in part to increased securitization); Taylor D. Nadauld & Michael S. Weisbach, Did Securitization Affect
the Cost of Corporate Debt?, 105 J. FIN. ECON. 332, 332 (2012) (explaining that the market for
collateralized loan obligations underpinned by corporate loans reached $540 billion in
2007).
179. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Hedge Fund Activism in the Enforcement of Bondholder Rights,
103 NW. U.L. REV. 281, 314 (2009) (noting that traditional investors in corporate debt such
as mutual funds and insurance companies do not act aggressively even when their contractual rights are violated and only act if bond values plummet suddenly); id. at 294 (observing
that traditional investors hold the vast majority of corporate bonds and engage in very little
activism); see also George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1073, 1076 (1995) (summarizing the general corporate
governance approach as viewing “managerial agency problems through the lens of equity interests”).
180. Covenant-light (or “cov-lite”) loans—loans where the covenants are tested much less frequently than traditional loans—have been issued in increasing volume, passing their pre2008 peak in 2012. Bo Becker & Victoria Ivashina, Covenant-Light Contracts and Creditor Coordination 1-2 (Swedish House of Fin. Research Paper No. 16-09, 2016) http://ssrn.com
/abstract=2756926 [http://perma.cc/NHV3-UZSR]. The authors point out that this phenomenon is a creature of the leveraged loan market, where loans are sliced up—syndicated—
and held by a broad set of investors. Id. at 2. The dynamics of this market are in ﬂux in part
due to relatively new leverage regulation from the Federal Reserve leading new nonbank
actors to enter the market, competing with traditional banks. Christine Idzelis & Craig
Torres, Risky Loans Shunned by Banks Are Booming in Wall Street’s Shadow, BLOOMBERG
(May 22, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-22/wall-street-ﬂouts
-fed-standards-to-fund-high-risk-loans [http://perma.cc/399V-RKHF]; see also Tracy Alloway, Growth of ‘Cov-lite’ Loans Sparks Debate, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2014), http://www.ft
.com/content/723dfb5c-b0f8-11e3-9f6f-00144feab7de [http://perma.cc/4QFF-9Z76] (describing issuer pressure for less-restrictive covenants and incentives for banks to comply to
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I am not revealing some undiscovered, obvious reality about our corporate
governance system. This fundamental fact—that human investors are now
largely spectators to the game—is known and occasionally kept in mind. Most
prominently, it has been reﬂected in trying to address the reality that who we
think of normatively as “owners” in the real sense do not exist. The most highproﬁle of those efforts was to get CEOs to think like owners rather than as
highly, but reasonably, paid salaried workers. Instead of steady captains of safe,
stable ships, money managers wanted American CEOs to be risk takers, going
hell-bent for equity gains, even if that meant hurting or compromising constituencies like workers through downsizings or communities through plant closings and offshoring.181 Money managers, activists of many kinds, and other interests called for management to get paid in equity, with the growth of stock
options being among the ﬁrst results of that advocacy—to align them with the
so-called “owners,” those who hold corporate stock.182 These owners in turn
called for more and more independent directors—ﬁduciaries with no prior ties
to the company or its indirect competitors, suppliers, or customers—to check
management even more.183 To make them think like owners, independent diavoid another bank acting as underwriter and because banks rarely hold the loans they originate for long); Michelle Davis, Borrowers Take Charge of Leveraged-Loan Market, BLOOMBERG
(June 7, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-06-07/borrowers-take
-charge-of-leveraged-loan-market-as-returns-shrink [http://perma.cc/9EL9-N5SB] (describing strong investor demand for loans).
181. Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives—It’s Not How Much You Pay, but How,
HARV. BUS. REV. 138, 138 (May-June 1990), http://hbr.org/1990/05/ceo-incentives-its-not
-how-much-you-pay-but-how [http://perma.cc/FG6G-6W57] (observing in 1990 that
CEOs were paid like bureaucrats and calling for CEO compensation to be more sensitive to
corporate stock price because “[i]s it any wonder then that so many CEOs act like bureaucrats rather than the value-maximizing entrepreneurs companies need to enhance their
standing in world markets?”); Mark Maremont & Charles Forelle, Bosses’ Pay: How Stock
Options Became Part of the Problem, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 27, 2006), http://www.wsj.com
/articles/SB116718927302760228 [http://perma.cc/GJ2L-BD7T] (describing the effort by
“[a]cademics, politicians and investors” to get CEOs’ pay shifted to stock-based compensation from cash).
182. See LUCIAN BEBCHUCK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 72 (2004) (describing the push by investors, economists, and regulators for increased use of performance-based compensation). See generally
Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation: Where We Are, and How We Got There, in HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 211 (2013) (surveying shifts in executive compensation
and the theories for what drives those changes).
183. TESSA HEBB, NO SMALL CHANGE: PENSION FUNDS AND CORPORATE ENGAGEMENT 47 (2008)
(noting that demands for independent directors were at the forefront of CalPERS’ Focus
List corporate governance campaigns from 1990 to 2000, during which 42% of the shareholder resolutions put forward by CalPERS called for more independent boards and committees).
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rectors were supposed to be paid in equity.184 The compensation of these independent directors has grown enormously.185 And it creates strong incentives for
directors to support transactions that involve a sale of the company and will
therefore unlock the capital that they would otherwise be required to keep invested.186 Not only that, because of the inﬂuence of proxy advisors and certain
vocal institutional investors, independent directors who wish to remain on the
independent director circuit—which likely comprises almost all of them—are
highly sensitive to resisting institutional campaigns at any company on whose
board they serve, for fear that they will be targeted for withhold campaigns at
all companies with which they are affiliated. That fear is rational because the
leading proxy advisory ﬁrms look at director performance at other companies
when voting at particular companies, and so do the largest investment fund.187
184.

David A. Katz, Dealing with Director Compensation, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE
& FIN. REG. (May 22, 2015), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/05/22/dealing-with
-director-compensation [http://perma.cc/8TSB-DWXN] (“As with executive pay, the theory is that full-value awards create closer alignment of leadership and shareholder interests.”); U.S. Executive Compensation 2015 Recap, Key Developments & Notable Trends, SIMPSON
THACHER & BARTLETT LLP & FREDERIC W. COOK & CO., INC. 4, 21-22 (Mar. 31, 2016) [hereinafter 2015 Executive Compensation Recap], http://www.stblaw.com/docs/default-source
/memos/ﬁrmmemo_fwcook_03_31_16.pdf [http://perma.cc/CS5D-N95W] (describing the
institutional investor’s expectation that directors hold a substantial block of equity until they
depart and be compensated primarily in equity during their service).
185. Alice Lee & Herman Yang, 2014 Board & Committee Fees Report, 16 CSUITE INSIGHT 11 (2015)
(“Among S&P 1500 boards, 38% are paying retainers of $200,000 or more, compared
to just 18.4% ﬁve years ago.”). Other studies have yielded slightly different numbers but
the same upward direction. 2015 Spencer Stuart Board Index, SPENCERSTUART 7 (Nov.
2015),
http://www.spencerstuart.com/~/media/pdf%20ﬁles/research%20and%20insight
%20pdfs/ssbi-2015_110215-web.pdf [http://perma.cc/63Y7-9D55] (reporting a 98% increase
in average annual retainer from 2005 to 2015).
186. See 2015 Executive Compensation Recap, supra note 184, at 4, 21 (describing how director compensation tends to be at least half stock, if not closer to 60%, and the increasing use of stock
ownership guidelines requiring directors to maintain company stock ownership at a minimum of ﬁve times their annual cash retainer).
187. E.g., Proxy Paper Guidelines 2016 Proxy Season: An Overview of the Glass Lewis Approach to
Proxy Advice, GLASS, LEWIS & CO., LLC 7 (2016) [hereinafter Glass Lewis 2016 Proxy
Guidelines],
http://www.glasslewis.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/2016_Guidelines
_United_States.pdf [http://perma.cc/5ARP-QWLX] (listing director “bad acts” prefaced by
the observation that “[w]e believe shareholders should avoid electing directors who have a
record of not fulﬁlling their responsibilities to shareholders at any company where they have
held a board or executive position”); see also, e.g., Proxy Voting Guidelines for U.S. Securities,
BLACKROCK 2-3 (Feb. 2015), http://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-no/literature/fact
-sheet/blk-responsible-investment-guidelines-us.pdf [http://perma.cc/L2G5-XTG2] (reporting that the ﬁrm “generally supports board nominees in most uncontested elections” but
also “may withhold votes from certain directors” if, for example, “it appears the director has
acted (at the company or at other companies) in a manner that compromises his or her relia-
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Less focus, oddly, was on those who claimed to be owners, i.e., the money
managers who controlled the funds that held human investors’ wealth, than on
the managers and directors of public companies. And the alignment between
the interest of fund managers and human investors is, at best, imperfect, and at
worst, out of sync.188 Funds under management, short-term performance
benchmarks not aligned with fund investors’ horizons, and other factors drive
their compensation. Nothing close to a serious attempt to subject fund managers to the risks of truly stuck-in 401(k) investors has been made. Pervading all
efforts at alignment is the fundamental question: ultimately, are we good
enough at creating efficient and reliable incentives that hold the full chain of
agents accountable for representing the interests of the long-term investor to
whom they ultimately owe the duties of loyalty? Ordinary people’s wages and
wealth have stagnated, while the take of the ﬁnancial classes—who control ordinary people’s capital—have soared.189 So far, acting as if alignment can be
created by giving agents some form of instant, Tang-like ownership—which
turns them after-the-fact into what an owner in the traditional sense would already be—has generated big picture results that have been less than outstanding for human investors.190
In this complicated design process, have we lost something? We have spent
all kinds of time trying to make managers—a form of worker—have the incentives the stock market wants. But have we forgotten that most Americans would
rather the system generate the most wealth for workers? Have we aligned on
the wrong dimension? And is this misalignment because of a prior shared sense

bility in representing the best long-term economic interests of shareholders” (emphasis added)). Glass Lewis also uses a database to track directors’ performance across companies as a
basis for their voting recommendations. Glass Lewis 2016 Proxy Guidelines, supra, at 6-7.
188. See supra notes 75-78, 154-156, and accompanying text.
189. See sources cited infra notes 243-244 .
190. A prominent practitioner, who has represented many of the leading corporate boards in the
United States, commented on the independent director class we now have in an incisive,
not-for-attribution way:
[Directors] don’t care enough. Boards are now overloaded with directors with zero ties to the company, ﬁnancial or personal. They are not just disinterested. They
are uninterested. They have no skin in the game at all. They didn’t participate in
building the enterprise. They don’t know the key employees. They have no relationship with the history or story of the company. They are robotic in fearing personal embarrassment. They are there as part of a sea change responding to the
problems of the past and only invite the problems of the future. They are the result of best practice visionaries who seem to always be looking backwards.
E-mail to Leon E. Strine, Jr. (Sept. 14, 2016, 9:08 PM) (on ﬁle with author).
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that “what was good for GM” was good for America,191 when it was thought
that with jobs came growth, and as proﬁts grew so did wages?
Into this republic sliding toward full direct democracy, we must connect the
role of the hedge fund activists. Now, this corporate republic has a concept of
citizenship that is truly remarkable in its liberality. There is no waiting period
or application process to be a citizen, or even to be elected to the highest office
of this republic; buying stock is all that is required, and you can come and go
largely as you please. In the case of activist hedge funds, the evidence of their
behavior as corporate citizens is clear. As explained in Part II, activist hedge
funds are not dissatisﬁed stockholders who decide to become active in changing policies of the corporation. Rather, they become stockholders for the ﬁrst
time to act on the corporation, change its business plans, and reap a proﬁt over
a period that can be as short as a handful of months, but is typically no longer
than two to three years.192 Although the hedge fund will argue to other investors that its plans are durably valuable and maximize long-term returns, the
hedge fund will itself not stay and reap the long-term gains for its beneﬁcence.
Rather, it will exit, take whatever gains have been baked into the stock price,
and leave the actual upside and downside of the change it wrought to others. In
fairness to the activist investors, they may actually hold the stock longer than
the horizon of the traditional money manager whose votes will determine the
outcome of any showdown vote on the proposal. Yes, index funds will also
vote, but not using their own “brains” or independent investment perspective.
Instead, the actively traded funds’ proxy advisor unit will drive the votes, and if
the funds vote on long-term metrics, they will be voting in a way that does not
match their investment horizon. Turnover rates reﬂecting their actual behavior—buying and selling—would suggest they are looking to outguess market
movements short-term and to reap gains off price movements in the immediate
year or so, not off long-term growth as buy and hold investors—i.e., human
investors.
The actual holding strategies of both hedge funds and actively traded mutual funds also act as a real world check on the issue of a key academic model—
the shareholder primacy model espoused by advocates of corporate California,
which justiﬁes a focus on stockholders’ best interests within corporate governance on the normative ground that it is best for everyone because the stockholders can only win as residual claimants if everyone else, including workers

191.

See supra note 142.
192. See sources cited supra note 70.
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and creditors, have their legitimate claims paid.193 This conception, of course,
acts as if there is an ultimate reckoning of accounts, and that stockholders can
only gain if that ﬁnal accounting is one where everyone else is treated as they
are entitled.194 But that is not how the world works. Certain stockholders can
come in and reap trading proﬁts, even if the underlying corporation’s ability to
create value is compromised to the detriment of continuing stockholders, company workers, and creditors.195 In fact, those speculative proﬁts do not come
out of residue in any but a momentary sense, and because they do not come out
of anything like a long-term summing up, those active traders who seek to reap
them have no rational incentive to seek to maximize the ultimate residual value
of the target ﬁrm, just its ability and willingness to generate gains for those
who hold its equity over the active trader’s short-term horizon. And the rationalization that they can only exit favorably if the rest of an actively speculating
market believes the target’s discounted cash ﬂow value is attractive is less assuring when the range of company trading prices over short-term periods is far
more expansive and shifting than can plausibly be explained by fundamental
changes in the company’s earnings prospects.196
193.

See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPOLAW 38 (1991) (“[M]aximizing proﬁts for equity investors assists the other ‘constituencies’ automatically. . . . A successful ﬁrm provides jobs for workers and goods and services
for consumers. The more appealing the goods to consumers, the more proﬁt (and jobs). . . .
Wealthy ﬁrms provide better working conditions and clean up their outfalls . . . .”); see also
LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST
HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 36 (2012) (describing assumptions for
the “standard” model of the economic structure of a corporation, including that
“[s]hareholders are the residual claimants in corporations, meaning they receive all proﬁts
left over after the company’s contractual obligations to its creditors, employees, customers,
and suppliers have been satisﬁed”).
194. STOUT, supra note 193, at 38-39.
195. Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 828-35 (2006) (describing the use of equity derivatives, complex ownership structures, and other techniques that have the effect of giving
certain shareholders interests at odds both with other shareholders and their theoretical role
as residual claimants); Kahan & Rock, supra note 47, at 1071 (noting that hedge funds’ use
of sophisticated strategies, including hedging and arbitrage, means that hedge funds are able
to make money “without regard to whether the strategies they follow beneﬁt shareholders
generally”).
196. Market studies have found a long-term increase in overall market volatility when measured
on a daily basis. See generally Kenneth M. Washer et al., The Increasing Volatility of the Stock
Market?, 19 J. WEALTH MGMT. 71 (2016). Some have found that ﬁnancial innovations like
high frequency trading and ETFs are associated with increased stock price volatility. See
Itzhak Ben-David et al., Do ETFs Increase Volatility? 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 20071, 2014); X. Frank Zhang, High-Frequency Trading, Stock Volatility,
and Price Discovery 1-3 (Yale Sch. of Mgmt., 2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1691679
RATE
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If most of the intermediaries inﬂuencing corporate policies are in fact acting
with a short-term perspective, why is it likely that the things that they advocate
for will be wise for human investors? Active trading strategies are unlikely to
beat the market.197 In fact, those who purport to advocate for stockholder direct democracy tend to tout the semi-strong form of the efficient market hypothesis in favor of their argument. But they ignore that the claim of the efficient market hypothesis is not that a corporation’s stock price at any time is a
reliable estimate of fundamental value, but rather that it is not possible to design a trading strategy that will outguess the guesses of the market as a
whole.198 Stockholder direct democracy advocates then compound that by arguing to place more and more immediate power behind the views of marginal
traders—i.e., those traders who are most likely to be engaged in active, speculative trading strategies dependent on their ability to outguess the market.
Hedge funds, at least of the kind we are focused upon here, argue that their
deviation from passivity can result in higher than market returns because they
assume non-diversiﬁable risks and acquire attributes of control from which
they can inﬂuence corporate policies and extract alpha.199 They also argue pas[http://perma.cc/EHT3-UHXR]. Others have attributed increased volatility to regulatory
factors. Emily Glazer, J.P. Morgan’s James Dimon Says Increased Volatility Here To Stay,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 6, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/jpmorgans-james-dimon-says
-increased-volatility-here-to-stay-1459983813 [http://perma.cc/RG6C-EH2L]. Although by
some measures market volatility is no higher today than before the ﬁnancial crisis, after a
heightened period from late 2007 through 2011, the likelihood of quick swings from low
volatility to high volatility has increased markedly. Tracy Alloway, Market Volatility Has
Changed Immensely, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 8, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles
/2015-09-08/market-volatility-has-changed-immensely
[http://perma.cc/7H39-CU4X].
Market participants attribute this, in part, to an increase in direct speculation on volatility
indices. Id.
197. See generally Malkiel, supra note 43 (collecting studies suggesting ﬁnancial markets are efficient enough that investors can’t earn above-average risk adjusted returns).
198. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 41, at 692; cf. Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 573
(“[O]utperforming the market as a passive [i.e., non-activist] stock picker is hard to do consistently (and impossible if we assume the market to be efficient).”).
199. See, e.g., About Us, TRIAN PARTNERS (2016), http://www.trianpartners.com/about-us
[http://perma.cc/5JLP-DZGA] (“Trian’s strategy involves investing in public companies
with attractive business models that Trian believes trade signiﬁcantly below intrinsic value
due to operating underperformance. Trian believes that its core competency is its ability to
optimize the proﬁtability of the companies in which it invests by working constructively
with management and the board of directors to execute Trian’s operational and strategic initiatives designed to increase the company’s overall value.”); Our Company, THIRD POINT
(2013), http://www.thirdpoint.com/our-company [http://perma.cc/RZY4-8RYF] (“Third
Point employs an event-driven, value-oriented investment style. The Firm seeks to identify
situations where we anticipate a catalyst will unlock value.”); Overview, STARBOARD
VALUE (2016), http://www.starboardvalue.com/overview [http://perma.cc/MD4D-E9L6]
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sionately for the right to secure a big stake before coming public because it is
precisely the nonpublic information they possess—their plans to inﬂuence the
target’s business strategy—that is not baked into their pre-13D disclosure purchase price. The reason, therefore, that activists can supposedly beat a market
return is that they can keep post-purchase gains based on their ability to
change the company’s earnings potential in a way that will increase its share
price. The industry’s ability to claim success in that regard is compromised,
however, by a few realities. Even at the most optimistic of estimates, the returns generated by hedge funds as a whole do not seem to exceed those of the
market on a risk adjusted basis.200 And the most optimistic is not the most reliable. Public CEOs that manage corporations into insolvency do not tend to get
second acts. But hedge funds fail regularly,201 and the industry-wide data about
their returns is likely overstated in a material way by the failure to consider this
reality.202 Of course, it is not surprising that hedge funds would fail more; after
all, the argument is that they are taking more risk to get more gain. The question, though, is why anyone who believes in the efficient market hypothesis
would embrace the idea that hedge fund managers as a class were likely to beat
(“[Starboard employs] a focused and fundamental approach to investing in publicly traded
U.S. companies. Starboard invests in deeply undervalued companies and actively engages
with management teams and boards of directors to identify and execute on opportunities to
unlock value for the beneﬁt of all shareholders.”).
200. When comparing against benchmarks and adjusting for hedge-fund-speciﬁc data biases,
studies have found that hedge funds materially underperform their relevant benchmarks.
Mila Getmansky et al., Hedge Funds: A Dynamic Industry in Transition 21 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21449, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2645525
[http://perma.cc/2ZV9-AHWD]. At least one analysis found that, in the aggregate, investors would have been better off putting money into Treasuries than hedge funds. Lack, supra
note 160, at 14. The measurement time frame is very important. Studies examining returns
before the late 1990s and early 2000s tend to ﬁnd positive risk-adjusted returns, albeit not
necessarily performances that materially exceed a benchmark index. Getmansky et al., supra,
at 21. But even some of those studies ﬁnd that their positive returns result from a limited
number of months within a multi-year sample period. Id. Additionally, even when studies
have found only short-term persistence in strong performance, evidence of long-term persistence in strong performance is elusive. Id. at 24 (observing that overall evidence is
“mixed” although most studies focused on hedge fund industry returns found persistence in
the short term, if at all); see also Nir Kaissar, Hedge Funds Have a Performance Problem,
BLOOMBERG GADFLY (Mar. 24, 2016, 10:23 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/gadﬂy
/articles/2016-03-24/hedge-funds-have-a-performance-problem
[http://perma.cc/W349
-7VJ2] (showing that ten-year returns peaked for equity hedge funds in February 2000 and
have declined by an order of magnitude since then). The same general decrease in returns
exists for hedge funds focused on strategies other than equity trading, e.g., macro funds,
Kaissar, supra.
201. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
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the market. Sure, there may be the fund manager who types Shakespeare for a
decade or so, but that anomaly is likely to be just that. Investors who thought
high-ﬂying hedge fund activists were writing A Midsummer Night’s Dream earlier this decade likely found their 2015 reports announcing record-breaking
poor performance to read more like a disgraced politician’s “mistakes were
made” speech.203 And the hedge fund industry’s overall performance has decreased steadily since the late 1990s,204 raising questions about whether hedge
fund activists can continue to grow and ﬁnd high-quality targets.205 More fundamentally, if it is now the case that hedge funds predominantly focus on consistently proﬁtable ﬁrms that they believe should pay out more to their investors now,206 there is less reason to think they are making the economy much
more efficient and more reason to be concerned that they are perhaps pushing
steady producers of societal wealth on a riskier course that has no substantial
long-term upside.
Another worrying trend in this republic is the unmooring of corporate citizenship. Corporate citizenship is not tied to any natural conception of citizenship, and so-called American corporations have a large international investor
base and derive large portions of their revenues from off-shore operations. The
adage that “what’s good for GM is good for America”207 is likely to induce justiﬁable eye rolling if it is applied to many American corporations now. In fact,
many household names have abandoned the United States as their domicile altogether, putting the chance to secure a tax haven and calmer governance controls over any concern for national identity.208 American institutional investors
have been happy to support these abandonments of our nation.
No doubt, it would markedly overstate things to attribute stagnation in
median wages, simultaneous explosive growth in executive compensation and
pay for ﬁnancial industry participants, and overall income and wealth inequality to the increasing ability of momentary stockholder majorities to inﬂuence

203.

See Jen Wieczner, Why Big Investors Are Finally Pulling Their Money out of Hedge Funds, FOR(Mar. 2, 2016, 2:35 PM), http://fortune.com/2016/03/02/hedge-fund-investors
-withdraw-returns/ [http://perma.cc/QCJ5-A367].
204. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
205. See supra note 64 (discussing changes in activist targets from underperforming companies to
proﬁtable ﬁrms and an associated decrease in returns).
206. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
207. See Wilson, supra note 142.
208. Zachary Mider & Jesse Drucker, Tax Inversion, BLOOMBERG QUICKTAKE (Apr. 6, 2016,
5:15 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/tax-inversion [http://perma.cc/DE9R
-RGU9] (reporting that more than ﬁfty U.S. companies have reincorporated in low-tax jurisdictions and twenty have done so in the last four years).
TUNE
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corporate behavior through the adoption of corporate governance policies
moving corporations toward a form of direct democracy. But it would also be
wrong to ignore the inﬂuence that enhancing the power of a stock market focused on immediate gratiﬁcation has on the way public corporations approach
doing business. Investing in their workers’ productivity to increase proﬁts over
the long term takes more time than offshoring jobs to nations where workers
receive pay that none of the advocates of stockholder power would accept for
themselves or their children. Keeping the market happy with stock buybacks,
special dividends, or a tax-slashing inversion may involve less headache than
sticking by a thoughtful, substantial program of long-term capital investment.
Shortcuts become comparatively more tempting when those who wield the
power seem more focused on near-term returns than cultivating sustainable
wealth.
Admittedly, these big picture facts cannot be solely or primarily attributed
to policy moves within corporate law itself or to the increasing power of institutional investors and immediate stock market sentiment over public companies. Trends like vigorous international competition that accelerated rapidly
since the 1970s, the reduction in legal protections for constituencies like organized labor, and evolving technologies have inﬂuenced how American public
corporations have done business and had an effect on key issues like employment and wage growth, income inequality, and the extent to which corporations can engage in gain-sharing between their equity investors and other corporate constituencies, such as workers and the communities in which the corcorporation operates. Likewise, with the globalization of not only product and
service markets, but stock ownership itself, corporations have increasingly lost
any genuine national identity.
The intra-agent skirmishes of this corporate republic do not ﬁt nicely with
the needs of those agents’ supposed masters—human investors. As Part I explained, real humans are stuck in for materially longer periods of time, and
they obtain most of their wealth through wages, rather than the markets. What
wealth does come from the markets is derived from a mixture of equity and
debt. These special attributes of human investors, distinct from the other
members of the corporate republic, give them disproportionate exposure to
whatever risks hedge funds generate for our country. As I discuss in the next
Part, human investors face two main areas of exposure: as indirect investors in
hedge funds themselves and as participants in the real economy businesses in
which activist hedge funds intervene.

1933

the yale law journal

126:1870

2017

iv
Hedge funds, as one peculiar class of agents in this corporate republic, have
the potential to cause harm to human investors in two different capacities. One
that is too often overlooked is that human investors bear risk as indirect investors in hedge funds themselves. The hedge fund industry’s growth has been increasingly fueled by investments made by pension funds to which human investors are looking for support in their retirement. The other source of
potential harm comes from the inﬂuence that activist hedge funds have on the
policies of public companies. That inﬂuence involves, most obviously, the
changes hedge funds generate when they target speciﬁc companies and those
companies accede in whole or in part to the hedge funds’ demands. But both
proponents and skeptics of hedge funds agree that the inﬂuence of activist
hedge funds goes beyond the companies they speciﬁcally target because the potency of hedge fund activism has an effect on the policies of companies not yet
facing the wolf pack’s direct attack.209 Those who fear the wolf rationally have
an incentive to do what it takes to avoid an encounter, by deciding to adopt
strategies that make it less attractive to the wolves to mount an attack.
A
Although typically unable to invest in hedge funds on their own, human
investors are still frequently directly exposed to hedge fund gains and losses.
Human investors are locked out of direct investments in hedge funds themselves by a variety of paternalistic, if well-meaning, rules, which include requirements that investors must be able to change their allocation of investments in 401(k)s at least once every three months,210 and by the reality that

209.

See Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 1147-54; Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 594 (noting that
the threat of an activist engagement has been found to pressure nontargeted ﬁrms “to
cut back on long-term investments and increase shareholder payout”); Martin Lipton,
The Bebchuk Syllogism, HARV. L. SCHOOL F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Aug.
26, 2013), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/08/26/the-bebchuk-syllogism/ [http://
perma.cc/57F9-HKZB] (“There is no way to study the parallel universe that would exist,
and the value that could be created for shareholders and other constituents, if these pressures and constraints were lifted and companies and their boards and managements were
free to invest for the long term.”).
210. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(2)(ii)(C)(1) (2015). Hedge funds typically impose a variety of
requirements that make it difficult for investors to achieve instant liquidity. See, e.g., All
Locked-Up, ECONOMIST (Aug. 2, 2007), http://www.economist.com/node/9596328 [http://
perma.cc/9X4F-XQ9C]; Ross Ford et al., Liquidity: Overview of Hedge Fund Liquidity Structures, PREQIN (Dec. 2012), http://www.preqin.com/docs/newsletters/hf/Preqin_HFSL_Dec
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almost all hedge funds offer only unregistered securities and are thus prohibited from securing investments from anyone who is not a so-called “accredited
investor” under Regulation D.211 But those prohibitions do not mean that human investors, or important societal institutions, such as our hugely subsidized
university sector and many charities, do not bear investment risk if hedge
funds fail or deliver returns lower than the market, on a risk-adjusted basis. It
just means that human investors are dependent on the sophistication and ﬁdelity of pension boards and other ﬁduciaries. Count me skeptical that there has
been an exponential growth in the base of sophisticated pension board ﬁduciaries, which renders them able to assess the quality and prudence of hedge
fund investments well, at least in the absence of better data than are currently
available.212
The accredited investor exception has its origins in allowing rich investors
to engage in caveat emptor transactions if they wished.213 I think of it as the
Thurston Howell exception because that iconic ﬁgure from Gilligan’s Island
comes to mind as the sort of person policymakers believed could proceed at his
own risk because we did not particularly care if he got hurt.214 But that exception has ballooned into one that exposes far more than super-wealthy individuals to substantial risk from making investments about which they know too little. Because pension funds, charities, and universities can qualify and claim to
be sophisticated,215 they regularly now expose human investors and society as a

211.
212.

213.

214.

215.

_2012_Liquidity_Structures.pdf [http://perma.cc/RP9R-6UQ6] (describing hedge fund
restrictions on redemptions).
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2016).
See e.g., Elizabeth Parisian & Saqib Bhatti, All that Glitters Is Not Gold, ROOSEVELT INST.
(2015), http://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/All-That-Glitters-Is-Not
-Gold-Nov-2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/3JC6-SHWJ] (noting that hedge funds were responsible for signiﬁcant investment losses for pension funds).
See Report on the Review of the Deﬁnition of “Accredited Investor,” U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION 2 (Dec. 18, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/corpﬁn/reportspubs/special-studies/review
-deﬁnition-of-accredited-investor-12-18-2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/6PVD-D42A] (remarking that the concept of an accredited investor was “intended to encompass those persons and
entities whose ﬁnancial sophistication and ability to sustain the risk of loss of investment or
ability to fend for themselves render the protections of the Securities Act’s registration process unnecessary” (quoting Regulation D Revisions; Exemption for Certain Employee Beneﬁt Plans, 52 Fed. Reg. 3015 (Jan. 16, 1987))).
Id. Thurston Howell III has appeared at number nine on Forbes Magazine’s “Fictional 15”
list of the wealthiest ﬁgures in popular ﬁction. Michael Noer, #9 Howell III, Thurston,
FORBES (Dec. 11, 2007), http://www.forbes.com/2007/12/11/thurston-howell-money-oped
-books-cx_mn_ﬁct1507_1211howell.html [http://perma.cc/2FJ7-9HJP].
17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (including in the deﬁnition of accredited investor “any plan established and maintained by a state, its political subdivisions, or any agency or instrumentality
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whole to the risks that come with hedge fund investing. Many pension funds
are not in fact well positioned to prudently select hedge funds or other nonregistered investments and may be attracted to those types of investments because they have not prudently funded and invested the pension fund in the
past.216 Thus, they chase the impossible dream of using above-market returns
to ﬁll a hole left by previous underinvestment and poor investing, creating a
probability that when the impossible dream does not come true, the hole is
even larger. And although the direct investor who makes these investments is
accredited, it is the human investor (who is supposedly unable to invest in
these vehicles) who in fact bears the risk of investment losses. Making this system even less rational is the reality that the lack of disclosure puts consumers
like pension funds and college investment funds in a poor position to shop
knowledgeably because track record information is unclear and unreliable, and
fund managers seem to be able to tout publicly return records that put to the
side their past failures.
The other major question is whether hedge fund activism can actually scale
in an effective and rational way, if the hedge funds who engage in the activism
are to be a prudent investment for socially important institutions upon which
human investors depend, such as pension funds, universities, and charities.217
of a state or its political subdivisions, for the beneﬁt of its employees, if such plan has total
assets in excess of $5,000,000” and “[a]ny organization described in section 501(c)(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code . . . with total assets in excess of $5,000,000”); see also Cheffins &
Armour, supra note 53, at 89-90 (describing how rule changes in the mid-1990s allowed
greater institutional investor participation in hedge funds).
216. See Parisian & Bhatti, supra note 212, at 4 (“[H]edge funds failed to deliver signiﬁcant beneﬁts to any of the pension funds we reviewed.”); id. at 3 (arguing that pension fund motivation for selecting hedge funds was the “promise [of] outsized returns”). Some pension
funds have gotten burned after they rushed to alternative asset managers, like hedge funds,
to ﬁll funding gaps. For example, after the dot-com crash caused steep losses, the Austin Police Retirement System moved almost half of its assets to alternative managers, only to experience another steep decline in the ﬁnancial crisis. Julie Creswell, Pensions Find Riskier Funds
Fail To Pay Off, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/02/business
/pension-funds-making-alternative-bets-struggle-to-keep-up.html [http://perma.cc/RU6R
-DT78]. The Teacher Retirement System of Texas has similarly moved into alternatives,
committing slightly under a third of its assets to various private equity and hedge fund
managers to try to make up losses from the ﬁnancial crisis. Michael Corkery, Pensions
Bet Big with Private Equity, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB
10001424127887323485704578258242293295894 [http://perma.cc/5TW7-5845] (describing,
among other investments, a material stake in the hedge fund Bridgewater Associates).
217. LO, supra note 56, at 16 (“As assets under management increase, it becomes progressively
more difficult for fund managers to implement strategies that are truly uncorrelated with
broad-based market indexes like the S&P 500.”). Concrete examples exist too. In a study
conducted on the University of California’s twelve-year experiment with hedge fund investments, AFSCME Local 3299 found that that the University of California could have saved
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As has been discussed, as hedge fund activism has grown, its targets have shifted to proﬁtable companies that they think can be even more so,218 but there is
also evidence that returns from this shift are less substantial.219 At the same
time, more money managers and more money are chasing what seem to be a
ﬁnite set of high-growth opportunities,220 and that competition is vigorous, so
it is not clear that hedge funds will be able to ﬁnd value gaps that will produce
the above-market returns required to justify their greater costs and risks as a
larger industry,221 and the evidence to date is that industry-wide hedge fund

218.
219.

220.

221.

$950 million in fees and generated the superior returns it sought by investing in low-cost,
traditional asset classes. There was a strong, positive correlation between the University of
California’s hedge fund-based returns and general market returns, showing that the University paid upward of $1 billion in fees for returns that largely mirrored the trends in the stock
market. The University’s hedge fund program yielded a cumulative 112% in net returns
whereas, excluding hedge fund investments, the returns were 168%. See Missing the Mark:
How Hedge Fund Investments at the University of California Shortchange Students, Staff and
California Taxpayers, AFSCME LOC. 3299 (Jan. 2016) http://www.afscme3299.org
/documents/media/WhitePaper_MissingTheMark.pdf [http://perma.cc/522R-7JS3]. Pension funds have also suffered because of unsuccessful investments in hedge funds. The New
York Times reported in April 2012 that the $26.3 billion Pennsylvania State Employees’ Retirement System had paid $1.35 billion in management fees during the prior ﬁve years and
reported a ﬁve-year annualized return of 3.6%, well below the 4.9% median return among
public pension systems. Creswell, supra note 216. In the wake of these developments, some
pension funds have increased their allocation to passive management and reduced the
money given to private equity funds and hedge funds. See, e.g., Timothy W. Martin, What
Does Nevada’s $35 Billion Fund Manager Do All Day? Nothing, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 19,
2016),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/what-does-nevadas-35-billion-fund-manager-do-all
-day-nothing-1476887420 [http://perma.cc/7R68-ZEBC] (proﬁling the head of the Nevada
Public Employees’ Retirement System, which has moved all of its holdings to passive funds
but has returns over one-, three-, ﬁve-, and ten-year periods besting pension funds such as
CalPERS).
See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
Brav et al., supra note 5, at 2726 (“[W]e ﬁnd that the improvement in production efficiency
associated with hedge fund activism is more pronounced when the activist targets operational issues, such as business strategies or asset sales, relative to when the activist targets
general undervaluation or capital structure issues.”); see also id. at 2739 tbl.5 (providing statistics behind Brav et al.’s ﬁndings).
John Authers & Robin Wigglesworth, Pensions: Low Yields, High Stress, FIN. TIMES (Aug.
22, 2016), http://www.ft.com/content/8a54a0c6-648b-11e6-a08a-c7ac04ef00aa [http://
perma.cc/F84K-B5WB] (describing pension deﬁcits and pension funds’ focus on ﬁnding
better-yielding—usually riskier—investment opportunities driven by the increasing number
of retirees and low interest rates).
Lack, supra note 160, at 15 (ﬁnding decreasing overall returns as the hedge fund industry has
increased in size); cf. Eileen Appelbaum & Rosemary Batt, Are Lower Private Equity Returns
the New Normal?, CTR. FOR ECON. & POL’Y RES. 3 (June 2016), http://cepr.net/images
/stories/reports/private-equity-performance-2016-06.pdf [http://perma.cc/N34C-TEFL]

1937

the yale law journal

126:1870

2017

returns generate either a small amount of return over a safer buy-and-hold
market-based strategy, or in fact, are lagging the market.222 Because the activist
hedge funds are pursuing strategies in strong tension with what the efficient
market hypothesis and market data suggest about prudent long-term approaches to investment, these factors suggest reason for concern that it is socially useful to have important institutions that ordinary investors depend upon investing in hedge funds, especially given the dearth of reliable and
consistent information available about them.223
B
The other way that human investors are exposed to the risk of hedge fund
activism is the one that is more often discussed. That involves the question of
whether hedge fund activism has a positive or negative effect on the long-term
performance of the public companies it targets. Because human investors bear
risk as indirect investors in public companies and, more importantly, as workers dependent on the economy’s ability to create and sustain good jobs, this issue is very important. This exposure is not limited to ﬁrms directly targeted by
activists. As Professors Coffee and Palia observe, summarizing studies on the
topic, “[f]or every ﬁrm targeted [by activists], several more are likely to reduce
R&D expenditures in order to avoid becoming a target.”224 A detailed survey of
top managers and directors found that corporate boards were not only feeling
increasing pressure to think and act short-term, but that boards and managers
were themselves more and more likely to propose the types of corporate ﬁnance
moves, such as increasing stock buybacks, that they perceived activist hedge
funds would likely advocate.225 Other companies, perhaps including those in
this country’s dynamic sectors, try to ﬁnd ways to avoid the wolf. An incisive
market participant argued to me that stockholder activism is having an inﬂu-

222.
223.
224.
225.

(attributing the decrease in private equity returns in part to increased competition among
private equity ﬁrms for deals and increased capital available to deploy).
See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 576 (summarizing studies on the topic).
Dominic Barton et al., Rising to the Challenge of Short-Termism, FCLT GLOBAL
8-10 (2016), http://www.fcltglobal.org/docs/default-source/default-document-library/fclt
-global-rising-to-the-challenge.pdf [http://perma.cc/7Z8P-QPJJ]. Also, the propensity of
managers and directors to say “more-vocal activist investors,” which was the most important
driver of pressure for short-term performance, doubled in the three years since the last survey took place. Id. at 10.
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ence on even the faster-growing segments of the economy.226 He noted that because even the most successful companies have been targeted by activists,227
entrepreneurs in the technology space are insisting on securing a dual-class
structure or other strong defenses if they go public, or they consider avoiding
activism another advantage to remaining private.228
For human investors, the overall trends as to the factors relevant to the
question of if activism harms or helps them are, at the least, worrying. American public corporations seem to be spending much more of their free cash ﬂow
on stock buybacks, increasing dividends, and other tactics to guarantee immediate payoffs than on research and development and other forms of long-term
investment.229 For the stuck-in human investor, increased dividends have to be
invested back into the very companies paying them out, and the same is basically true as to buybacks. And if the sources of those dividends or buybacks are
funds that would have otherwise been invested in developing new products or
services, which involve the prospect for greater employment opportunities and
growth in the future, this choice of current consumption over future growth is
problematic.230 Even Professor Brav, who is generally optimistic regarding the

226.

E-mail to Leo E. Strine, Jr. (Oct. 17, 2016, 12:44 PM) (on ﬁle with author).
Id. Apple has been one recent activist target. See sources cited supra note 106. Other
well-performing technology companies that have been recent activist targets include
Microsoft, data-storage company NetApp, and design software maker Adobe Systems. David Benoit et al., Activist Investor Report Card, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 5, 2015), http://graphics
.wsj.com/activist-investor/#FBHS [http://perma.cc/9CF4-KX68]; David Benoit & Vipal
Monga, Are Activist Investors Helping or Undermining American Companies?, WALL ST. J. (Oct.
5, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/activist-investors-helping-or-hindering-1444067712
[http://perma.cc/U4KC-CHVW]; supra note 119 and accompanying text.
228. A prominent venture capitalist made this point as well. In an interview with the Wall Street
Journal, Ben Horowitz argued that activist investors increase the likelihood that young,
growing companies will refrain from going public. Joann S. Lublin, Venture Capitalist: Beware of Activist Holders, WALL ST. J. (July 10, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000
1424052702303292204577518733086203236 [http://perma.cc/Q7E5-VB2P].
229. In the second quarter of 2016, forty-four companies in the S&P 500 paid annual dividends
exceeding their prior twelve month’s net income, reaching a new decade-high. Mike Bird et
al., Dividends Eat up Bigger Slice of Company Proﬁts, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 18, 2016), http://www
.wsj.com/articles/dividends-eat-up-bigger-slice-of-company-proﬁts-1471565154
[http://
perma.cc/56XE-JDBF]. The time horizons of a company’s shareholders have been shown to
affect managers’ decisions about investment—speciﬁcally, that “transient” ownership “signiﬁcantly increases” the likelihood that managers will cut research and development investment for the sake of earnings. Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 573-74 (quoting Brian J.
Bushee, The Inﬂuence of Institutional Investors on Myopic R&D Investment Behavior, 73 ACCT.
REV. 305, 307 (1998) (summarizing studies)).
230. Taking a broader look at the effect of changes that shift power from management to shareholders (including hedge fund activism) on target companies, one study found that compa227.
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effect of hedge fund activism, admits that hedge funds’ tool boxes are limited
and tend to be concentrated in corporate ﬁnance moves,231 as discussed in Part
II. The reason for this, Brav candidly admits, is that most hedge fund managers
are ﬁnancial, not operational or management, experts and “are not experts in
the speciﬁc business of the target ﬁrms.”232
Another important attribute of human investors is that they are also likely
to be invested not just in equity securities, but in debt securities.233 Without
disparaging them, it is not clear that mutual fund families spend a great deal of
time worrying about the implications of corporate governance arrangements on
their investors in funds that focus on debt securities. As discussed, the voice of
debt capital in corporate governance has decreased and tends to become loud
only when ﬁrms are in actual distress.234 And under corporate law itself, the
corporation’s lenders have no vote and are left to rely on triggering events of
default and other extreme measures.235 Perhaps for this reason, some scholars
have found that rather than creating additional ﬁrm value, hedge fund activism
engaged in by equity investors has the effect of shifting wealth from debt capital to equity capital.236 For human investors, especially those in the years when

231.
232.
233.

234.
235.
236.

nies experienced a “pop” in performance in the ﬁrst year after the change, followed by a reverse in gains in terms of sales, proﬁtability, and payouts. Jillian Popadak, A Corporate Culture Channel: How Increased Shareholder Governance Reduces Firm Value 3-4 (Oct. 25,
2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2345384 [http://perma.cc/56U6
-SSST]. The author concludes that shareholder-centric governance reforms are a “dualedged sword,” by which she means that whatever short-term boost stockholders get is then
followed by the risk of a longer-term decline that erases the gain and cuts long-run performance. Id. at 4; see also Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 574-76 (describing studies by researchers who nominally fall on both sides of the activist debate but who all tend to ﬁnd that
activist targets reduce spending on research and development after an intervention; and
summarizing the studies’ ﬁndings by stating that “it seems safe to conclude only that research and development expenditures decline signiﬁcantly in the wake of hedge fund pressure,” but conceding that it is possible that targets “increase the proﬁtability of their R&D
investments” in the wake of an activist intervention).
Brav et al., supra note 16, at 1741-44.
Id. at 1755; see also Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 591 (summarizing studies tending to show
“[l]ittle evidence” that activist interventions promote sales growth or increases in assets).
See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions About 401(k) Plans, INV. COMPANY INST. (Sept.
2014) http://www.ici.org/policy/retirement/plan/401k/faqs_401k [http://perma.cc/VE68
-RXYD] (showing that 401(k) balances included at least 20% ﬁxed income assets, measured
as a percentage of assets).
See supra text accompanying notes 178-180.
See Triantis & Daniels, supra note 179, at 1075-77.
See Klein & Zur, supra note 64, at 194 & n.11, 224-25 (ﬁnding that hedge funds’ targets experienced a “signiﬁcant” post-intervention increase in leverage, often sold off assets, and were
less proﬁtable, but paid out more returns to equity); Hadiye Aslan & Hilda Maraachlian,
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they actually are relying on their investment portfolio to pay for tuition or their
expenses during retirement,237 value shifts of this kind are of dubious, and
even perhaps negative, value, especially when solvency risks are considered.238
Perhaps more troubling, there is evidence that equity gains from activism
come from the workers of the target ﬁrm. Because human investors owe most
of their wealth to their ability to ﬁnd and hold a job, and from the wages that
they receive from their labor,239 transfers from labor to equity are likely to hurt
human investors. In one paper by respected scholars, the authors referred to
the activists reducing “labor rents.”240 That is an interesting usage, which suggests that the workers at the target ﬁrm were exploiting the equity holders.
There are other words than “interesting” for this usage, given the overall trends
during the last thirty years of American economic history. During this period,
the traditional share that workers have received from increases in their productivity has been eroded substantially to their detriment and to the beneﬁt of eq-

Wealth Effects of Hedge Fund Activism 30 (Feb. 2009) (unpublished manuscript), http://
www.efa2009.org/papers/SSRN-id1428047.pdf [http://perma.cc/CD3M-79FS] (“[P]art of
the overall gain to stockholders is the result of a wealth transfer from bondholders.”); see also
Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 588-89 (summarizing studies showing, for example, “that
there is a wealth transferred from bondholders to shareholders”); Chris Plath, Shareholder
Activism: Impact on North American Corporate Sectors, MOODY’S INV. SERV. 1 (Mar.
11, 2014), http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/corp_gov/activist-interventions-round
table-2014-materials/2014_03_shareholder-activism-impact-on-na-corporates.pdf [http://
perma.cc/5WLE-BBQT] (noting that activist interventions are “[i]n most cases . . . a creditnegative for bondholders”). But see Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 1147 (“[S]ummary statistics for the full universe of activist interventions do not reveal higher odds of ﬁnancial distress than for non-targeted public companies.”); Brav et al., supra note 16, at 1732, 1767
(ﬁnding no shifts from equity to debt because even though leverage goes up, many targets
have no substantial long-term debt, even after increasing near-term payouts).
237. See discussion supra Part I.
238. See Jin Xu & Yinghua Li, Hedge Fund Activism and Bank Loan Contracting 25 (AFA 2011 Denver Meetings Paper 2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1573217 [http://perma.cc/J8F9-57XD]
(“[W]e ﬁnd that hedge fund activism signiﬁcantly increases the credit risk of target ﬁrms.”);
see also Plath, supra note 236, at 1. Human investors also depend on life insurance, and life
insurance companies often buy debt securities in order to fund their obligations to pay off
policies. Insurance companies buy their bonds looking for the correct durational structure
and risk proﬁle, rather than an investment with which they can take an aggressive posture.
Kahan & Rock, supra note 179, at 296.
239. See discussion supra Part I.
240. Brav et al., supra note 5, at 2753; see also Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 589 (noting that wages and hours worked at target ﬁrms stagnate and that the total number of employees may
decrease).
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uity investors.241 Given this undisputed reality, as well as stagnation in median
income and wage growth,242 post-activist intervention gains that result from
reducing labor rents might well be considered yet another deepening of income
inequality that reduces the wealth of the many to beneﬁt the few.243 Human investors care not just about whether corporations make money, but also about
how. Gains that come from squeezing out workers and squeezing those who
remain do not promise wealth gains for most human investors, but wealth
losses.
Another related issue is the potential costs to human investors in the future,
in terms of slower job, wage, and overall economic growth, if hedge fund activism tends to result, both for direct targets of activism and, as a systemic matter,
for the overall market, in reduced capital investments. Respected scholars have
concluded that after hedge fund activists succeed, targeted ﬁrms’ research and
development spending materially decreases.244 Now, there are of course con-

241.

Lawrence Mishel et al., Wage Stagnation in Nine Charts, ECON. POL’Y INST. 4 ﬁg.2 (Jan. 6,
2015), http://www.epi.org/ﬁles/2013/wage-stagnation-in-nine-charts.pdf [http://perma.cc
/4MFT-HXKS].
242. Josh Bivens et al., Raising America’s Pay: Why It’s Our Central Economic Policy Challenge,
ECON. POL’Y INST. 4-5 (June 4, 2014), http://www.epi.org/ﬁles/pdf/65287.pdf [http://
perma.cc/TYG9-VF2M] (showing that wages for the vast majority of workers have either
stagnated or declined since 1979, extending even to college degree holders).
243. Mishel et al., supra note 241, at 3 ﬁg.1.
244. One recent study concludes:
We provide evidence that the presence of short-term investors is associated with
cuts in long-term investment to generate earnings surprises, leading to temporary
boosts in the stock price. Short-term investors beneﬁt from temporarily inﬂated
stock prices as they subsequently leave the ﬁrm so that only long-term shareholders suffer from the reduction in long-term investment and equity value.
Martijn Cremers et al., Short-Term Investors, Long-Term Investments, and Firm Value 27
(July 2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2720248 [http://perma.cc
/7E7E-NG7C]; see also Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 574-77, 590 (noting that activist interventions are associated “with a decline in R&D and long-term investment”); Krishnan et al.,
supra note 64, at 309 tbl.9 (noting that research and development spending decreased postintervention in the aggregate for a collection of 396 of 447 interventions studied); supra
notes 229-232 and accompanying text. But see Klein & Zur, supra note 64, at 220-21 tbl.VIII
(ﬁnding negative effects to creditors but no drop in spending on research and development
in the ﬁrst year after a hedge fund activist intervention, and suggesting that other activist interventions reduce research and development more than hedge fund interventions). There is
also more generalized evidence suggesting short-term shareholders decrease companies’ research and development spending. Brian J. Bushee, The Inﬂuence of Institutional Investors on
Myopic R&D Investment Behavior, 73 ACCT. REV. 305, 307 (1998) (ﬁnding that ﬁrms with
more short-term shareholders are more likely to cut research and development expenses to
meet short-term targets). As discussed elsewhere, interventions by certain subsets of activist
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tradictory arguments and evidence that hedge fund activists increase the shortterm harvest on prior investments and make research and development more
efficient.245 What is worrying, of course, is that most of us realize that it is possible, over some period, to milk an asset (human or machine) to squeeze out
more. When a new coach or boss comes in, when the workforce is terriﬁed by
the prospects of job cuts, when output is pushed to the max in a blitz, results
can go up.246 But if the changes are not durable and do not involve policies that
are sustainable and nurture future growth, the immediate years of robust harvest can portend future famine. Surveys of corporate managers done by scholars have found that: 1) managers feel the pressure to deliver short-term proﬁts
and to develop business plans using a horizon that they believe is counterproductively short-term;247 and 2) managers admit to refusing to do projects with
very positive long-term prospects because they would involve reductions in
GAAP earnings in the near term and therefore a feared negative immediate
stock market reaction.248 Other scholars have looked at the effect of short-term
pressure on research and development output and found similar trends.249

245.

246.

247.

248.

249.

investors are associated with an increase in research and development. Krishnan et al., supra
note 64, at 309 tbl.9.
Alon Brav et al., How Does Hedge Fund Activism Reshape Corporate Innovation? 6-7
(2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2409404 [http://perma.cc
/2W5S-CSZA] (noting that target ﬁrms decrease research and development spending, but
do not see a decrease in the quality and quantity of patents); see also Coffee & Palia, supra
note 6, at 576 (noting that activist targets may increase proﬁtability from research and development after an activist engages with the company).
Cf. Jon Bois, Should You Fire Your Coach Midseason? A Statistical Breakdown, SB NATION (Apr.
10, 2012, 12:12 PM), http://www.sbnation.com/2012/4/10/2936696/head-coach-ﬁred-stats
[http://perma.cc/UT2D-5X3E] (reviewing changes in professional sports teams’ intraseason records when a head coach is ﬁred midseason and showing a slight boost from such
ﬁrings in the aggregate—with a great deal of underlying variation).
Dominic Barton & Mark Wiseman, Investing for the Long Term, MCKINSEY
& CO. (Dec. 2014), http://www.mckinsey.com/industries/private-equity-and-principal
-investors/our-insights/investing-for-the-long-term [http://perma.cc/5N9M-PRYY] (surveying directors and C-suite executives and ﬁnding that 79% felt “especially pressured” to
demonstrate strong ﬁnancial performance over a period of two years or less and that 86% of
respondents believed that using a longer time horizon would positively affect corporate performance). Managers are possibly pressured to the point of engaging in ﬁnancial misreporting. Natasha Burns et al., Institutional Ownership and Monitoring: Evidence from Financial
Misreporting, 16 J. CORP. FIN. 443, 454 (2010).
See John R. Graham et al., Value Destruction and Financial Reporting Decisions, 62 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 27 (2006) (surveying a material group of executives willing to trade long-term
growth for smoother earnings).
For example, one study, using research-analyst coverage as a proxy for pressure to focus on
the short term, found that the number of granted patent applications and citations of those
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Admittedly, there is also some evidence that the intervention of activist hedge
funds who are willing to place experienced business executives on target boards
and remain as investors for a period more like a typical private equity investor
is not associated with declines in research and development. In contrast, the results in interventions by hedge funds who are more short-term and less focused on a strategy of improving their targets’ long-term performance is associated with declines.250
Setting aside the effect activism has on the internal workings of its targets,
how stock prices increase matters to human investors. For example, a good deal
of the stock price gains that scholars claim result from hedge fund activism
come in the form of returns from targets pushed or nudged into sale mode.251

applications by other parties was inversely related to the intensity of analyst coverage. Jie
(Jack) He & Xuan Tian, The Dark Side of Analyst Coverage: The Case of Innovation, 109 J. FIN.
ECON. 856 (2013).
250. One interesting example of this work is a study of the Hermes UK Focus Fund, which has a
blended private equity and hedge fund model, where researchers were afforded unusual access to the fund’s private records. Marco Becht et al., Returns to Shareholder Activism: Evidence
from a Clinical Study of the Hermes U.K. Focus Fund, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 3093 (2009). Hermes
is generally regarded as a strong performer and the researchers determined that over 90% of
the fund’s excess return was related to activism. Id. at 3096. The vast majority of interventions were never public and involved “numerous meetings and telephone calls” both with
senior executives as well as other executives, such as divisional managers. Id. at 3109 tbl.5.
The fund’s median holding period was around two-and-a-half years, although that masks
material variation, with Hermes holding many of its targets closer to three to four years. Id.
at 3107 tbl.3. This is materially longer than results recorded studying hedge funds more
broadly. See Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 567 (summarizing studies). Intervention by
Hermes was connected with an increase on return on assets that was sustained after the fund
exited the investment. Becht et al., supra, at 3097, 3118 tbl.10. Although Hermes often called
for asset sales and other typical activist goals, its goals were as often operational in nature,
involving calls for changes in company strategy, as often as they were ﬁnancial, involving
changes in the ﬁrm’s payout policy. Id. at 3112 tbl.6 (comparing the “Financial policies” category of goals with the “Other policies” category). Even when viewed in this comparatively
positive light, though, Hermes’s interventions may not have been universally positive for
human investors: in twenty-eight out of thirty interventions, at least one of the fund’s goals
included asset sales or restrictions on new investments, id. at 3097, and companies targeted
for restructuring by the fund substantially decreased the number of their employees after the
fund’s intervention, id.
251. Brav et al., supra note 16, at 1759; Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 588 (“[C]hanges in the expected takeover premium, more than operating improvements, account for most of the stock
price gain, both in short-term and long-term studies.”); William W. Bratton, Hedge Fund
Activism, Poison Pills, and the Jurisprudence of Threat 13 (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Inst. for Law &
Econ. Research Paper No. 16-20; Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. Working Paper Series in Law
Paper No. 330/2016) (Sept. 1, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2835610 [http://perma.cc
/MU7Q-JS7S] (summarizing studies and observing that “[t]here is no question that activism prompts mergers”); see also Yvan Allaire & François Dauphin, The Game of ‘Activist’
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It is, of course, the case that hedge funds sometimes come in on the buy side to
argue that the buyer is making an improvident acquisition, sometimes an acquisition urged by another activist.252 What seems less clear is that there is anything like symmetry in this context, as it seems unlikely and not borne out by
experience that hedge funds have often come into ownership of acquiring ﬁrms
to block an improvident acquisition.253 By contrast it has often been the case
that hedge funds have bought into corporations and pushed them to sell themselves.254 There is evidence, in fact, that activism aimed at encouraging the target company to sell itself provides the best returns for the activists.255 And to
the extent that some hedge funds enter the target side to goose up an already
large premium, the potential for negative effects to employees and communities grows, as the only way for the buyer to maintain the proﬁtability of the
surviving entity is to jack up the “synergy gains” from the merger, gains that
often involve cutting jobs, slashing wages, and closing operations in some
communities. In other words, activism of this kind can actually increase the
dangers of mergers to human investors.
Human investors experience the beneﬁts and risks of this sort of merger or
sale differently from their agents. For one thing, target-side gains must be
weighed against buy-side losses. A good deal of evidence exists that mergers

252.
253.

254.

255.

Hedge Funds: Cui Bono?, INT’L J. DISCLOSURE & GOVERNANCE 18 (“[T]he large gains realized
by hedge funds [came] from getting targeted companies sold off.”).
Bratton, supra note 46, at 1426.
Brav et al., supra note 16, at 1742 tbl.I (noting that 2.4% of studied hedge fund activism involved buying the shares of an acquirer in a pending acquisition to block the deal or push for
better terms).
See id. (noting that 14% of studied hedge fund activism involved urging the sale of a target
to a third party). See generally Nicole M. Boyson et al., Activism Mergers, J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming 2017) (noting that the probability of a company receiving a takeover bid is three
times larger for companies in which a hedge fund switches from being a passive investor to
an activist investor in the company, compared to companies that did not experience such a
switch).
Brav et al., supra note 16, at 1759; Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 588. See generally Allaire &
Dauphin, supra note 251 (noting that the most lucrative opportunities for activists involve a
sale of the target company or a spinoff of some of its assets). One troubling case study on
this point involves Timken Steel, by all accounts a well-run midwestern steel manufacturer
that had delivered steady proﬁts and was beginning to reap the rewards of a multi-decade
investment program, but became a target for an activist urging the company to sell or break
itself up to achieve a higher market value. Nelson D. Schwartz, How Wall Street Bent Steel,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/07/business/timken-bows-to
-investors-and-splits-in-two.html [http://perma.cc/RVJ5-XG4N]. The company ultimately
acceded to the activist’s demands and split apart, delivering a strong stock price return but
creating great uncertainty about the two new companies’ respective futures. Id.
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are often injurious to the buying ﬁrm and its stockholders.256 If human investors tend to be diversiﬁed and a merger involves two public companies, it will
often, if not usually, be the case that the human investor has a stake in both
sides of the merger.257 The question for the human investor is whether the
costs of the merger outweigh the beneﬁts, a question that cannot be answered
without evaluating the costs to the buying ﬁrm and whether the wealth that
will be generated by the single entity after the merger exceeds that which
would have been expected had the ﬁrms continued to operate independently.
What is likely, as scholars have long detailed, is that the acquirer in a merger
will not do well, and for many mergers, it is not clear that the net gains to diversiﬁed investors from the premiums paid to them as owners of targets are
outweighed by the collective losses.258
Those stock price losses may not constitute the only way human investors
lose out in a hedge fund-induced merger. For human investors, of course, the
other costs involved in mergers—which can often involve job losses for workers, demands on state and local governments to provide subsidies as a cost of
keeping operations, and the diverse harms that can occur when an acquisition
is done at such a high premium that the resulting ﬁrm cannot pay its creditors
from operations after the merger and must enter bankruptcy259—are very real
and little focused on by corporate law scholars.

256.

See, e.g., Sara B. Moeller et al., Wealth Destruction on a Massive Scale? A Study of AcquiringFirm Returns in the Recent Merger Wave, 60 J. FIN. 757, 757 (2005) (noting that acquiringﬁrm shareholders lost twelve cents per dollar spent on acquisitions).
257. Maria Goranova et al., Owners on Both Sides of the Deal: Mergers and Acquisitions and Overlapping Institutional Ownership, 31 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1114, 1115 (2010) (“A cursory analysis of
the 2,688 M&A deals involving publicly traded companies during 1998-2004 from the
Bloomberg database reveals that in 41.7 percent of the deals, the acquiring and target ﬁrms
shared some of the same owners.”).
258. Bratton, supra note 46, at 1424-25 (observing that the “merger premium appears in most
cases to be so substantial as to arrogate the entire merger gain to the selling shareholders,”
and that a study looking at combined gains and losses from mergers from 1991 to 2001
found mergers caused a combined loss of $90 billion in stock price terms).
259. See Neil Fligstein & Taek-Jin Shin, Shareholder Value and the Transformation of the U.S. Economy, 1984-2000, 22 SOC. F. 399, 401 (2007) (“[M]ergers subsequently led to more layoffs,
consistent with the shareholder value perspective that emphasizes that ﬁrms needed to deploy their resources more efficiently as they reorganized.”); Paul M. Healy et al., Does Corporate Performance Improve After Mergers? 15 (NBER Working Paper No. 3348, 1990) (ﬁnding
that the median number of employees and employee growth rate at merged ﬁrms decline
post-merger); William D. Schneper & Mauro F. Guillén, Stakeholder Rights and Corporate
Governance: A Cross-National Study of Hostile Takeovers, 49 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 263, 275 (2004)
(summarizing studies showing that hostile takeovers tend to result in job cuts). See generally
Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in CORPORATE
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In certain activism campaigns, activists have set off a chain of events that
have caused a transfer in wealth from society as a whole to equity investors. For
example, to the extent that activists have pushed for inversion transactions that
reduce the duty of previously American corporations to pay taxes,260 the burden to fund important American priorities like national defense, health research, transportation, technologies to address climate change, higher education, and other priorities that matter to Americans—and that provide a support
structure within which businesses operate—is shifted to others. Not only that,
hedge fund activism has spurred mergers and other activities, such as plant
closings and consolidations, that involve wealth transfers to the corporations
from society.261 That does not just involve the obvious costs, such as increases

TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988) (arguing that hostile takeovers enable private beneﬁts even when they are socially undesirable).
260. Many activists have indeed pushed for inversion transactions in the recent inversion
wave. See, e.g., David Benoit, Activist Firms Join Tax-Deal Push, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 3,
2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/activist-ﬁrms-join-tax-deal-push-1407124167 [http://
perma.cc/CAW8-SMWG] (describing the hedge fund Mercato shopping an inversion involving InterContinental Hotels Group PLC); Liz Hoffman & Rob Copeland, Hedge
Funds Bet Big on Overseas Tax Deals, WALL ST. J. (July 25, 2014), http://www.wsj.com
/articles/hedge-funds-bet-big-on-overseas-tax-deals-1406330775
[http://perma.cc/82EQ
-WY8B] (describing Sachem Head calling for Helen of Troy Ltd. to ﬁnd a U.S. buyer for inversion purposes).
261. See, e.g., Liz Moyer, 2 Senate Democrats Introduce Bill To Curb Activist Hedge Funds,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/18/business/dealbook/2-sen
ate-democrats-introduce-bill-to-curb-activist-hedge-funds.html
[http://perma.cc/4N3U
-BBEC] (explaining that a bill designed to limit hedge fund activism was inspired by a small
town in Wisconsin whose economy was devastated after activist fund Starboard Value targeted the Wausau Paper Company, which led to the closing of a paper mill and the elimination of more than a hundred jobs). In the case of Wausau, the hundred jobs were only the
beginning—a total of 450 jobs were predicted to be eliminated shortly after Starboard announced its program. John Schmid, Changes at Wausau Paper To Have a Ripple Effect, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Dec. 24, 2011), http://archive.jsonline.com/business/changes-at
-wausau-paper-to-have-a-ripple-effect-ko3hkhm-136163678.html [http://perma.cc/ZV7D
-7GGE]. The layoffs were predicted to remove at least $72 million a year from central Wisconsin’s economy. Id. But see generally Alon Brav et al., Anti-Activist Legislation: The Curious Case of the Brokaw Act (Oct. 27, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com
/abstract=2860167 [http://perma.cc/3HED-VWJK] (examining the events driving the
Brokaw Act and arguing that activists were not the cause of the mill closures). Other recent
examples abound across many sectors of the economy. Design software company Autodesk
cut 10% of its workforce within two months of an activist disclosing its stake. Kshitiz
Goliya, Autodesk To Cut Jobs by 10 Percent as It Transitions to Cloud, REUTERS (Feb.
3, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-autodesk-restructuring-idUSKCN0VC1OR
[http://perma.cc/W6EZ-5HLS]. Rolls-Royce said it would cut three thousand jobs in its
aerospace and marine businesses after an activist began agitating for change. Robert Wall,
Rolls-Royce To Cut More Senior Management Jobs, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 28, 2016), http://www
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in government expenditures for unemployment and other dislocation costs
when workers are displaced, but also involves the arbitrage corporations engage in with affected communities when they are squeezed by stockholders. In
a case that hits close to home for me, in the activism campaigns at DuPont and
Dow that resulted in their decision to merge, any resulting gains to equity
holders will involve direct shifts from taxpayers in Delaware, Iowa, and Indiana.262 In Delaware alone, DuPont and its to-be-named agricultural spin-off
.wsj.com/articles/rolls-royce-to-cut-more-senior-management-jobs-1454013670
[http://
perma.cc/S8YU-8T48]. Packaged foods company ConAgra cut one thousand jobs and
moved its headquarters from Omaha to Chicago at an activist’s behest. Barbara Soderlin, Jana’s Still Hungry: ConAgra’s Activist Investor Is Sticking Around, Which Means More Changes
May Be on the Way, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (June 7, 2016), http://www.omaha.com
/money/jana-s-still-hungry-conagra-s-activist-investor-is-sticking/article_612c8b4f-6bcf-5a
5f-93df-8299d279fd4f.html [http://perma.cc/MB38-BM2T]. Qualcomm provides another
example, having announced plans to cut around 15% of its workforce after an activist took a
stake in the company. Liana B. Baker, Qualcomm President Says Splitting Company May Not
Create Value, REUTERS (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-qualcomm-pres
ident-idUSKCN0R32HL20150903 [http://perma.cc/7S9D-XD8P]. Still another example is
Macy’s, the department store chain. After activist Starboard took a stake in Macy’s, it
began agitating for Macy’s to split its property portfolio into separate joint ventures, arguing
that the stock market was not giving Macy’s adequate “credit” for those holdings. Unlocking
Value at Macy’s, STARBOARD VALUE 4-5 (Jan. 11, 2016), http://www.starboardvalue.com
/publications/Starboard_Value_LP_Presentation_M_01.11.16.pdf [http://perma.cc/3UMY
-TX73]. Macy’s ended up cutting costs by laying off thousands of workers and closing department store locations. Suzanne Kapner, Macy’s To Cut Costs, Thousands of Jobs, WALL ST.
J. (Jan. 6, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/macys-to-cut-costs-thousands-of-jobs-145211
5239 [http://perma.cc/WXK4-GY22]. DuPont and its spin-off, Chemours, cut thousands of
jobs and closed plants as part of their efforts to address an activist intervention. See sources
cited supra notes 246-247. Over a decade earlier, a distant descendant of the DuPont Company, Hercules Inc., was approached by corporate raider cum activist Samuel Heyman. Reid
Champagne, Recalling Hercules, DEL. TODAY (Dec. 2008), http://www.delawaretoday
.com/Delaware-Today/December-2008/Recalling-Hercules [http://perma.cc/TV47-6PTY];
Andrew Ross Sorkin, Corporate Raider Tries a Moneyless Coup, N.Y. TIMES (July 11,
2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/11/business/corporate-raider-tries-a-moneyless
-coup.html [http://perma.cc/DNE2-TNLZ]. Against that backdrop, Hercules went from
10,000 employees in 2000 to 4,700 in post-activist 2008 when it was purchased by a competitor. Joseph N. DiStefano, Hercules Inc. Sold; Another Headquarters To Leave Area, PHILA.
INQUIRER (July 12, 2008), http://articles.philly.com/2008-07-12/business/25245304_1_her
cules-shareholders-hercules-chief-executive-officer-dow-chemical [http://perma.cc/2BE2
-54V6]. In a twist, Hercules’s acquirer was later acquired by Ashland Inc., which has
more recently shed businesses and jobs at the behest of a different activist. Jack Kaskey
& Brooke Sutherland, Ashland Pushed by Jana Seen Higher with Split, BLOOMBERG (May
28, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-05-28/ashland-pushed-by-jana
-seen-higher-with-split-real-m-a [http://perma.cc/H8AW-ZM47].
262. Joseph N. DiStefano, In Delaware, New Incentives for Wealthy DuPont and Dow, PHILA. INQUIRER (Mar. 28, 2016), http://www.philly.com/philly/business/20160328_In_Delaware
__new_incentives_for_wealthy_DuPont_and_Dow.html [http://perma.cc/GZ9V-DD8S];
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asked for and received subsidies from the state and county governments, costing other taxpayers over $57 million over four years for keeping downsized operations in Delaware.263 These operations are downsized in the important sense
of involving operations that employ at least 1,700 fewer workers, many of
whom were skilled scientiﬁc researchers and technical workers.264 The hedge
fund-inspired merger itself was leveraged by DuPont and Dow to extract value
from society itself to give to its hungry equity owners. Whether the merger—
which involves two huge science corporations becoming one in order to then
become three—will generate more jobs and wealth for Americans in the long
term remains to be proven. What is certain is that lots of corporate advisors
and others will have generated huge fees when the tumult settles, lots of human investors will have lost jobs, and the affected communities will either have
to look to their human citizens to make up for the revenues lost or cut the public services they would otherwise have delivered.
Admittedly, no one wants executive rent seeking or empire building for its
own sake. Perhaps hedge funds are operating on companies that face slack
competitive pressures to otherwise be efficient in deploying capital? Perhaps
they squeeze oligopolies? I suppose this story would be more plausible had we
not just gone through nearly ﬁfty years of robust and ever-growing international competition. Yesterday’s Japan became today’s China, without lessening
the vigor of Japanese competition, or Korean, or German, or Swedish for that
matter. Even without hedge funds, private equity ﬁrms, strategic acquirers, and
institutional money managers have had sharp eyes on American public companies. Without doubting that inefficiency will always tend to creep into some
organizations, the overall vigor of competition seems to belie the idea that large
pockets of “fat” exist that can be cut, cost-free. Thus, fear that what may be ocChristopher Doering & Kevin Hardy, $17M Deal: No DuPont Ag HQ, but No Jobs Lost Either,
DES MOINES REG. (Feb. 19, 2016), http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/money/agricul
ture/2016/02/19/iowa-loses-ag-headquarters-new-dow-dupont/80561874 [http://perma.cc
/BMJ4-A9XW]; Scott Goss et al., How Delaware Outhustled Other States To Win DuPont
Ag Unit, NEWS J. (Feb. 21, 2016), http://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/2016/02
/20/how-delaware-outhustled-other-states-win-ag-unit/80633980 [http://perma.cc/SS9P
-NTHU]; Jeff Mordock et al., Spinoffs To Stay in Delaware After Dow-DuPont Merger, NEWS
J. (Feb. 20, 2016), http://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/2016/02/19/dupont-dow
-name-delaware-headquarters-ag-unit/80599772 [http://perma.cc/HN74-LGU9]; Press
Release, Office of Governor Markell, Governor Signs Commitment to Innovation Act
(Mar. 17, 2016), http://news.delaware.gov/2016/03/17/governor-signs-commitment-to-in
novation-act [http://perma.cc/PZW3-JYEX].
263. Mordock et al., supra note 262.
264. Beryl Lieff Benderly, DuPont Cutbacks Send a Chill Through Delaware’s Science Community,
SCI. AM. (June 23, 2016), http://www.scientiﬁcamerican.com/article/dupont-cutbacks-send
-a-chill-through-delaware-s-science-community [http://perma.cc/H7UR-QP8X].
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curring are cuts in investments in “muscle” are not irrational, but instead arise
from considering the larger facts about the markets and incentive systems
within which American corporations and their managers work. And this is the
crucial point often lost in corporate governance debates: Just because a fact is
large and systemic does not render it unimportant. That a “law and ampersand” scholar can’t ﬁt it into his model without creating too much noise does
not make the uncomfortable sound of reality go away.
Looking at the big and systemic facts from the perspective of an average
American human investor, the world is not an optimistic place. Median income
has stagnated since the early 1970s.265 Productivity increases have slowed and
wages never did fully experience the beneﬁt of the rapid productivity increases
of the last two decades.266 Economic growth is stagnant.267 The government
has been compelled to provide giant subsidies to corporations engaged in risky
commercial conduct.268 At the same time, the number of American public corporations has declined sharply.269 Finally, there is a growing disparity between
the pay of CEOs and that of average workers, symptomatic of a general in-

265.

Real median household income has hovered around $50,000 since the mid-1970s. See Carmen DeNavas-Walt & Bernadette D. Proctor, Income and Poverty in the United States 2013:
Current Population Reports, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 5 ﬁg.1 (2014), http://www.census
.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2014/demo/p60-249.pdf [http://perma.cc
/L3KV-7JYR].
266. Bivens et al., supra note 242, at 5 (“Between 1979 and 2013, productivity grew 64.9 percent,
while hourly compensation of production and nonsupervisory workers, who comprise 80
percent of the private-sector workforce, grew just 8.2 percent. Productivity thus grew eight
times faster than typical worker compensation.”).
267. See PAVLOS E. MASOUROS, CORPORATE LAW AND ECONOMIC STAGNATION: HOW SHAREHOLDER VALUE AND SHORT-TERMISM CONTRIBUTE TO THE DECLINE OF THE WESTERN ECONOMIES
3 (2013) (arguing that increased short-term focused shareholder inﬂuence has contributed to
“persistent stagnation” and lower GDP growth).
268. See STOUT, supra note 193, at 4-5 (arguing that recent events such as the 2008 bailouts illustrate how “[c]orporate America’s mass embrace of shareholder value thinking has not translated into better corporate or economic performance”); Adam J. Levitin & Susan M.
Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 GEO. L.J. 1177, 1231 (2012) (“[T]he long-term
implications of a short-run income-maximization strategy were apparent, but preserving
long-term reputation did little to address immediate earnings pressures.”); Tyler Cowen,
Bailout of Long-Term Capital: A Bad Precedent?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2008), http://
www.nytimes.com/2008/12/28/business/economy/28view.html
[http://perma.cc/2F8N
-P4FB].
269. David Weild & Edward Kim, Capital Markets Series: A Wake-Up Call for America, GRANT
THORNTON 1 (2009), http://www.rcgt.com/wp-content/blogs.dir/2/ﬁles/2011/04/A_wake
_up_call_for_America.pdf [http://perma.cc/PG6J-BWQ9] (noting that between 1997—the
peak for U.S. listings—and 2008, the number of exchange-listed companies declined from
6,943 to 5,401); see also STOUT, supra note 193, at 5 (describing the “go-private” trend).
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crease in inequality.270 These larger considerations raise an issue about hedge
fund activism’s effect on human investors that is serious. If proponents of
hedge fund activism disclaim that activists have contributed to these negative
trends—things like growing income inequality, inﬂated executive pay, job losses, wage stagnation, increases in externalities—and instead attribute them to
vigorous international and domestic competition in products and services markets, they must consider the consequences of that answer. If that type of competition is already acting on American public companies, does it add socially
useful value for activist investors with short-term perspectives to put additional
pressure on them, pressures that tend to involve increases in near-term payouts
rather than innovative, long-term investment strategies that position the United States and its worker base to thrive in the future? In other words, if competition in products and services markets has already squeezed out most of the
slack, the likelihood that pressures that predominantly involve demands for
corporate ﬁnance moves, like leveraging up, spin offs, or mergers, will create
incentives for corporations to focus their energies on ways of making money
that are also good for their workers and society seems less probable.
C
In the clash between small, less important facts that the law and ampersand
movement can measure and evaluate, and bigger, more important ones the
movement seems to slight because it cannot, modesty would suggest grappling
with the larger facts in as candid a way as possible and not instead exaggerating
the signiﬁcance of less important facts, such as short-term stock market prices,
that law and ampersand scholars can turn into mathematical equations and
270.

See STOUT, supra note 193, at 20-21 (noting that the disparity between CEO and worker pay
increased after Congress enacted tax policies encouraging linking CEO compensation to
stock price increases); Roger Altman et al., Reforming Our Tax System, Reducing Our Deﬁcit,
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 6-7 (Dec. 2012) http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content
/uploads/2012/12/CAPTaxPlanReportFINAL-b.pdf [http://perma.cc/MF3P-TH47] (noting
“skyrocket[ing]” income inequality over a period from 1979 to 2007 and the shrinkage of the
federal tax rate applied to the wealthiest Americans); Harold Meyerson, The Forty-Year
Slump, AM. PROSPECT 20-27 (Sept.-Oct. 2013), http://prospect.org/article/40-year-slump
[http://perma.cc/2YD8-AN5A] (noting that income stagnation was driven in important
part by the embrace of the principle that shareholder wealth maximization is the sole objective for corporate governance and noting that if median household income kept pace with
productivity gains from 1974-2013, the income level would be over $86,000, rather than the
2013 level of approximately $50,000); cf. COLIN MAYER, FIRM COMMITMENT: WHY THE
CORPORATION IS FAILING US AND HOW TO RESTORE TRUST IN IT 185-86, 200, 240 (2013)
(arguing that corporate owners with the shortest time horizon are able to concentrate wealth
with themselves “at the expense of other stakeholders”).
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when the smaller facts you measure are themselves less than assuringly reliable,
there is even less basis for failing to challenge your ideological world view
against the systemic facts.
In that vein, the most hotly debated topic regarding activist hedge funds
does not, however, involve whether it is good for human investors for pension
funds and charitable institutions to invest in them or whether human investors
beneﬁt from the changes activist hedge funds work on human investors’ employers. Rather, the central topic has been whether hedge fund activism has a
positive or negative effect on the stock price performance of public corporations. Speciﬁcally, much ink has been spilled on the question of whether companies targeted by hedge funds enjoy durable increases in their stock prices
after the activist intervention has occurred, and whether any resulting gains reﬂect an increase in overall societal wealth or a transfer in wealth from other
corporate constituencies to equity holders. These debates are ongoing and vigorous.271
Distinguished corporate practitioners have also jumped into the fray, complicating the lives of those obsessed with regressions by introducing perspectives from those in the trenches.272 Firing back, scholars with their own ﬁrm
ideological views have in turn vexed the practitioners by taking them up on duels regarding what data is necessary to prove their contending perspectives.273
271.

The papers in this back and forth have proliferated in recent years. A database started by
Professors Randall Thomas, Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, and Frank Partnoy has been the source of
numerous articles examining the impact of hedge fund activism on stock prices, corporate
creditors, employees, and other workers. Brav et al., supra note 16. Later authors whose
work uses the database include Yvan Allaire, The Case for and Against Activist Hedge Funds,
INST. FOR GOVERNANCE PRIV. & PUB. ORGS. (2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2613154
[http://perma.cc/6WKZ-L8D8]; Allaire & Dauphin, supra note 251; Bebchuk et al., supra
note 5; and Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism: A Review, 4 FOUND. & TRENDS FIN. 185
(2010). Other respected law and economics scholars have also contributed to the debate. See,
e.g., Bratton, supra note 46; Coffee & Palia, supra note 6; Cremers et al., supra note 244; K.J.
Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, The Shareholder Value of Empowered Boards, 68 STAN. L.
REV. 67 (2016); Gilson & Gordon, supra note 170; Robin Greenwood & Michael Schor, Investor Activism and Takeovers, 92 J. FIN. ECON. 362 (2002); Martijn Cremers et al., Hedge
Fund Activism and Long-Term Firm Value (2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2693231 [http://perma.cc/N6WP-7Q9Z].
272. See, e.g., Thomas W. Briggs, Corporate Governance and the New Hedge Fund Activism: An Empirical Analysis, 32 J. CORP. L. 681 (2007); Martin Lipton, Important Questions About Activist
Hedge Funds, HARV. L. SCHOOL F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 9, 2013),
http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/03/09/important-questions-about-activist-hedge
-funds [http://perma.cc/MP6N-R3NL].
273. The origin of The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, was
a debate between its author, Lucian Bebchuk, and corporate lawyer Martin Lipton. See Michael D. Goldhaber, Marty Lipton’s War, AM. LAW. 44 (Apr. 2015), http://www.siia
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Although some of the intellectual ﬁsticuffs have a “handbags at six paces” quality, the intensity of the interaction is suggestive of the shared agreement of the
participants that the subject they are discussing is societally important.
Empirical data is a very useful thing, and it should not be ignored. But empirical data also involves factual renditions of what is behind a statistic that has
been aggregated. For humans interested in knowing about their human world,
that means that the story behind statistics matters. And the stories behind the
empirical data cited by hedge fund activists seem to mostly involve ﬁnancial
engineering. And what they do not commonly involve is most important. They
do not involve tangible stories of technological breakthrough accomplished because hedge funds have identiﬁed an innovative new way to make something.
They do not typically involve thinking up new services that humans need or
even want. They do not typically involve transformational approaches in managing businesses, or in marshalling the productivity of American workers. Even
as to interventions by hedge funds led by experienced, proven operators, the
scholars have not yet put names of companies to the data, to show how the
hedge fund has improved corporate operations in a durably valuable way.274 By
contrast, examples of operational failures, such as the interventions at J.C.
Penney275 and Sears,276 are widely known.
Of course, if one could peer behind the regressions and consider the human
facts, these overall tendencies are not surprising. Hedge fund managers have
typically never managed an actual business that makes a product or delivers a
service. For the most part, they are the sidewalk superintendents of management, those who by dint of having gotten a prestigious M.B.A. and being good
in ﬁnance classes, were recruited into the stock-picking business. Finance is
what they were taught and what they focus on. This is not a criticism; it is
simply an observation, but one that cannot be logically ignored by anyone con.net/archive/neals/2016/ﬁlez/442068/688_1732_442068_e3453e11-8f7e-4e03-bbee-a396f76
c806a_82357_3_1.pdf [http://perma.cc/U3N5-AVQ6].
274. E.g., Krishnan et al., supra note 64 (ﬁnding meaningful differences in post-intervention return on assets among targets of different groups of activist hedge funds without connecting
differences to operation change).
275. See supra notes 84, 125-126 and accompanying text.
276. See Kevin Allison, Edward Lampert and His White Whale, Sears, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
29, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/30/business/dealbook/edward-lampert-and
-his-white-whale-sears.html [http://perma.cc/9724-V7TH] (comparing the activist
head fund manager and CEO of Sears to Captain Ahab); Mina Kimes, At Sears,
Eddie Lampert’s Warring Divisions Model Adds to the Troubles, BLOOMBERG (July
11, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-07-11/at-sears-eddie-lamperts
-warring-divisions-model-adds-to-the-troubles [http://perma.cc/M6D9-GJVA] (attributing many of Sears’s problems to its hedge fund manager-CEO).
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cerned about facts. Because if the reality is that the ability of corporations that
make products and deliver services to generate sustainable proﬁts turns more
importantly on talents that do not involve ﬁnancial engineering, then why
would one rationally expect that business strategies shaped by pressures from
hedge funds lacking any substantial managerial, technological, scientiﬁc, or entrepreneurial expertise would be engines for long-term wealth creation?
Participants in the debate about our corporate governance system often
joust about the comparative relevance of examinations of empirical evidence
from relatively short-term periods and of arguments based on more descriptive
evidence about how corporations and the institutional investors who inﬂuence
them behave. I have no desire to disparage either source of information, as it
seems to me that someone who is open-minded ought to be willing to consider
a variety of relevant factors in coming to conclusions about important issues of
public policy. But being open-minded does not require paying homage to arguable results from arguable data measuring results inarguably inconsistent with
the horizon relevant to human investors and relevant to those who actually
manage real businesses. As to the debate about wolf packs, there are several
factors that make these studies a dubious guide to good policy.
For starters, the gains to target stock prices from hedge fund activism do
not seem that impressive, even when taken at face value. Professor Bebchuk’s
ﬁve-year analysis of target company stock price performance ﬁnds valueweighted abnormal returns of 5.81% over that ﬁve-year period (by another
measure, investors would have experienced a slightly negative abnormal return).277 But these gains are not measured in a way that makes for easy acceptance on that basis. For example, that study starts with 1,584 companies targeted by activism and ends with 694 companies in year ﬁve.278 This is a large
drop, and each company’s fate is not tracked and documented.279 Undoubtedly,
targets were pushed into sale. Others may have gone insolvent, though. And
the overall gains seem largely driven by those targets that did get sold for a
premium, rather than by increased productivity or the execution of a new business plan.280 Scholars who bring a non-ideological perspective to the debate
have questioned how sufficiently that study’s data supports its ﬁndings.281

277.

Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 1126-27.
Allaire & Dauphin, supra note 70, at 9 (critiquing the study’s methodology). The study’s authors acknowledged this defect. Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 1118.
279. Allaire & Dauphin, supra note 70, at 9.
280. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
281. Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 587 n.173. Professors Coffee and Palia observe:
278.
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Duration is another issue. The longest of the studies measure the impact of
hedge funds over a period—typically two years, with one important study
tracking performance for ﬁve years following activist intervention282—that is
decidedly not long-term. Human investors save for two primary purposes, paying for college for their kids and paying for retirement for themselves. Determining that hedge fund activism is not associated with any negative impact on
stock price during a one- to ﬁve-year period is not the same thing as determining that the changes in business policy generated by that activism produce
more wealth for human investors than a policy not inﬂuenced by their behavior.
The argument, of course, is that if the stock price increase driven by activism endures for one to ﬁve years, that means that the activism has not reduced
the corporation’s ability to generate sustainable returns over the long term. But
proving that is not only difficult, it also seems to me to require a long-term
analysis, which scholars have not done. If market prices are dominated by
speculation (i.e., traders with short-term perspectives) and thus those involved
in marginal trading tend to be focusing on short-term movements in prices, it
seems possible that the changes activists cause could, in fact, reduce the ﬁrm’s
long-term earnings without necessarily causing it to suffer a stock price reduc-

[Professor Bebchuk’s] Table 4, which reports ROA and Tobin’s Q over the six
years that begin with the event year, shows only ﬁve out of twenty regression coefficients in the post-event year (or 25%) to be positive at the standard 95% conﬁdence level. Thus, the majority of coefficients are not positive, which is hardly
supportive of their conclusion. They also ﬁnd that the third, fourth and ﬁfth years
after the activist intervention earn higher ROA and Tobin’s Q than the year of, or
prior to, intervention. But this test is inconclusive because we know that it is signiﬁcantly affected by the ﬁrm’s underperformance in the year of, or prior to, intervention. Additionally, in their Table 5, they repeat their analysis, using high
dimensional ﬁxed-effects of industry codes and year dummies as controls. This
method does not adequately control for ﬁrm-level effects.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Allaire & Dauphin, supra note 70, at 8, 11 (observing that
some of the study’s results are not statistically signiﬁcant and that its use of dummy variables “is particularly questionable”).
282. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 1089, 1099 (“[W]e study how operational performance
and stock performance relative to the benchmark evolve during the ﬁve-year period following activist interventions,” and “we use this dataset of activist interventions to provide the
ﬁrst systematic evidence on the long-term effects of hedge fund activism.” (emphasis added));
Matthew Denes et al., Thirty Years of Shareholder Activism: A Survey of Empirical Research
10-11 (June 8, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2608085 [http://
perma.cc/9WYN-8V6N] (summarizing studies focusing on hedge fund activism with
measurement windows largely measured in terms of months, not years).
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tion in the near term.283 That is especially so if activists are targeting so-called
value ﬁrms that are proﬁtable but pre-intervention are reinvesting more cash in
the business or retaining more of it than other ﬁrms. It is, of course, possible
that changing their ﬁnancing to reduce capital expenditures and increase current payouts will have no negative impact on the ﬁrm’s earnings future, but it is
also possible that it will have a negative impact but that the effects are not felt
enough in the near term to have a negative effect on the stock price.
As to this point, this is where ignoring long-term trends and the absence of
plausible real-world stories comes in. The big picture for human investors entails declining wages, growing inequality, and greater international competition. At the same time, pension money has ﬂooded into the market and demand has met supply with more funds looking for investments and more
analysts searching for value gaps. Between these two trends, it is unclear what
story hedge funds have to explain how they create long-term value.
v
As the preceding discussion suggests, any policy initiative sensibly designed
at better balancing the beneﬁts and risks of hedge fund activism must focus as
much, if not more, on the incentives and duties of other institutional investors
and other agents who participate in the corporate governance debate, as much
as on the activist hedge funds themselves. In this ﬁnal Part, I offer a measured
set of proposals, beginning with regulatory changes that would increase hedge
fund disclosure of factors, such as performance, managers’ compensation, and
prior manager fund failures, that are relevant to human investors and their
agents. Then, in a similar vein, I propose changes to current position-reporting
rules so human investors, mainstream institutional investors, proxy advisory
ﬁrms, target corporations, and other participants in our corporate republic can
understand an activist’s overall economic positions in a target—and take them
into account accordingly. Expanding my focus from the wolves to their prey, I
next turn to what the rise of activism means for public companies and how
those concerned about activism’s effect on their investments should think about
certain corporate takeover defenses. The balance of this Part considers what
other participants in this corporate republic—including the agents who hold
human investors’ equity capital—can do to better align their actions with the
best interests of human investors. I offer reforms that will best promote a longterm perspective on the part of human investors in how they hold their mutual

283.

That said, a survey of studies ﬁnds that ﬁrms targeted by activists do not seem to produce
better operating results. See Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 587.
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and index funds and on the part of funds themselves in terms of how they vote
and compensate their managers. Finally, I propose that we treat human investors more like adults and give them direct access to invest in private equity
funds that have investment philosophies more aligned with long-term investors than those of actively traded mutual funds.
***

The primary issues regarding the regulation of activist hedge funds are
similar to those faced by many industries when they reach a level of success
where they wield power that affects society in a materially important way.
When that happens, it is often the case that the emerging industry must be
prepared to disclose more about how it works and to be open about its interests.284 To my mind, there is nothing intrinsically worrisome about the philosophy of activist hedge funds. Whether or not I or others believe their approach
to investment is sustainable on the scale to which it has now grown is not a
sufficient basis to ban the industry. If it were, then actively traded mutual funds
would be on regulatory death row. And, as to those hedge funds willing to, as
my British friends say, get stuck in, contribute meaningful management expertise for the long term, and eat their own cooking, I harbor little skepticism at
all, so long as the fund matches its actions in long-term commitment to its upfront promises.
But what does distinguish all activist hedge funds is not only that they do
not have to make anywhere near the level of disclosure required of investment
funds registered under the Investment Company Act, but also that the activist
funds are not passive investors, and instead have as their goal inﬂuencing the
business plans of their targets in a manner that therefore affects other investors
and other corporate constituencies. Furthermore, because it is not the case that
hedge funds take only investments from wealthy individuals who are well positioned to bargain for themselves, but take money from pension funds, universities, charities and other institutions on which ordinary Americans depend,
the rationale for allowing them to continue to disclose so little in terms of reliable track records, taking into account past failures, is hard to discern.
To better protect human investors from direct investment risk, it would
therefore seem useful to enhance the disclosure hedge funds must provide to

284.

See Elisabeth Keller & Gregory A. Gehlmann, Introductory Comment: A Historical Introduction
to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 331-36
(1988) (describing the development of federal securities law partially in response to growth
in industry and capital markets activity in the ﬁrst quarter of the twentieth century).
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those considering investing in them. The additional registration and disclosure
mandated by Dodd-Frank285 was a step in the right direction, but it was not
sufficient. Recognizing the reality that hedge funds’ main investors are increasingly socially important pension funds and university and charitable endowments on which ordinary Americans depend, rather than wealthy and ﬁnancially sophisticated individuals, suggests more and standardized disclosure about
hedge fund performance should be required. Under this model, institutional
investors who are ﬁduciaries of pensioners, universities, or charities could not
purchase hedge fund investments that were not subject to a more extensive disclosure regime. This disclosure regime should require complete disclosure regarding the fund manager’s past track record so that over time better public information about speciﬁc fund managers and overall industry performance is
known. Especially important is a requirement to identify closed funds and account for their records, including the records of the funds that failed. Likewise,
it is vital that regulators develop a standard disclosure regime allowing for reliable comparisons of what the sponsoring fund manager made, considering its
proﬁt participation, total fees, and returns, and that of its actual investors, and
taking into account their costs, including the manager’s compensation. These
should involve clear charts comparing how dollars invested resulted in investment gains, net of fees, over time in comparison to the overall market and to
the fund manager itself. As for all investment funds—not just hedge funds, but
traditional mutual funds, too—disclosure about average and median holding
periods for particular investments would be illuminating, by giving investors
and regulators reliable information about portfolio turnover and how much a
fund deviates from a buy and hold strategy. These disclosures, in all respects,
should not allow for material variations among funds, but rather create reliable
information about industry performance and its effect on investors.
Now it may be that some will argue this disclosure regime would lock these
institutions out of this sector. There are two answers to that concern. The ﬁrst
is that if those are the consequences of increased disclosure, a departure from

285.

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, tit. IV,
124 Stat. 1376, 1570 (2010). Title IV of Dodd-Frank eliminates the private adviser exemption
from the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 and requires advisers with more than $150 million
in assets under management to register with the SEC as investment advisers. Id. §§ 403,
408. Title IV also includes exceptions for venture capital fund advisers and advisers with less
than $25 million in assets under management, as well as foreign private advisers. Id. §§ 402403, 408. Title IV also requires registered investment advisers to maintain records and other
information that the SEC requires to evaluate the private fund industry. Id. § 404; see also
Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry: Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2015, 71 BUS. LAW. 1151, 1158-65 (2016) (explaining the new requirements for private fund advisers under Dodd-Frank).
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the sector might be preferable to a status quo where human investors and society as a whole face risk from ﬁduciaries poorly positioned to be good consumers of funds whose investment philosophy is unlikely to beat the market over
time, especially when risk is considered. The second is that this is a false choice.
The hedge fund industry cannot function at its current scale without ﬁnding
investments from pension funds and the like, and would, as a practical matter,
be required to comply with a sensible registration and disclosure regime that
takes into account the industry’s unique investment style—no need to disclose
the “secret sauce”—but that recognizes that style is no justiﬁcation for lack of
other forms of reliable disclosure. This would help pension fund ﬁduciaries
make more informed decisions about with whom they entrust their real human
beneﬁciaries’ capital.286
***

Consistent with the focus on disclosure, more should be known about
hedge fund interests by the rest of the market. Scholars have argued that hedge
funds are useful in framing debates between themselves and corporate managers, which mainstream investors like mutual funds can then resolve using their
voting power.287 This contention, however, is problematic if the electorate does
not have full and complete information about the activists’ own economic interests. Just like institutional investors have called for corporate managers and
directors to disclose their economic interests, so too is it vital that the electorate
know just how long an activist is in the company and any arrangements relevant to its likely holding period. The current reach of Section 13 is incomplete,
outdated, and has not kept pace with ﬁnancial evolutions. It seems a modest

286.

On a related front, state efforts to mandate better disclosure of information of this sort by
private equity funds were met with ﬁerce resistance by the industry. Gretchen Morgenson,
Private Equity Funds Balk at Disclosure, and Public Risk Grows, N.Y. TIMES (July 1,
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/03/business/private-equity-funds-balk-at-disclo
sure-and-public-risk-grows.html [http://perma.cc/6436-QNYH] (describing efforts to require private equity funds investing public pension money to publicly disclose information,
such as fees and related-party transactions). Like hedge funds, private equity fund returns
have been declining in the past decade relative to funds that track market returns, and like
hedge funds, there is a question of whether the private equity industry can generate solid returns at its greatly expanded size. See generally Appelbaum & Batt, supra note 221, at 5 (reviewing recent studies and suggesting that the median private equity fund no longer beats
the S&P 500).
287. See, e.g., Gilson & Gordon, supra note 170, at 901 (“Activist shareholders specialize in framing alternatives to existing company strategies and thereby increasing the value of governance rights to institutional investors.”).
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and inarguable improvement to require all-in disclosure of ﬁnancial instruments of any kind—long or short, natural or synthetic—tied to the value of the
company’s stock so market participants can understand a fund’s ability to gain
from increases or decreases in a target’s stock price. All in, pure and simple, no
exceptions. Likewise, disclosure relating to any contractual or other arrangements that relate to the hedge fund’s incentives, commitment, and ability to
hold the target stock should be reported so that its likely investment horizon
can be evaluated by the electorate. Given the emerging evidence that funds that
act as long-term relational investors are associated with better outcomes, disclosure requirements that bear on the hedge fund’s investment horizon and
willingness to remain as a long-term investor as well as bear the risks of its
proposed strategy as long-term investors would be valuable. This important
information would help mainstream investment funds and their proxy advisors
evaluate whether activist incentives are really aligned with the best interests of
the target’s long-term investors.
In addition, after an activist has come public under Section 13(d), real-time
disclosures of changes in position, as are now required in the United Kingdom
and the European Union generally, should be expected. Even Professor Bebchuk, an ardent opponent of amending the rule to require more timely disclosure, is troubled by the evidence he has found of substantial rates of noncompliance with the existing disclosure rules.288 An effort by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), similar to its 2014 sweep of routinely late-ﬁling
insiders,289 could help increase the baseline level of compliance with the current
rule in a way few involved in the corporate governance debates could criticize.
And, of course, evidence that other hedge funds follow the scent of the alpha wolf supports updating Section 13 to require more prompt disclosure when
an investor crosses the reporting threshold. It seems entirely clear to me that
the idea of Section 13 was that an investor should come public as soon as reasonably possible after hitting the 5% threshold and that the reporting deadline
was due to what it took to type up, proof, and deliver to Washington the required ﬁling in 1968, when word processors and electronic ﬁling with a button

288.

See Bebchuk et al., supra note 85, at 13-14 (identifying more than 10% of a sample of Section
13(d) ﬁlings where investors failed to disclose stakes within ten days of crossing the 5%
threshold).
289. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Announces Charges Against Corporate Insiders for Violating Laws Requiring Prompt Reporting of Transactions and Holdings
(Sept. 10, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/13705429046
78 [http://perma.cc/CXP7-VH2E]. This enforcement initiative involved “quantitative analytics” of ownership reports completed by corporate insiders, including Schedule 13D. Id.
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push did not exist.290 But, the hedge fund industry wants to grab more stock
than 5%. Fair enough, I suppose. But how about then coming up with a sensible higher threshold—say 8%291—and requiring immediate reporting upon hitting that threshold or a requirement to cease further acquisitions until disclosure is made. Opponents of reform vehemently argue that situations when a
hedge fund or its fellows in the pack have come public with control of over 10%
are anomalous292 and that most hedge fund activists come public with a median stake of 6.3%.293 If that is so, how about using a sensible threshold as the
basis for a new rule? Additionally, sophisticated commentators have noted that
using a single percentage threshold for all companies, regardless of market capitalization, is a rather blunt instrument, given the variation in market capitali290.

See Adam O. Emmerich et al., Fair Markets and Fair Disclosure: Some Thoughts on the Law and
Economics of Blockholder Disclosure, and the Use and Abuse of Shareholder Power, 3 HARV. BUS.
L. REV. 135, 143 (2013) (citing Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership and in Corporate
Takeover Bids: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the S. Comm. on Banking and Currency,
90th Cong. 136 (1967) (statement of Stanley Kaplan, Professor, University of Chicago))
(noting that Congress’s decision to impose a ten-day reporting window was due to the administrative burden of preparing and ﬁling the Schedule 13D).
291. The United States’s 5% level is higher than that of major European nations, such as the
U.K., Germany, Netherlands, and Italy. See, e.g., Marco Becht et al., Hedge Fund Activism in
Europe 8 n.8 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. Fin. Working Paper No. 283, 2010) (noting that
public disclosure thresholds were set at 2% in Italy and at 3% in the U.K.); European Regulatory Snapshot: The Amended Transparency Directive, DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL 3 (2013),
http://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/ﬁles/10.24.13.European.Regulatory.Snapshot.pdf
[http://perma.cc/Z734-4NUV] (describing the current U.K. disclosure thresholds, where
disclosure is required when an investor’s voting rights reach, exceed, or fall below 3% and
each 1% threshold thereafter); Ruleﬁnder Shareholding Disclosure: Germany, AOSPHERE 1
(2016), http://www.aosphere.com/downloads/Germany_Shareholding_Disclosure_Rules
_Summary.pdf [http://perma.cc/4TFE-DASJ] (reﬂecting Germany’s 3% disclosure threshold); Han Terrink, Summary of Changes in Ongoing Reporting and Disclosure Requirements Following Implementation of Amendments to Transparency Directive in the Netherlands,
CLIFFORD CHANCE 2 (2016), http://www.cliffordchance.com/brieﬁngs/2016/02/summary
_of_changesinongoingreportingan.html [http://perma.cc/74PL-KHUW] (noting the
Netherlands’s 3% threshold). This Feature does not deal with the ideal. Rather, it advances a
practical threshold that allows sizable but not unreasonable stake building. But it then demands that stake building cease until immediate disclosure.
292. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 85, at 4 (arguing that anecdotes supposedly illustrating gaps in
the current rules are not representative of typical practice). The anecdotes include two
funds’ acquisition of 25% beneﬁcial ownership of J.C. Penney before disclosure. See Letter
from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n 5-6 (Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2011/petn4-624.pdf
[http://perma.cc/6WF7-WCR5].
293. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 85, at 4-5. But see Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 597 (arguing
that reported stability in hedge fund accumulations does not take into account the growth in
“wolf pack” behavior).
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zation of U.S. companies. Perhaps, then, it would make sense to have a threshold that is lower—e.g., the current 5% threshold—for purchases of shares in
large cap companies and one that is higher for small- and mid-cap companies,
where a larger percentage stake is necessary to obtain an economic interest
sufficient to reward the activist for its costs.
Furthermore, given the strong evidence that activist accumulations seem to
be discovered by other wolves and that these other wolves engage in trading
before the alpha wolf discloses to the larger public, there seems to be a strong
basis for requirements that address what information an activist can share with
others before the activist goes public. A presumption that a tip made between
investors creates a 13(d) group might be one way to do it.294 The argument that
hedge funds should not have to disclose until they can stake out a position that
is sufficiently large to justify the costs of their activism is understandable. What
is not understandable is carving out an exception that allows funds to selectively share knowledge of their purchases and other plans with industry colleagues
while keeping the larger community of investors in the dark.
Some commentators believe that activist investors should be considered ﬁduciaries, owing duties of loyalty to their targets on the grounds that they act
on their targets, inﬂuence their business strategies, and thus wield elements of
corporate control that affect all other investors.295 Adolph Berle, no less, presaged the potential power of institutional investors and the need to regulate
their power.296 This is a complicated topic, but I do agree that there is more
comfort for other investors and corporate constituencies when an activist hedge
fund places a representative on the board, and, as a result, is subject to a host of
equitable and legal restrictions. These include the state law and ﬁduciary trading restrictions that result if the fund representative on the board has access to
non-public conﬁdential information, both by their status as an insider297 and
by typical provisions operating to restrict the fund’s ability to trade apart from
regulation.298

294.

Professors Coffee and Palia have proposed something similar. See Coffee & Palia, supra note
6, at 600-01.
295. See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV.
1255 (2008).
296. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 142, at 143.
297. There are obvious and important ﬁduciary implications of that representative sharing company information back at the hedge fund ranch. In that situation, the hedge fund itself is a
ﬁduciary and can only use that information while complying with its legal and equitable duties to the portfolio company and to its other stockholders.
298. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
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Eliminating the unfair tax advantages hedge funds get over other human
laborers—e.g., the ability to treat some of their managerial income as capital
gains rather than wages from labor under the “2 and 20” model—would also
diminish the ability of hedge fund managers to reap proﬁts not shared with
their investors and their targets’ other stockholders in the long-run.299 This
would therefore shift the activist hedge fund market directionally toward those
fund managers able to generate value by contributing managerial expertise that
creates durable value for the public companies in its portfolio.
***

Under the current Section 13(d) stake disclosure regime, concerns about
creeping control from wolf pack behavior are not irrational. In much of the
world, the deﬁnitions of when an investor or group of investors are considered
to have control are triggered at lower levels than is the case in U.S. corporate
law. In the European Union, it is common for any group of concerted investors
who acquire 30% of shares to be required to make a mandatory offer to all other stockholders to buy their shares.300 The emergence of a bloc of stockholders
who can deter other bidders and inﬂuence corporate management poses risks
for other stockholders. Institutional investors have long salivated for sell-side
premiums. Thus, they should understand why it is useful to ensure that control is not bought on the cheap, leaving ordinary investors without a takeover
premium and potentially subject to a riskier business plan. Especially in a
world where classiﬁed boards are increasingly rare,301 institutional investors
should rethink their traditional hostility to poison pills. A standard poison pill
used by a declassiﬁed board can do human investors more help than harm by
preventing a creeping takeover where an activist or wolf pack acquires effective
negative control over a corporation without paying a control premium. An innovative reﬁnement to the standard pill comes from Professors Coffee and Pa299.

See Fleischer, supra note 78 and accompanying text.
300. See Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on
Takeover Bids, 2002 O.J. (L 142) 12 (stating that the “mandatory bid rule” requires stockholders crossing certain ownership thresholds set by individual European countries to make
a bid for all of the company’s shares); Report on the Implementation of the Directive on Takeover
Bids, COMMISSION EUR. COMMUNITIES 13-14 (2007), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_mar
ket/company/docs/takeoverbids/2007-02-report_en.pdf
[http://perma.cc/FH36-L4NL]
(summarizing ownership thresholds adopted in different jurisdictions with 30% being the
most common threshold in major economies, such as Belgium, Germany, France, Ireland,
Luxembourg, Spain, and the U.K.).
301. 2015 Spencer Stuart Board Index, supra note 185, at 12 (noting that 92% of directors are currently elected on an annual basis, compared to 51% in 2005).
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lia, who have proposed a “window closing” pill structured to force activists to
disclose their stakes before the end of the Schedule 13D ten-day period.302
***

But the most important changes suggested in this Feature are not within
the hedge fund industry itself. Rather, human investors would see great beneﬁt
from reforms encouraging the agents responsible for their money to adopt the
long-term horizon held by their principals, i.e., human investors.
First, recognizing that mutual funds and other institutional investors face
irrational incentives to compete on short-term metrics rather than areas aligned
with the interests of human investors is vital. Demonizing fund managers is
unfair when they face cost-free fund hopping from their investors and equity
investors get credit for holding an asset long-term if they can eke out a year.
Adoption of a sensible fractional trading tax on all securities transactions, including transactions by 401(k) investors, and capital gains reform to make eligibility for a long-term rate dependent on long-term investment would help
fund managers focus more on long-term returns.303 Not only that, Pigouvian
taxes like these discourage speculation, including in derivatives, thus reducing
systemic risks and the need for more complex forms of regulation. And they
would also raise world government revenues to invest in infrastructure; basic
research to address critical issues, such as climate change; and human capital to
give workers the skills needed to compete in more technologically advanced societies, thereby fueling long-term economic growth.
At the same time, corporate managers are often hostage—or at least feel
hostage—to the metrics they are required to report in securities disclosures,
and to which fund managers and stock analysts look when considering if they
will invest in or recommend the stock. An interesting proposal has been made
to give corporations greater market credit for a type of investment that human
investors should care deeply about—investment in human capital, such as job
training.304 Unlike research and development spending, which is typically disclosed as a separate line-item on a company’s income statement, expenditures
302.

Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 602. The pill would be triggered if an activist crossed the 5%
threshold and did not ﬁle a Schedule 13D immediately. Id.
303. Others have proposed tax law reforms that might have the effect of inducing activist funds
to increase their holding periods and “deter the ‘hit-and-run’ activist.” Id. at 594-95.
304. See Angela Hanks et al., Workers or Waste? How Companies Disclose—Or Do Not Disclose—
Human Capital Investments and What To Do About It, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS
(June 2016), http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/03042031
/HumanCapital.pdf [http://perma.cc/S85Q-KZD4].
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on human capital are lumped in the Sales, General, and Administration
(“SG&A”) expense line.305 SG&A is also home to the kinds of general overhead
expenses that investors, activist or otherwise, like to see kept to a minimum,
and so this disclosure regime creates an incentive for corporate managers to cut
back on the all-important investment in human capital.306 Commentators concerned that activist campaigns will put even more pressure on human capital
investments have thus urged that the SEC require disclosure of several variables related to human capital investment, including, most importantly, disclosing the total amount spent on worker skills training.307 There are perhaps other
changes to public company disclosure that would similarly help align the metrics corporate managers are measured against to the interests of human investors.
The index and mutual funds that are primarily responsible for human investors’ money should vote with their investors’ needs in mind. This is a relatively simple proposition to state but, as discussed elsewhere in this Feature, it
gets lost in practice. Index funds should be required to use voting policies and
recommendations tailored to the reality that they have only voice, not exit options. Human index investors do not beneﬁt from bubbles or corporategovernance fads. Thus, index funds should be required to think independently
and vote in a way that reﬂects an informed judgment about what is best for
their investors over the long haul—not just what the fund family proxy unit or,
even worse, a proxy advisor has generically instructed it to do. To that end, index funds should be precluded from relying on proxy advisory ﬁrms that do
not provide guidance tailored to index funds’ unique buy-and-hold perspective. Admittedly, there are promising developments in this ﬁeld. A prominent
investment manager, Blackrock, has voiced the need for and utility of index
funds more assertively voting their stuck-in, long-term perspective.308 And,
some important money managers have signed on to a paper arguing for a “new
paradigm,” which contains a call for money managers to adopt a set of shared

305.

Id. at 9.
306. Id. at 10-11.
307. Id. at 14.
308. See, e.g., John Authers, Passive Investors Are Good Corporate Stewards, FIN. TIMES (Jan.
19, 2016), http://www.ft.com/content/c4e7a4f6-be8a-11e5-846f-79b0e3d20eaf [http://
perma.cc/6BCG-7U6Y] (reporting on Blackrock CEO Larry Fink’s comment that “[index
funds] can’t sell those stocks even if they are terrible companies. As an indexer, our only action is our voice and so we are taking a more active dialogue with our companies and are
imposing more of what we think is correct”).
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principles predicated on the goal of “economic growth that beneﬁts shareholders, employees and the economy as a whole.”309
Both index funds and mutual funds should also take a fresh look at their
policies and how the policies ﬁt with the long-term growth conducive to human investors’ needs. Any fund that accepts 401(k) or college savings money
should be required to have voting policies speciﬁcally tailored to the long-term
purposes of those investments.310 At a minimum, increased disclosure demonstrating, as a practical matter, how much a given fund deviated from off-theshelf voting procedures would help investors gauge if a fund advertising itself
as socially responsible or for the long-term actually behaved that way.
Implicit in these proposals that essentially urge more thoughtful voting behavior is a need for votes only on those matters requiring thought. Rolling back
the federal mandate that essentially requires institutional investors to vote on
every measure before them would be one way to begin to achieve this end.311

309.

Tim Armour et al., Commonsense Corporate Governance Principles, COMMONSENSE CORP.
GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES, http://www.governanceprinciples.org [http://perma.cc/YWN6
-48PR] (emphasis added); see also Tim Armour et al., Commonsense Principles of Corporate
Governance, COMMONSENSE CORP. GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES (July 2016) http://www.gov
ernanceprinciples.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/GovernancePrinciples_Principles.pdf
[http://perma.cc/D6VJ-7W97] (further elaborating on the governance principles). The
open letter adopting this goal has been signed by money managers including Blackrock,
Capital Group, J.P. Morgan Asset Management, State Street Global Advisors, T.Rowe Price,
and Vanguard. Tim Armour et al., Open Letter: Commonsense Principles of Corporate Governance, COMMONSENSE CORP. GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES (July 2016), http://www.governance
principles.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Governance_Principles_Open_Letter.pdf
[http://perma.cc/949R-DYNT]. Notably, the Canadian Pension Plan Investment Board and
activist investor ValueAct Capital have also signed on. Id. The open letter calls for corporate
governance principles, including encouraging a long-term focus similar to that of owners of
a private company. Commonsense Principles of Corporate Governance, supra, at 4. It also calls
for money managers to devote sufficient efforts to voting with an eye toward “long-term
value creation,” id. at 8, as well as toward “senior-level oversight” for proxy vote decisions,
id. at 9. But it is worth noting that even this document does not call for differentiated index
fund voting.
310. This idea has been given a high-level gloss by the Group of Twenty and by the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development. See generally G20/OECD High-Level Principles
of Long-Term Investment Financing by Institutional Investors, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION
& DEV. (Sept. 2013), http://www.oecd.org/daf/ﬁn/private-pensions/G20-OECD-Principles
-LTI-Financing.pdf [http://perma.cc/49VT-YLZH].
311. See Letter from Alan D. Lebowitz, Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Dep’t of Labor, to Helmuth Fandl,
Chairman of the Ret. Bd, Avon Prods., Inc. at *2 (Feb. 23, 1988), 1988 WL 897696 (“In
general, the ﬁduciary act of managing plan assets which are shares of corporate stock would
include the voting of proxies appurtenant to those shares of stock.”); see also 29 C.F.R.
§ 2509.08-2 (2015) (“The ﬁduciary act of managing plan assets that are shares of corporate
stock includes the management of voting rights appurtenant to those shares of stock.”).

1966

who bleeds when the wolves bite?

As former SEC Commissioner Gallagher has argued, money managers have
approached voting with too much of a “compliance mindset” rather than a “ﬁduciary mindset,” and he at least partially attributes that shift to the SEC.312
Rule changes allowing institutional investors to make rational decisions about
what votes actually mattered to the investment objectives of their human principals, and focusing their limited resources on analyzing the optimal way to
vote would be useful.
As important, if proxy advisory ﬁrms are going to continue to be an important inﬂuence on the behavior of societally important institutions like money managers and public companies, they should be regulated in the public interest. Sensible requirements preventing investment funds from relying upon
proxy advisory ﬁrm recommendations unless those are tailored to the fund’s
investment style and horizon would create incentives for proxy advisory ﬁrms
to do better; and in particular, force them to develop voting recommendations
and policies tailored to index investors, who are uniquely long-term and committed to sustainable wealth creation. A bill in Congress was introduced313 and
action at the SEC has been suggested314 to address the responsibility of this industry, which only exists because of changes to federal laws, such as ERISA315
and the Investment Company Act,316 in recent decades mandating that institutional investors have voting policies.
As important, stockholder votes should only occur if the electorate can actually take them seriously and vote on an informed basis faithful to the investors’ interests. It comes with little grace to simultaneously argue that corpora312.

313.
314.

315.

316.

Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at Society of Corporate
Secretaries and Governance Professionals (July 11, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech
/Detail/Speech/1370539700301 [http://perma.cc/4FER-Q7MV]. Gallagher also identiﬁes
rulemaking by the SEC as inadvertently increasing money manager reliance on proxy advisory services. Id.; see also Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, 68 Fed. Reg. 6585 (2011)
(codiﬁed at 17 C.F.R. § 275).
Corporate Governance Reform and Transparency Act of 2016, H.R. 5311, 114th Cong. (2016)
(proposing requirements for proxy ﬁrms to register with the SEC).
Id. (requiring the SEC to conduct assessments of proxy advisory ﬁrms). But see Div. of Inv.
Mgmt. & Div. of Corp. Fin., Staff Legal Bulletin No. 20 (IM/CF), Proxy Voting: Proxy Voting
Responsibilities of Investment Advisers and Availability of Exemptions from the Proxy Rules for
Proxy Advisory Firms, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (June 30, 2014), http://www.sec
.gov/interps/legal/cfslb20.htm [http://perma.cc/LJG3-549F] (describing the SEC staff ’s
position that investment advisors should assess proxy advisory ﬁrms’ “capacity and competency to adequately analyze proxy issues”).
See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.08-2 (2015) (“The ﬁduciary act of managing plan assets that are shares
of corporate stock includes the management of voting rights appurtenant to those shares of
stock.”); see also Letter from Alan D. Lebowitz to Helmuth Fandl, supra note 311.
See supra note 158.
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tions should be inundated with thousands of votes on say-on-pay, 14a-8 proposals, and the like, and then argue that institutional investors cannot possibly
be expected to vote on a fund-speciﬁc basis because that costs too much. That
is inconsistent hypocrisy. Stockholder voting is only valuable if it is thoughtful
and helpful to holding corporations accountable for the creation of sustainable
wealth. Burdening corporations with constant referenda at the insistence of institutions that do not wish to invest in thinking about voting is a wasteful drag
on social welfare. If something is important to do, it should be done only when
it can be done well.
The current frantic cycle of say-on-pay votes in particular is not conducive
to thoughtful voting and could be made more rational on a systemic basis. The
initial legislative mandate for say-on-pay votes did not require that they be held
annually.317 Holding say-on-pay votes every third or fourth year would allow
investors to cast their votes more thoughtfully, both because they would have
fewer votes to focus on in a given year and because they would have an actual
management track record to assess. The incidence of costly 14a-8 proposals
could be reduced by sensible reform involving a required ﬁling fee, a higher
ownership threshold, and a stronger bar on resubmitting proposals that have
failed.318 Scholars have noted that as a practical reality, there is “no alternative
to stockholder democracy.”319 Taking that as true, they recognize, makes it even
more important that the system of so-called stockholder democracy works for
those whose capital is ultimately at stake, not just for the agents who control it.
The continuing creep toward direct stock market control of public corporations
is difficult to reconcile with any sensibly constructed system of accountability
toward human investors. Instead, what it maximizes is the disruptive power of
momentary coalitions of agent money managers, which may act at any time on
a corporation, rather than in a rationally ordered system of accountability focusing on sustainable and ethical wealth creation.
Perhaps fund managers would be more likely to think and invest in a manner more aligned with their investors’ long-time horizon if their compensation
was more tied to the performance of the funds they manage than to that of the
asset manager who employs them.320 Although, as with compensation for pub317.

15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(a)(1) (2012) (requiring that “[n]ot less frequently than once every 3 years”
a company “include a separate resolution subject to shareholder vote to approve the compensation of executives” in its proxy materials for a shareholder meeting).
318. Professor Romano has made useful suggestions for reform on this point. See Romano, supra
note 175, at 229-30 (arguing that rebalancing the cost-beneﬁt calculation for submitting proposals under Rule 14a-8 would encourage more thoughtful submissions).
319. Coffee & Palia, supra note 6, at 606.
320. See supra note 160 and accompanying text (discussing fund manager pay structures).
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lic company managers, this is a complex task, subjecting a material part of a
fund manager’s compensation to the same realities that, for example, 401(k) or
index investors face, should better align their interests. Moves in this direction
would also move in a complementary direction with the incentives that would
be created with tax reforms that priced the costs of fund-hopping and portfolio
turnover, and together help solid, buy-and-hold fund managers adhere to fundamentally more sensible strategies, without as much fear of losing funds under management because of short-term market sector bubbles or busts.
***

Finally, and consistent with these prior thoughts, human investors should
have investment options tailored to their long-term investment horizon. Although many of these other proposals would help sharpen money managers’
focus on the longer term, some investments are structurally better suited to the
patient money of a twenty-ﬁve-year-old starting to save for retirement. A
locked-in ten-year investment in a private equity fund of funds would arguably
be a more appropriate place for retirement investments the saver will not touch
for at least three decades, as compared to an actively traded mutual fund that
frequently turns over its holdings in search of benchmark-beating returns. Unfortunately, providing an option to allow for human-investor access to private
equity as part of the 401(k) portfolio requires overcoming numerous regulatory
barriers.321 But as between actually traded mutual funds and private equity, the
latter is clearly a more rational choice for human investors. For this to be feasible, however, the private equity industry must be assured that it can aggregate
pools of capital from ordinary investors for lengthy periods. It is an unwise paternalism to facilitate worker access to churning mutual funds, while denying
them the arguably most rational choice after index funds.
***

321.

Sponsors of self-directed plans, such as 401(k)’s, have a safe harbor from liability to plan
beneﬁciaries if the investment options available to beneﬁciaries are structured in certain
ways. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1) (2012). The safe harbor acts as a barrier to the development
of a private equity option because it is only available if the plan offers investments from
which participants can achieve liquidity on a relatively frequent basis. Id.; 29 C.F.R.
§ 2550.404c-1 (2016). Similarly, private equity-style funds might have to register under the
Investment Company Act of 1940 for ordinary investors to be permitted to invest in them. 15
U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(51) (2012).
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Most of all, however, it is time to ask whether we have lost our focus on
what is most important in the corporate governance debate. As this concentration on human investors reveals, it is the economy’s ability to create and sustain
good jobs that remains most important to most people. The current corporate
governance system, however, gives the most voice and the most power to those
whose perspectives and incentives are least aligned with that of ordinary American investors.
If empowering short-term investors turns out to be optimal for our society
and its human citizens, that seems like a very improbable and unsustainable
triumph of the law of unintended consequences. Call me old-fashioned, but it
would be more comforting to know that those with the power over the capital—equity, debt, and most important, labor—of ordinary Americans were duty-bound to align their thoughts and actions with those they supposedly represent. American optimism makes me have conﬁdence when we pull together
toward a common goal, but be consequently skeptical when the many are asked
to accept that what is good for the plutocrats is good for them.
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